Enhancing supply chain decisions with consumers’ behavioral factors: An illustration of decoy effect

Author(s):  
Feng Li ◽  
Timon C. Du ◽  
Ying Wei
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tetiana Kolodizieva

The article explores theoretical and methodical aspects of managing dual relationships that arise between participants in logistic cooperation in the process of formation and functioning of supply chains. The use of a behavioral approach to defining supply chains has allowed identifying and justifying the priority role of behavioral factors that influence modern logistics entities and determine the effectiveness and long-term satisfaction with logistics cooperation. Given the literature summary, the study has classified types of cooperation in logistic activity and proved that among the behavioral factors influencing the of logistical cooperation efficiency, the trust is of particular importance, which remains a limitation, a bottleneck in the process of formation and development of dual relationships in logistics chains. It is proposed to introduce a generic indicator, namely the level of confidence in the supply chain to assess the social, economic and strategic aspects of logistics interaction. A methodological approach to assessing the level of trust in logistic cooperation was adjusted based on determining the composition of criteria that directly affect this indicator and using the expert survey of supply chain participants. The study proposes to use the confidence indicator to form and improve networks and supply chains, taking into account its value when constructing a generalized outsourcing model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 158 ◽  
pp. 104818 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anil Kumar ◽  
Md. Abdul Moktadir ◽  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan ◽  
Jose Arturo Garza-Reyes ◽  
Mrinal Tyagi ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Jianhong He ◽  
Lei Zhang ◽  
Xiao Fu ◽  
Fu-Sheng Tsai

We argue that a Nash bargaining model with behavioral factors (i.e., fairness concern and risk aversion) should be introduced to the price strategizing process in the context of a closed-loop supply chain. We consider three different pricing models: The first is when both the manufacturer and the retailer have fairness concerns; the second is when both the manufacturer and the retailer have risk aversion; and the final is when the manufacturer has risk aversion but the retailer has both risk aversion and fairness concern. Then we examine the model with game theory. The results have shown that fairness and risk aversion change the optimal pricing strategy, which affects the expected profits of retailers and manufacturers. The impacts of two (relatively irrational) behavioral factors on the wholesale and retail prices of new products, the recycle price and recycle transfer price of the waste products, are not the same. For new products, the wholesale price is most affected by behavioral factors and the sales price scores second. For waste recycling products, the transfer price is most affected by behavioral factors and the recycle price scores second. When considering fairness and risk aversion in retail, fairness concern is good for both manufacturers and retailers. This innovative pricing strategy model adds implications for sustainability in supply chain operations.


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