Estimation of reactor protection system software failure probability considering undetected faults

2014 ◽  
Vol 280 ◽  
pp. 201-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Khalaquzzaman ◽  
Seung Jun Lee ◽  
Man Cheol Kim ◽  
Wondea Jung
Author(s):  
Masahiro Yamashita ◽  
Satoshi Miura ◽  
Mamoru Fukuda ◽  
Mitsumasa Hirano

The reliability analysis of the digital reactor protection system (RPS) is one of the essential parts in the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of the advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR). In this study, the reliability model and methodology were modified to evaluate the reliability of the digital RPS installed in the Japanese ABWR plant. The hardware failure rates in the foreign data source of digital components were applied, based on the similarity of the function of the digital components. The hardware failure rates of the digital components were estimated to range from 1.0E−5 (/hr) to 1.0E−7 (/hr), according to the types of the components. The software error events and their recovery factors in the design and fabrication stages were evaluated, considering the verification and validation process provided by the Japanese industry guideline on the digital reactor protection system. Then, the software failure probability of the programmable digital component was evaluated, utilizing the probability of software error events and their recovery factors. The software failure probability was estimated to be 3.3E−7 (/demand), which was about one order higher than that of our previous estimation. These models and results were applied to evaluate the reactor trip system (RTS) and the engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation system of the ABWR plant, both of which are the subsystems of the RPS. The unavailability of the digital RTS was estimated to be the mean value of 7.2E−06 (/demand). If both an alternate rod insertion (ARI) and a manual scram were considered, the unavailability was estimated to decrease to 1.6E−09. This value was nearly equal to the mean value of the previous study, 1.1E−09 (/demand), even though the quantification model and data were considerably modified, including the software failure probability. The system unavailability of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) was also evaluated in conjunction with the ESF actuation system, in order to investigate the effect of the model and data modification. The ECCS unavailability was estimated to be also nearly equal to the same values as the previous estimation, because the system unavailability was dominated by the unavailability of the mechanical components, such as pumps, valves, etc. The sensitivity analyses were conducted systematically, in order to evaluate the effect of the modeling uncertainty on the digital RTS unavailability. The results indicated that the unavailability of the digital RTS only changed within the range of factor 2, even though the various assumptions were used on the hardware and the software failure of the digital components.


Author(s):  
Jun Zhao ◽  
Xing Zhou ◽  
Jin Hu ◽  
Yanling Yu

The Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant phase 1 unit (QNPP-1) has a power rating of 320 MWe generated by a pressurized water reactor that was designed and constructed by China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The TELEPERM XS I&C system (TXS) is to be implemented to transform analog reactor protection system (RPS) in QNPP-1. The paper mainly describes the function, structure and characteristic of RPS in QNPP-1. It focuses on the outstanding features of digital I&C, such as strong online self-test capability, the degradation of the voting logic processing, interface improvements and CPU security. There are some typical failures during the operation of reactor protection system in QNPP-1. The way to analyze and process the failures is different from analog I&C. The paper summarizes typical failures of the digital RPS in the following types: CPU failure, communication failure, power failure, Input and output (IO) failure. It discusses the cause, risk and mainly processing points of typical failure, especially CPU and communication failures of the digital RPS. It is helpful for the maintenance of the system. The paper covers measures to improve the reliability of related components which has been put forward effective in Digital reactor protection system in QNPP-1. It will be valuable in nuclear community to improve the reliability of important components of nuclear power plants.


2007 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 319-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Hyung Yang ◽  
Soo Hyung Kim ◽  
Young Jong Chung ◽  
Sung Quun Zee

Author(s):  
Sun Na ◽  
Shi Gui-lian ◽  
Xie Yi-qin ◽  
Li Gang ◽  
Jiang Guo-jin

Communication independence is one of the key criteria of digital safety I&C system design. This paper mainly analyzes the requirements for communication independence in safety regulations and standards, and then introduces the architecture and design features, including communication failure processing measures, of communication networks of ACPR1000 nuclear power plant safety digital protection system based on FirmSys platform developed by CTEC. The communication design meets the regulations requirements and effectively improves the safety and reliability of the system, and it is successfully applied in reactor protection system (RPS) of Yang Jiang nuclear power plant unit 5&6. In addition this design can provide reference for communication designs of other NPPs and industries.


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