scholarly journals CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?

2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan E. Brick ◽  
Oded Palmon ◽  
John K. Wald
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Director Compensation

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

Outside director compensation and firm performance

1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Hempel ◽  
Charles Fay
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Outside Director

CEO compensation, firm performance and operational characteristics

2008 ◽  
Vol 34 (8) ◽  
pp. 562-584 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud M. Nourayi ◽  
Frank P. Daroca
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Operational Characteristics

scholarly journals Family business, director compensation and board efficacy: the case of Taiwan

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-91
Author(s):  
Tsun-Jui Hsieh ◽  
Yu-Ju Chen
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Specific Pattern ◽  
Chinese Family ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Outside Director ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of outside directors on firm performance during legal transitions and examines how the roles of family business and director compensation influence board efficacy. By using Taiwanese listed companies as our sample, the empirical results show that outside directors who are appointed by legal mandate have less positive impacts on firm performance than outside directors appointed voluntarily. Family business weakens the positive impact of outside director on firm performance. The evidence further suggests that director compensation contributes to firm performance, particularly when outside directors are voluntarily appointed. The findings provide western managers with an understanding of how the typical Chinese family business affects board independence. We also demonstrate and incorporate the cultural and the ownership characteristics into the analysis to present a country-specific pattern that should be informative for foreign investors who are concerned about the quality of corporate governance in East Asia.

scholarly journals CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of ESG Transparency

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 278
Author(s):  
Chetna Rath ◽  
Florentina Kurniasari ◽  
Malabika Deo
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

Chief executive officers (CEOs) of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) firms are known to take lesser pay and engage themselves in corporate social responsibility activities to achieve the dual objective of the enhancement of firm’s performance as well as benefit for stakeholders in the long run. This study examines the role of ESG transparency in strengthening the impact of firm performance on total CEO pay in ESG firms. A panel of 67 firms for the period of 2014–2019 has been analyzed using the two-step system GMM model, with NSE Nifty 100 ESG Index as the data sample and ESG scores from Bloomberg database as a proxy for transparency. Findings reveal that environmental and governance disclosure scores have the potential to intensify the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, while social disclosure scores do not. In addition, various firm-specific, board-specific, and CEO-specific attributes have also been considered controls affecting remuneration. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of exhibiting ESG transparency and its nexus with CEO pay as well as firm performance.

CEO Compensation in Japan: Why So Different from the United States?

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 2261-2292
Author(s):  
Luyao Pan ◽  
Xianming Zhou
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
The United States ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay

In Mar. 2010, Japan’s financial regulator implemented the country’s first legislation concerning the disclosure of director compensation for named individuals. Using the first publicly available data for Japanese executives, we document direct evidence on the level, structure, and mechanisms of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in Japan and perform a matched-sample comparison between Japan and the United States. In contrast to the findings of recent studies showing that international differentials in CEO pay have largely disappeared since the mid-2000s, our results show strikingly large differences between the Japanese and American systems that are difficult to explain by differences in conventional incentive contracts.

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