Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention: Implications for genetic testing policy

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 95-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Peter ◽  
Andreas Richter ◽  
Paul Thistle
2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. S53-S71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don S. Kenkel ◽  
Hua Wang

Abstract Personalized prevention uses family history and predictive genetic testing to identify people at high risk of serious diseases. The availability of predictive genetic tests is a newer and still-developing phenomenon. Many observers see tremendous potential for personalized prevention to improve public health. At the same time, the emergence of these new markets raises familiar health policy concerns about costs, cost-effectiveness, and health disparities. This paper first discusses an economic framework for the analysis of personalized prevention. On the demand side, consumers use personalized prevention as a form of information that allows them to make better choices about prevention, including medical care and health behaviors like diet and exercise. On the supply side, an interplay of complex market forces and regulations will determine the prices, advertising, and insurance coverage of predictive genetic tests. Beyond the question of whether health insurance will cover the costs of predictive genetic tests, there is a great deal of concern about whether consumers’ use of genetic tests might place them at risk of genetic discrimination or might lead to adverse selection. The paper also reports descriptive analysis of data from the 2000, 2005, and 2010 National Health Interview Surveys on the use of predictive genetic tests. The empirical analysis documents large socioeconomic status-related disparities in consumers having heard of genetic tests: for example, consumers with less schooling, Blacks, and Hispanics were substantially less likely to have heard of genetic tests. Evidence from other empirical studies provides little evidence that genetic testing leads to genetic discrimination in insurance markets. There is more evidence suggesting adverse selection, where genetic testing leads consumers to purchase long-term care insurance. The paper concludes with some preliminary thoughts about important directions for future research. The goal of the paper is to review relevant research to help develop an economic approach and social science research agenda into the determinants and consequences of genetic tests for prevention.


1999 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krupa Subramanian ◽  
Jean Lemaire ◽  
John C. Hershey ◽  
Mark V. Pauly ◽  
Katrina Armstrong ◽  
...  

1997 ◽  
Vol 352 (1357) ◽  
pp. 1063-1066 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. S. Harper

Life insurance is a key element of the UK social structure in terms of family protection and house purchase; it thus needs to be viewed in this broad context, rather that solely as a commercial activity. Insurers have not so far actively requested genetic tests for life insurance, but have insisted on knowing of and being able to act on existing genetic test information. The main reason given for this has been to avoid servious adverse selection; however, this has never been adequately estimated. Review of the different major categories of Medelian genetic disorders suggests that the scope for adverse selection is extremely limited and that insurers would lose little, and possibly gain more, by foregoing the disclosure and use of this information in relation to life insurance policies of ‘normal’ size and nature. The likely future use in service of genetic tests based on susceptibility or population screening makes it especially important that the issue is rapidly resolved for Menelian disorders; so far there is no sign that insurers are willing to achieve this.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. D. MacMinn ◽  
P. L. Brockett ◽  
J. A. Raeburn

ABSTRACTThe implications of genetic testing information availability for society, medicine, employment, and individual privacy rights have generated much political debate, legislation and academic research. Part of this debate centres on the ethical and economic considerations resultant from this expanded knowledge, particularly for insurance practices. Within insurance economics, the possibility of adverse selection has been debated and the potential for a ban on an insurer's use of genetic testing has been studied with respect to whether or not such a ban might actually result in insurance market failure due to this adverse selection. Studies have examined the issue using expected loss cost (actuarial or ‘fair’) pricing models, and have not considered either equilibrium (supply and demand) price setting as is present in markets, or the potentially swamping effect of background health care risks facing the insured, having nothing to do with any particular genetic mutation. Here we construct a supply and demand function with both high and low risk individuals in the presence of background health care cost risks, and derive an equilibrium price and market composition to determine whether, if genetic information is allowed for individuals, but this same information is not shared with insurers: (1) is market failure inevitable? (it is not if the background risk is sufficiently high relative to potential genetic risk costs); (2) will equilibrium prices result in all low risk insured exiting the market? (not in the presence of significant background risk); and (3) how much would prices increase and market sales decrease if insurers do not have the same genetic information as the insured? (prices will increase, but not necessarily very much in the presence of background risk, and not as much as that previously estimated in the insurance literature).


2007 ◽  
pp. 57-70
Author(s):  
Ken R. Smith ◽  
Cathleen D. Zick ◽  
Robert N. Mayer ◽  
Jeffrey R. Botkin

Author(s):  
Cathleen D. Zick ◽  
Ken R. Smith ◽  
Robert N. Mayer ◽  
Jeffery R. Botkin

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