Correct Voting on Proximity and Valence

2017 ◽  
pp. 106-121
Author(s):  
Walter J. Stone
Keyword(s):  
2010 ◽  
pp. 72-90
Author(s):  
Richard R. Lau ◽  
David P. Redlawsk
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (1112) ◽  
pp. 354-356
Author(s):  
Philip D Welsby

Human brains have about 100 billion neurons each with about 1000 dendritic connections with other neurons giving a total of 100 000 billion deterministic dendritic switches. Various voting systems that the brain may use can produce conflicting results from identical inputs without any indication as to which one or ones would be correct. Voting systems cannot deliver unequivocal results in any other than the simplest situations. It is hypothesised that these conflicting results provide an indeterminacy that underlies free will, self-awareness, awareness of others, consciousness and personal responsibility, all of which can influence doctor-patient interactions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Milic

2012 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 751-764 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anand Edward Sokhey ◽  
Scott D. McClurg

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (04) ◽  
pp. 761-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Blais ◽  
Anja Kilibarda

ABSTRACTRegret is a basic affect associated with individual choice. While much research in organizational science and consumer behavior has assessed the precedents and consequents of regret, little attention has been paid to regret in political science. The present study assesses the relationship between one of the most democratically consequential forms of political behavior—voting—and feelings of regret. We examine the extent to which citizens regret how they voted after doing so and the factors that might lead one individual to be more regretful than another. Relying on surveys in five different countries after 11 regional and national elections, we find not only that political information leads to a decrease in post-election regret, but also that having voted correctly, or having voted in accordance with one’s underlying preferences regardless of information, similarly mitigates regret. The effect of correct voting on regret is greater among the least informed.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard R. Lau ◽  
Parina Patel ◽  
Dalia F. Fahmy ◽  
Robert R. Kaufman

This article extends Lau and Redlawsk's notion ofcorrect voting– whether voters, under conditions of uncertainty, choose the alternative they would have chosen had they been fully informed about the issues and candidates in that election – to sixty-nine elections in thirty-three established and emerging democracies around the world. At the individual level, political sophistication, political experience and motivation all significantly predict the probability of casting a correct vote. However several institutional factors proved to be even more important. In particular, elections with more parties running – and settings that encourage candidate-centred voting – decrease the probability of correct voting, while more ideologically distinctive alternatives, clearer lines of responsibility and greater media access to information are associated with higher rates of correct voting.


2015 ◽  
Vol 96 (5) ◽  
pp. 1196-1213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew L. Bergbower ◽  
Scott D. McClurg ◽  
Thomas Holbrook

2006 ◽  
Vol 16 (01) ◽  
pp. 93-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDRZEJ PELC

A source sends a piece of data (message), relayed to a receiver by n processes, some of which can be faulty. We assume that the number of faulty processes is at most f and that faulty processes exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A deciding agent has to make a decision concerning the source message, on the basis of results obtained from the receiver. The environment is totally asynchronous. An Asynchronous Byzantine Voting Mechanism is a method that enables the deciding agent to always correctly determine the source message in this scenario. We show that there exists a correct Asynchronous Byzantine Voting Mechanism if and only if f < n/3. If this condition is satisfied, we provide such a mechanism. This result should be contrasted with the feasibility of synchronous voting mechansisms, in which the receiver can wait until all fault-free processes convey their values: for this scenario a correct voting mechanism exists whenever f < n/2.


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