Optimal Sales Mechanism with Outside Options

2021 ◽  
pp. 105279
Author(s):  
Dongkyu Chang
Keyword(s):  
1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paola Manzini ◽  
Marco Mariotti
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Roberts Cynthia ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

The chapter analyzes the prospects for continued BRICS collective financial statecraft. Contrary to initial expectations, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have hung together by identifying common aversions and pursuing common interests within the existing international order. Their future depends not only on their bargaining power, but also on their ability to overcome domestic impediments to the sustainable economic growth that provides the basis for their international positions. To continue successfully with collective financial statecraft, the members must tackle the so-called middle-income trap, as well as their preferences for informal rules originating from their own institutional weaknesses or regime preferences. This study shows that, in the context of a global power shift, the BRICS club has operated to protect the member countries’ respective policy autonomy, while also advancing their joint voice in global governance. Recently, the BRICS have made concrete institutional gains, giving them expanded outside options to achieve specific objectives in global finance.


2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin W Bahney ◽  
Radha K Iyengar ◽  
Patrick B Johnston ◽  
Danielle F Jung ◽  
Jacob N Shapiro ◽  
...  

Participating in insurgency is physically risky. Why do people do so? Using new data on 3,799 payments to insurgent fighters by Al Qa'ida Iraq, we find that: (i) wages were extremely low relative to outside options, even compared to unskilled labor; (ii) the estimated risk premium is negative; and (iii) the wage schedule favors equalization and provides additional compensation for larger families. These results challenge the notion that fighters are paid their marginal product, or the opportunity cost of their time. They may be consistent with a “lemons” model in which fighters signal commitment by accepting low wages.


2004 ◽  
Vol 06 (04) ◽  
pp. 525-554
Author(s):  
GREGORY K. DOW

This paper replaces the standard view of the firm as a nexus of contracts with a repeated game framework where input contributions and side payments are self-enforced. General production technologies and flexible transfers among team members are allowed. When an incentive constraint binds, input demand and output supply are influenced by the discount factor, the probability of exogenous team dissolution, and the aggregate value of outside options. When this incentive constraint does not bind, the firm maximizes profit in the usual way. I discuss examples involving the Cobb-Douglas technology, firms with a single residual claimant, and partnerships.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document