Social Welfare and Individual Preferences under Uncertainty: A Questionnaire-Experimental Approach

2007 ◽  
pp. 345-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Amiel ◽  
Frank Cowell
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Individual Preferences

Symposium on Amartya Sen's philosophy: 2 Unstrapping the straitjacket of ‘preference’: a comment on Amartya Sen's contributions to philosophy and economics

2001 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Individual Behavior ◽  
Microeconomic Theory ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Individual Welfare ◽  
Philosophy And Economics

The concept of preference dominates economic theory today. It performs a triple duty for economists, grounding their theories of individual behavior, welfare, and rationality. Microeconomic theory assumes that individuals act so as to maximize their utility – that is, to maximize the degree to which their preferences are satisfied. Welfare economics defines individual welfare in terms of preference satisfaction or utility, and social welfare as a function of individual preferences. Finally, economists assume that the rational act is the act that maximally satisfies an individual's preferences. The habit of framing problems in terms of the concept of preference is now so entrenched that economists rarely entertain alternatives.

Measuring Well-Being

2019 ◽  
pp. 41-82
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Adler
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Equivalent Income ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Good Account ◽  
The Social ◽  
Income Measure

This chapter discusses the well-being measure: a key component of the social welfare function (SWF) framework. This measure, w(·), assigns well-being numbers to individuals in outcomes so as to reflect admissible well-being comparisons (of well-being levels and/or well-being differences). In order for the SWF framework to function, these admissible comparisons must include interpersonal as well as intrapersonal comparisons; the chapter explains why. It then shows how von Neumann/Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions can be used to construct an interpersonally comparable well-being measure that respects individual preferences. A different preference-based well-being measure, the equivalent-income measure, is also reviewed. Although the preference view of well-being is dominant in the SWF literature, w(·) may instead be based upon a non-preference view of well-being, such as an hedonic or objective-good account. The chapter concludes by considering why some economists have been skeptical about interpersonal comparisons.

Distributive Justice for Behavioural Welfare Economics

2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (628) ◽  
pp. 1114-1134
Author(s):  
Michael Mandler
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Pareto Optima ◽  
Individual Preferences

Abstract The incompleteness of behavioural preferences can lead many or even all allocations to qualify as Pareto optimal. But the incompleteness does not undercut the precision of utilitarian policy recommendations. Utilitarian methods can be applied to groups of goods or to the multiple social welfare functions that arise when individual preferences are incomplete, and policymakers do not need to provide the preference comparisons that individuals are unable to make for themselves. The utilitarian orderings that result, although also incomplete, can generate a unique optimum. Non-separabilities in consumption reduce this precision but in all cases the dimension of the utilitarian optima drops substantially relative to the Pareto optima.

scholarly journals Using Social Choice Function Vs. Social Welfare Function To Aggregate Individual Preferences In Group Decision Support Systems

2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 167
Author(s):  
Dat-Dao Nguyen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Support ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Group Decision Support ◽  
Group Decision Support Systems ◽  
Group Decision Support System ◽  
Group Preference ◽  
Individual Preferences

In multi-criteria decision making, any Group Decision Support System (GDSS) requires a social judgment model for calculation of weights on decision alternatives, and tabulation of individual votes toward a consensus. One could assess a Social Welfare Function - such as Keeneys - to aggregate individual cardinal preferences or utilities into a group preference. Alternatively, one could use Social Choice Functions - such as Condorcet, Borda, Copeland, and Eigenvector - to aggregate individual ordinal preferences or rankings into a group ranking. This study empirically investigates the consensus between individual preferences and the group preference derived from various aggregation methods.

scholarly journals Toward a theory of ecosystem well-being

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Fleurbaey ◽  
Christy Leppanen
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Welfare Analysis ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Multiple Species

AbstractCan the main methods of social welfare analysis be extended to cover multiple species? Following a non-anthropocentric approach, we examine the pros and cons of various objective and subjective methods of well-being comparisons across species. We argue against normalizing by specific capacities but in favor of taking account of individual preferences and specializations. While many conceptual and practical difficulties remain, it appears possible to develop methods for the assessment of collective well-being of multi-species communities and ecosystems.

scholarly journals Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Takaaki Abe ◽  
Yukihiko Funaki ◽  
Taro Shinoda
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Sequential Mechanism ◽  
Social Surplus

This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects’ decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor’s choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the sequential mechanism induces higher social surplus than the simultaneous mechanism. Second, most subjects make choices consistent with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential setting and choose the dominant strategy in the simultaneous setting, when a dominant strategy exists. Finally, when the subjects need to look further ahead to make a theoretically rational choice, they are more likely to fail to choose rationally.

Social Welfare Functions

2019 ◽  
pp. 123-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Adler
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Cost Effectiveness ◽  
Probability Distribution ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
The Social

The social welfare function (SWF) framework is a core methodology of welfare economics. This chapter describes the approach, discusses its application to health priority-setting, and illustrates this application with a concrete example. The SWF framework conceptualizes any given policy as a probability distribution over outcomes, with each outcome in turn a pattern of well-being among the population of concern. The well-being measure can be derived from utility functions representing individual preferences with respect to the attributes that determine well-being (e.g., health, longevity, income). Different rules for ranking well-being patterns are possible, including both “utilitarian” and “prioritarian” rules. Unlike cost-effectiveness analysis, the SWF framework is sensitive to the way in which a given individual’s income, health, and longevity interact to determine her lifetime well-being. Unlike cost-benefit analysis, the utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs take account of the declining marginal utility of income. Health scholars’ traditional concerns about considering income in allocating health care are mitigated by this feature of both SWFs and, even more so, by the extra concern for the well-being of the worse off that is characteristic of prioritarianism.

Experimental Determination of the Effective Resolution Limit in Thick Specimens at High Voltages

1975 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 664-665
Author(s):  
Mircea Fotino
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Chromatic Aberration ◽  
Resolving Power ◽  
Biological Research ◽  
Specimen Thickness ◽  
Resolution Limit ◽  
High Voltage Electron Microscopy ◽  
Voltage Electron ◽  
Resolution Level

The use of thick specimens (0.5 μm to 5.0 μm or more) is one of the most resourceful applications of high-voltage electron microscopy in biological research. However, the energy loss experienced by the electron beam in the specimen results in chromatic aberration and thus in a deterioration of the effective resolving power. This sets a limit to the maximum usable specimen thickness when investigating structures requiring a certain resolution level.An experimental approach is here described in which the deterioration of the resolving power as a function of specimen thickness is determined. In a manner similar to the Rayleigh criterion in which two image points are considered resolved at the resolution limit when their profiles overlap such that the minimum of one coincides with the maximum of the other, the resolution attainable in thick sections can be measured by the distance from minimum to maximum (or, equivalently, from 10% to 90% maximum) of the broadened profile of a well-defined step-like object placed on the specimen.

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