State-Led Land Reform and Local Institutional Change: Land Titles, Land Markets and Tenure Security in Mexican Communities

2009 ◽  
Vol 37 (8) ◽  
pp. 1390-1399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuelle Bouquet
Author(s):  
Hazel Gray

This chapter explores the role of the political settlement in shaping outcomes of land investments by analysing struggles in key sectors of the economy. Land reform during the socialist period had far-reaching implications for the political settlement. Reforms to land rights under liberalization involved strengthening land markets; however, the state continued to play a significant role. Corruption within formal land management systems became prevalent during the period of high growth. Vietnam experienced a rapid growth in export agriculture but, in contrast with stable property rights for smallholders, Tanzania’s efforts to encourage large land investments were less successful. Industrialization in both countries generated new forms of land struggles that were influenced by the different distributions of power between the state, existing landowners, and investors.


Socialization was a hallmark of China’s economic strategy from the early 1950s onward, and the collective organization of agriculture was a defining characteristic of China’s rural economy under Mao Zedong. The strong organizational emphasis of farm policy reflected a belief that institutional change was the main determinant of agricultural growth. By 1953, land reform had fundamentally changed the balance of political power, as well as the profile of land ownership, land use, and farm management, in the countryside. However, it had not advanced the cause of socialization. It was, in fact, always the government’s intent that land reform would be merely the first step in a series of institutional changes eventually leading to a fully socialist collective agriculture, to be completed by 1967. The process would take place gradually and in stages, with farmers initially engaging in what were called “lower-level (semisocialist) agricultural-producer cooperatives” until the demonstrated benefits of cooperation encouraged them to voluntarily join fully socialist (“higher-level”) collectives. The underlying economic rationale was that collectivization would bring agriculture more firmly within the remit of planning and strengthen government control over grain, while the larger scale of farming and the mobilizational capacity of the collectives would enhance agricultural efficiency and generate sustained output growth. But thanks to the overwhelming response to Mao’s call for accelerated collectivization (31 July 1955), the original timetable was abandoned, and coercion was increasingly used to force peasants—including those with minimal or nonexistent experience of lower-level cooperatives—into fully socialist collectives. A mere two years later, under a more indigenous strategy of development (the “Great Leap Forward”), another massive institutional upheaval took place, as peasants were incorporated into a new and huge organizational unit (the rural people’s commune), whose remit extended to political as well as economic management. Following the human and economic catastrophe precipitated by the Great Leap, there was a temporary institutional retreat. But the imperative of collective farming soon reemerged and remained intact until decollectivization in the early 1980s. These events have generated a rich literature, much of it written before the post-1978 explosion of data and other materials from China. That so many of these early studies still merit careful reading is testament to the remarkable dedication of authors (e.g., Kenneth Walker, Nicholas Lardy, Chao Kuo-chün) who spent years locating and then immersing themselves in Chinese-language books, journals, and newspapers to an extent that seems inconceivable in the 2020s. Economic issues define the major themes of the literature (e.g., the rationale of institutional change, its impact on yields and output growth, the role of state procurement policies, the implications for urban and rural food consumption). But it has also embraced political-economy dimensions of China’s rural institutional framework, a notable example being Jean Oi’s pathbreaking 1989 study.


2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Gersbach ◽  
Lars-H. R. Siemers

We examine the nexus between land transfers and human capital formation. A sequence of land redistributions enables the beneficiaries to educate their children and thus to escape from poverty. A successful land reform allows the transition of a society from an agriculture-based state of poverty to a human capital–based developed economy. We find that a temporary state of inequality among the poor is unavoidable. Finally, we discuss the political economy of land reform, whether access to land markets should be allowed for beneficiaries of land reforms, and property rights issues.


Author(s):  
William D. Ferguson

Development requires institutional change. This chapter suggests a ray of hope. Policy innovations, according to hypothesis 5, can enhance capacities for resolving CAPs, relaxing political impediments to development—notably, CAPs from hypotheses 3 and 4. South Korea’s 1950s land reform policy established foundations for subsequent development. Innovations, however, emerge and spread within political contexts; institutional change presents formidable CAPs. Distinct individual as opposed to organizational capacities for information processing, combined with asymmetric distributions of power, typically generate relatively long periods of institutional and policy stability that occasionally succumb to rapid change: punctuated equilibria. Within such contexts, coalitions vie for influence, using policy narratives and images (mini ideologies) to legitimate their influence and discredit opponents.


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