scholarly journals Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Takaaki Abe ◽  
Yukihiko Funaki ◽  
Taro Shinoda

This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects’ decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor’s choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the sequential mechanism induces higher social surplus than the simultaneous mechanism. Second, most subjects make choices consistent with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential setting and choose the dominant strategy in the simultaneous setting, when a dominant strategy exists. Finally, when the subjects need to look further ahead to make a theoretically rational choice, they are more likely to fail to choose rationally.

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1778-1803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven T Anderson ◽  
Daniel Friedman ◽  
Ryan Oprea

Several impatient investors with private costs Ci face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-Ci. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Brownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost. (JEL C73, D44, D82, G31)


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 1250004 ◽  
Author(s):  
CAMELIA BEJAN ◽  
JUAN CAMILO GÓMEZ

This work uses the defining principles of the core solution concept to determine not only payoffs but also coalition formation. Given a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game, we propose two noncooperative procedures that in equilibrium deliver a natural and nonempty core extension, the aspiration core, together with the supporting coalitions it implies. As expected, if the cooperative game is balanced, the grand coalition forms. However, if the core is empty, other coalitions arise. Following the aspiration literature, not only partitions but also overlapping coalition configurations are allowed. Our procedures interpret this fact in different ways. The first game allows players to participate with a fraction of their time in more than one coalition, while the second assigns probabilities to the formation of potentially overlapping coalitions. We use the strong Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concepts.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Hsuan LIN

This study examines the relationship between individual altruistic attitudes and the incentives of participating in a climate coalition by using a laboratory experiment. A dominant strategy solution design categorizes players into two roles in the game: critical and non-critical players. The critical players have a weakly dominant strategy of joining and are essential to an effective coalition. On the other hand, the non-critical players have a dominant strategy of not-joining. The theory suggests that strong altruism would lead non-critical players to join a coalition. The experimental evidence shows that coalitions could be enlarged from the self-interest prediction. However, the result indicates that the individual incentives for participation seem to be negatively correlated with altruistic attitudes. The stronger the altruistic tendencies the less likely individuals are to join a coalition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillem Roig

Abstract When consumers have preference costs, two opposing effects need to be assessed to analyse the incentives of firms to set collusive prices. On the one hand, preference costs make a deviation from collusion less attractive, as the deviating firm must offer a large enough discount to cover the preference costs. On the other hand, preference costs lock in consumers and make punishment from rivals less effective. When preference costs are low, the latter of the two effects dominates and collusion is more challenging to sustain than in a situation with no preference costs. With high enough preference costs, collusion is a (weakly) dominant strategy. These results do not eventuate in a model with switching costs.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-275
Author(s):  
Andrew W. Bausch

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine how different rules for re-selecting the leader of a group affects how that leader builds a winning coalition. Leaders play an inter-group game and then distribute winnings from that game within their group before standing for re-selection. The results of the experiment show that leaders of groups with large winning coalition systems rely heavily on distributing winnings through public goods, while leaders of groups with small winning coalition systems are more likely to target specific citizens with private goods. Furthermore, the experiment shows that supporters of small coalition leaders benefit from that support in future rounds by receiving more private goods than citizens that did not support the leader. Meanwhile, citizens that support a large coalition leader do not benefit from this support in future rounds. Therefore, small coalition leaders target individual citizens to maintain a coalition over time in a way not possible in a group with a large winning coalition. Finally, in the experiment, small coalition leaders increased their payoffs over time, suggesting that once power has been consolidated, small coalition leaders narrow their coalition.


Author(s):  
Valerii P. Trykov ◽  

The article examines the conceptual foundations and scientific, sociocultural and philosophical prerequisites of imagology, the field of interdisciplinary research in humanitaristics, the subject of which is the image of the “Other” (foreign country, people, culture, etc.). It is shown that the imagology appeared as a response to the crisis of comparatives of the mid-20th century, with a special role in the formation of its methodology played by the German comparatist scientist H. Dyserinck and his Aachen School. The article analyzes the influence on the formation of the imagology of post-structuralist and constructivist ideological-thematic complex (auto-reference of language, discursive history, construction of social reality, etc.), linguistic and cultural turn in the West in the 1960s. Shown is that, extrapolated to national issues, this set of ideas and approaches has led to a transition from the essentialist concept of the nation to the concept of a nation as an “imaginary community” or an intellectual construct. A fundamental difference in approaches to the study of an image of the “Other” in traditional comparativism and imagology, which arises from a different understanding of the nation, has been distinguished. It is concluded that the imagology studies the image of the “Other” primarily in its manipulative, socio-ideological function, i.e., as an important tool for the formation and transformation of national and cultural identity. The article identifies ideological, socio-political factors that prepared the birth of the imagology and ensured its development in western Humanities (fear of possible recurrences of extreme nationalism and fascism in post-war Europe, the EU project, which set the task of forming a pan-European identity). It is concluded that the imagology, on the one hand, has actualized an important field of scientific research — the study of the image of the “Other”, but, on the other hand, in the broader cultural and historical perspective, marked a departure not only from the traditions of comparativism and historical poetics, but also from the humanist tradition of the European culture, becoming part of a manipulative dominant strategy in the West. To the culture of “incorporation” into a “foreign word” in order to understand it, preserve it and to ensure a genuine dialogue of cultures, the imagology has contrasted the social engineering and the technology of active “designing” a new identity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. e1008217
Author(s):  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Seung Ki Baek

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3.


2022 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Penelope Theologi-Gouti ◽  
Ioannis Iliopoulos ◽  
Maria Kokkaliari

This paper describes a study case of the Science and Technology Museum “Pedagogical Competence Programme” for students of the Department of Geology. It highlights an experimental approach of the museum for designing museum educational programmes with students. The museum succeeded from one side to develop a new program to offer to schools using participatory design and from the other to offer university students pedagogical experience through innovative, non-formal educational programmes, new ways to approach school students at all levels, cultivate their special skills, and enhance their knowledge, in order to familiarise them with the popularisation of science.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Künzer ◽  
Robert Zinke ◽  
Gesine Hofinger

Abstract Guidance to emergency exits play an important role for safe evacuation. Dynamic route guidance by colored flashing lights and strobe lights at emergency exits has been tested [1–3], but the effects of dynamic lights to support route choices need to be determined in more detail. Also, the guidance effects of different colors need to be examined and the reaction of various groups of evacuees. The paper analyzes the effects of red and green running lights on route choice in subway stations comparing adults and older children (10 to 12 years old). Data was gathered in a laboratory experiment, focusing on the concept of affordance [4, 5]. Participants were asked to make a decision about the safest direction between two alternative directions. Their choice was either unsupported or supported by red or green running lights. In general, an interaction between color and direction of the running light was found. Green running lights influenced route choices of both participant groups and led participants clearly into the direction indicated by the lights. Red running lights influenced route choices of both participant groups, but red lights lead to ambiguous decisions. Architectural elements such as stairs influenced route choices of both participant groups (functional affordance). But green running light offered a stronger indication to a safe route (cognitive affordance) than a visible staircase (functional affordance). Green lights even led participants to modify their route preference. In contrast, red running lights had an aversive effect: older children chose against the lights and preferred the other direction than the red lights were directing to. Implications for design of dynamic route guidance are discussed. This includes colored running lights to lead evacuees to a safe exit and to implement the influence of running lights on route choice and movement in simulations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 66-85
Author(s):  
Matteo Greco

Function words are commonly considered to be a small and closed class of words in which each element is associated with a specific and fixed logical meaning. Unfortunately, this is not always true as witnessed by negation: on the one hand, negation does reverse the truth-value conditions of a proposition, and the other hand, it does not, realizing what is called Expletive Negation. This chapter aims to investigate whether a word that is established on the basis of its function can be ambiguous by discussing the role of the syntactic derivation in some instances of so-called Expletive Negation clauses, a case in which negation seems to lose its capacity to deny the proposition associated with its sentence. Both a theoretical and an experimental approach has been adopted.


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