Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

2021 ◽  
pp. 102848
Author(s):  
Sarat Kumar Jena ◽  
Purushottam Meena
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Product Return

Reward-penalty mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain with sequential manufacturers' price competition

2017 ◽  
Vol 168 ◽  
pp. 118-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenbin Wang ◽  
Lingling Fan ◽  
Peng Ma ◽  
Peng Zhang ◽  
Zhenye Lu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

scholarly journals Complex Characteristics of Multichannel Household Appliance Supply Chain with the Price Competition

Complexity ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Wandong Lou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Domain Of Attraction ◽  
Bullwhip Effect ◽  
Price Adjustment ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Household Appliance ◽  
Internet Channel

This paper studies the complex characteristics caused by the price competition in multichannel household appliance supply chains. We consider a two-level household appliance supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer with an Internet channel and a retailer with a traditional channel and an Internet channel. Each channel’s price-setting follows the bounded rational decision process in order to obtain the optimal profit or more market share. Considering that the price competition often leads to the demand and order fluctuation, we also investigate the bullwhip effect of the multichannel supply chains on the basis of the order-up-to-inventory policy. From the numerical simulation, we find a system in a chaotic state will suffer larger bullwhip effect than a stable system, and the manufacturer’s Internet channel is helpful to mitigate the bullwhip effect. Our results provide some useful managerial inspirations for the household manufacturer and retailers. Firstly, each channel should make their retail price with a suitable price adjustment speed in the stable region, and each time pricing cannot exceed the domain of attraction. Secondly, the manufacturer can adopt a more radical pricing strategy in their Internet channel to mitigate the bullwhip effect. Thirdly, the price adjustment should be reviewed and be appropriately reduced if the price adjustment is too large.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doo Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Experiment ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Game Model ◽  
New Materials ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Equilibrium Prices

In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.

The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Returns Policies and Supply Chain Coordination

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gulay Samatli-Pac ◽  
Wenjing Shen ◽  
Xinxin Hu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Lower Price ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Product Return ◽  
Returns Policy ◽  
The Impact

Product return is a common after-sale service. Existing literature has assumed loss neutral consumers, while in practice consumers are often more sensitive to utility losses than gains, i.e., customers are often loss averse. In this paper, we study the impact of such loss aversion on the retailer's optimal pricing and returns policies. We analyze three scenarios where the seller offers no refund, full refund and partial refund for the returned products. Under each scenario, the seller determines the optimal price, quantity, and refund amount (under partial refund case) in order to maximize the expected profit. Our results demonstrate that consumer loss aversion leads a no-refund retailer to charge lower price and order smaller quantity, has no impact on a full-refund retailer, and results in a more lenient returns policy for a partial-refund retailer. We also find contracts that coordinate supply chains selling to loss averse consumers. Therefore, this article sheds some lights on how the management of returns policies should be adapted when consumers are loss averse.

scholarly journals Product bundling and advertising strategy for a duopoly supply chain: a power-balance perspective

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarat Kumar Jena ◽  
Abhijeet Ghadge
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Market Size ◽  
Power Balance ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Product Bundling ◽  
Advertising Strategy ◽  
Advertising Effort ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe paper studies product bundling in a duopoly supply chain network under the influence of different power-balance structures, bundling decisions and advertising efforts on total supply chain profit. Mathematical models comprising two manufacturers and a single retailer are developed to capture the impact of bundling policy and advertisement strategy under three power-balance structures, namely Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash. Following game theory models and numerical examples, the study found that the total profit of the supply chain is undifferentiated under the manufacturer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash case in the manufacturer bundling and retailer bundling strategies. However, total supply chain profit under manufacturer bundling strongly dominates under retailer bundling in Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash, and remains valid under multiple settings of market size, price elasticity and advertising elasticity. It is also found that manufacturer bundling is significantly affected by advertising effort compared to retailer bundling. The study contributes to the literature interfacing supply chain and marketing by studying bundling policy and advertising strategy simultaneously for homogenous products, under various power-balance structures and price competition.

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