Inter-port price competition in a multi-port gateway region

Author(s):  
Gang Dong ◽  
Rongbing Huang
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael Boleslavsky ◽  
Christopher Cotton ◽  
Haresh B. Gurnani
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Jason Choi ◽  
Kinshuk Jerath ◽  
Miklos Sarvary

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paddy V. Padmanabhan ◽  
Ivan P. L. Png

Author(s):  
Peter Scott

The vacuum cleaner was an archetypal new economy product of the early twentieth century. It offered both major time savings and qualitative advantages over previous household cleaning methods—the brush, broom, and manual carpet sweeper—and was sold in a novel way (by household demonstration). The direct sales techniques pioneered by vacuum manufacturers in the United States were to have a profound impact on the way vacuums were sold in Britain, and globally. Yet by 1939 their household diffusion was relatively slow compared to refrigerators or washing machines. This chapter explores why the industry evolved a structure based on high prices, high cost distribution methods (door-to-door sales), and a strong emphasis on non-price competition, based on differentiation through features. It also shows how door-to-door selling eventually came to constitute both a key firm-level competitive advantage and a substantial industry-level constraint on product diffusion.


Author(s):  
A. Bërdëllima

AbstractWe study a variation of the duopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Firms limited by their capacity of production engage in a two stage game. In the first stage they commit to levels of production not exceeding their capacities which are then made common knowledge. In the second stage after production has taken place firms simultane- ously compete in prices. Solution of this sequential game shows that the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome as in Kreps and Scheinkman is not always guaranteed. However the Cournot outcome is still robust in the sense that given sufficiently large capacities this equilibrium holds. If capacities are sufficiently small, firms decide to produce at their full capacity and set a price which clears the market at the given level of output.


Author(s):  
In Kyung Kim

AbstractIn this article, I study the effect of entry and ownership structure on product variety within a city. Using longitudinal data on theaters in Korea, I find that the positive effect of entry on city-wide movie variety is limited only to the first few entrants. This finding, together with the observation that movie variety in a theater does not respond to entry, suggests that a theater's incentive to soften price competition by screening less popular movies not otherwise available in the city decreases as more theaters enter. I also find evidence that movie variety is greater in more concentrated cities, implying that a chain that owns multiple theaters in a city may differentiate the movie lineup offered in each theater more than when the theaters are individually owned in order to avoid cannibalization or to preempt entry.


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