Learning by (virtually) doing: Experimentation and belief updating in smallholder agriculture

2021 ◽  
Vol 189 ◽  
pp. 28-50
Author(s):  
Emilia Tjernström ◽  
Travis J. Lybbert ◽  
Rachel Frattarola Hernández ◽  
Juan Sebastian Correa
2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex O. Holcombe ◽  
Samuel J. Gershman

AbstractZwaan et al. and others discuss the importance of the inevitable differences between a replication experiment and the corresponding original experiment. But these discussions are not informed by a principled, quantitative framework for taking differences into account. Bayesian confirmation theory provides such a framework. It will not entirely solve the problem, but it will lead to new insights.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Tobias Kube ◽  
Lukas Kirchner ◽  
Thomas Gärtner ◽  
Julia Anna Glombiewski

Abstract Background In two experimental studies, we tested the hypothesis that negative mood would hinder the revision of negative beliefs in response to unexpectedly positive information in depression, whereas positive mood was expected to enhance belief updating. Methods In study 1 (N = 101), we used a subclinical sample to compare the film-based induction of sad v. happy mood with a distraction control group. Subsequently, participants underwent a well-established paradigm to examine intra-individual changes in performance-related expectations after unexpectedly positive performance feedback. In study 2, we applied the belief-updating task from study 1 to an inpatient sample (N = 81) and induced sad v. happy mood via film-clips v. recall of autobiographic events. Results The results of study 1 showed no significant group differences in belief updating; the severity of depressive symptoms was a negative predictor of belief revision, though, and there was a non-significant trend suggesting that the presence of sad mood hindered belief updating in the subgroup of participants with a diagnosed depressive episode. Study 2 revealed that participants updated their expectations significantly less in line with positive feedback when they underwent the induction of negative mood prior to feedback, relative to positive mood. Conclusions By indicating that the presence of negative mood can hinder the revision of negative beliefs in clinically depressed people, our findings suggest that learning from new experiences can be hampered if state negative mood is activated. Thus, interventions relying on learning from novel positive experiences should aim at reducing state negative mood in depression.


Author(s):  
Ziqing Yao ◽  
Xuanyi Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu

Abstract When people are confronted with feedback that counters their prior beliefs, they preferentially rely on desirable rather than undesirable feedback in belief updating, i.e. an optimism bias. In two pre-registered EEG studies employing an adverse life event probability estimation task, we investigated the neurocognitive processes that support the formation and the change of optimism biases in immediate and 24 h delayed tests. We found that optimistic belief updating biases not only emerged immediately but also became significantly larger after 24 h, suggesting an active role of valence-dependent offline consolidation processes in the change of optimism biases. Participants also showed optimistic memory biases: they were less accurate in remembering undesirable than desirable feedback probabilities, with inferior memories of undesirable feedback associated with lower belief updating in the delayed test. Examining event-related brain potentials (ERPs) revealed that desirability of feedback biased initial encoding: desirable feedback elicited larger P300s than undesirable feedback, with larger P300 amplitudes predicting both higher belief updating and memory accuracies. These results suggest that desirability of feedback could bias both online and offline memory-related processes such as encoding and consolidation, with both processes contributing to the formation and change of optimism biases.


Author(s):  
Praveen Suthaharan ◽  
Erin J. Reed ◽  
Pantelis Leptourgos ◽  
Joshua G. Kenney ◽  
Stefan Uddenberg ◽  
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2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Edi Karni ◽  
Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey ◽  
Marie-Louise Vierø

AbstractThis paper studies an environment in which a decision maker choosing between acts may initially be unaware of certain consequences. We follow the approach of Karni and Vierø (2013) to modeling increasing awareness, which allows for the decision maker's state space to expand as she becomes aware of new possible consequences. We generalize the main result in Karni and Vierø (2013) by allowing the discovery of new consequences to nullify some states that were non-null before the discovery. We also provide alternative assumptions which strengthen the predictions of the belief updating model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 1130-1141
Author(s):  
Anne-Sophie Käsbauer ◽  
Paola Mengotti ◽  
Gereon R. Fink ◽  
Simone Vossel

Although multiple studies characterized the resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) of the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), little is known about the link between rTPJ rsFC and cognitive functions. Given a putative involvement of rTPJ in both reorienting of attention and the updating of probabilistic beliefs, this study characterized the relationship between rsFC of rTPJ with dorsal and ventral attention systems and these two cognitive processes. Twenty-three healthy young participants performed a modified location-cueing paradigm with true and false prior information about the percentage of cue validity to assess belief updating and attentional reorienting. Resting-state fMRI was recorded before and after the task. Seed-based correlation analysis was employed, and correlations of each behavioral parameter with rsFC before the task, as well as with changes in rsFC after the task, were assessed in an ROI-based approach. Weaker rsFC between rTPJ and right intraparietal sulcus before the task was associated with relatively faster updating of the belief that the cue will be valid after false prior information. Moreover, relatively faster belief updating, as well as faster reorienting, were related to an increase in the interhemispheric rsFC between rTPJ and left TPJ after the task. These findings are in line with task-based connectivity studies on related attentional functions and extend results from stroke patients demonstrating the importance of interhemispheric parietal interactions for behavioral performance. The present results not only highlight the essential role of parietal rsFC for attentional functions but also suggest that cognitive processing during a task changes connectivity patterns in a performance-dependent manner.


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