Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game

2005 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kang-Oh Yi
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Equilibrium Models ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining Game

Dynamics and Learning

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Least Squares ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Learning Models ◽  
Equilibrium Models ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Learning Rules ◽  
Processing Information ◽  
Quantal Responses ◽  
Least Squares Learning

This chapter explores questions related to learning and dynamics. The first part explores dynamic quantal response equilibrium models where strategies are conditioned on observed histories of past decisions and outcomes of stage games. The second part considers models in which players are learning about others' behavior via a process in which they may update and respond to current beliefs in a noisy (quantal) manner. The final section explores learning models that involve quantal responses to beliefs formed by processing information from finite (but possibly long) histories of prior or observed action profiles. The formulation permits consideration of a wide variety of exogenous or even endogenous (e.g., least squares) learning rules.

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