scholarly journals The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017

2022 ◽  
Vol 206 ◽  
pp. 104559
Author(s):  
Yasmine Bekkouche ◽  
Julia Cagé ◽  
Edgard Dewitte
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-621
Author(s):  
Alenka Krašovec ◽  
Nemanja Batrićević

AbstractIn this article we identify the factors that contribute to the formation and especially the durability/stability of governments in both Slovenia and Montenegro after they formally introduced multiparty systems and following their democratic transition, with a focus on the effect of cleavages and party system characteristics generally. Although these two polities share several important similarities (small size, common institutional setting during Yugoslav era, aspirations for membership in international organisations etc.), the nature of governments’ durability/stability in the democratic era entails distinct differences. While Montenegro stands out in post-socialist Europe as the only case where the ruling party has not been overthrown, Slovenia has been led by many governments composed of different political parties. While it seems that in neither country are the ideological characteristics of the governments able to explain their duration/stability to any important extent, it is obvious that the cleavage structure in the two countries has varied, as has the importance of particular cleavages.


1989 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
MILDRED SCHLESINGER

A neglected aspect of parliamentary democracies that do not conform to the British model is the relation between executive and legislative leadership. In multiparty systems with strong legislative committees, committee chairmen constitute a governing coalition comparable to the cabinet. Given the coalitional nature of each leadership group, their partisan composition may not be identical; nor need they be equally stable. These are matters of importance for the operation of government. This article examines the relations between the two coalitions in the primordial parliamentary democracy, the French Third Republic. Using correlation analysis, I found a weak partisan relation between the two coalitions during the five legislatures of the interwar years. Using two measures of stability, durability and the continuity of coalitions beyond formal tenure, I found the legislative coalition always more stable. Institutional rules and the multiparty system helped account for these differences. Nevertheless, there was enough variation from legislature to legislature to show that electoral rules and results had an impact. Variations resembled those in the American republic. Periods of greater similarity in partisan composition coincided with greater effectiveness or stability for the executive; periods of divided control coincided with lesser executive stability. This was of consequence for the making of policy.


Author(s):  
Matthew A. Baum ◽  
Philip B. K. Potter

This chapter examines the validity of the “Downsian Premise,” which states that democratic multiparty systems tend to engender political coverage that is more diverse, more policy-centric, and more prone to challenge the government's policy line than coverage in two-party democracies. To test this proposition, the chapter conducts content analyses of international media coverage of four recent multinational conflicts (Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003, and Libya 2011). Newspapers in countries with more political parties offered relatively more policy-oriented news, more criticism of government policy, and more varied topical coverage than their counterparts in countries with fewer parties. These results lend credence to the Downsian Premise.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oana Fodor ◽  
Alina Fleștea ◽  
Iulian Onija ◽  
Petru Curșeu

Multiparty systems (MPSs) are defined as collaborative task-systems composed of various stakeholders (organizations or their representatives) that deal with complex issues that cannot be addressed by a single group or organization. Our study uses a behavioral simulation in which six stakeholder groups engage in interactions in order to reach a set of agreements with respect to complex educational policies. We use a social network perspective to explore the dynamics of network centrality during intergroup interactions in the simulation and show that trust self-enhancement at the onset of the simulation has a positive impact on the evolution of network centrality throughout the simulation. Our results have important implications for the social networks dynamics in MPSs and point towards the benefit of using social network analytics as exploration and/or facilitating tools in MPSs.


2014 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck ◽  
Julia Partheymüller

This article addresses two aspects of social network influence on voters’ electoral choices that are not well understood: the role of party systems as institutional contexts and the relationship between social pressure and information sharing as mechanisms of influence. It argues that in the cleavage-based multiparty systems of Western Europe, discussant influence at elections occurs in two stages. First, discussants place social pressure on voters to opt for parties from the same ideological camp. Secondly, by providing information, discussants influence which parties voters eventually choose out of these restricted ‘consideration sets’. The study tests these assumptions using a panel survey conducted at the 2009 German federal election. The first proposition is clearly confirmed, and the evidence supports the second proposition, although less unequivocally.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document