Elite Cues and Economic Policy Attitudes: The Mediating Role of Economic Hardship

Do voters update their attitudes toward economic issues in line with their material self-interest? The consensus among students of public opinion is that material self-interest plays a very limited role and that competing non-material factors, such as partisanship or ideological predispositions, do most of the heavy lifting. This paper moves beyond comparing the role of material and non-material factors. Instead, we examine how these factors combine to shape policy preferences. Specifically, we propose a friendly amendment to Zaller’s influential model according to which attitudinal change results from the interaction between changes in elite messaging on the one hand and individual political predispositions on the other. In Zaller’s model, partisanship and ideological predispositions help explain why some resist and others embrace new elite messaging. We hypothesize that material self-interest also conditions the effect of elite messaging. Using British individual-level panel data collected over more than a decade, we show that material hardship predicts who, among left-wing voters, resist new right-wing partisan cues. Our results highlights the incremental impact of material self-interest on economic attitudes.

When Do Voters Respond to Campaign Finance Disclosure? Evidence from Multiple Election Types

In recent American elections political candidates have actively emphasized features of their fundraising profiles when campaigning. Yet, surprisingly, we know comparatively little about how financial information affects vote choice specifically, whether effects differ across types of election, and how robust any effects are to other relevant political signals. Using a series of conjoint experiment designs, I compare the effects of campaigns’ financial profiles on vote choice across direct democratic and representative elections, randomizing subjects’ exposure to additional political cues. I find that while the financial profile of candidates can affect vote choice, these effects are drowned out by non-financial signals. In ballot initiative races, the explicit policy focus of the election appears to swamp any effect of financial information. This paper is the first to explore the comparative effects of financial disclosure across election type, contributing to our understanding of how different heuristics interact across electoral contexts.

Sexual Harassment and Candidate Evaluation: Gender and Partisanship Interact to Affect Voter Responses to Candidates Accused of Harassment

Public airing of incidents of sexual harassment have moved abuse from the shadows to the light, spurring mass response in the form of #MeToo and “Time’s Up.” While sexual harassment holds negative valence, election outcomes suggest that not all voters punish leaders accused of harassment. We argue there is systematic variation in how voters respond to candidates accused of harassment because evaluations are made within the context of both partisanship and the gendered issue of sexual harassment. As a result, we expect to find distinct responses across four voter groups—Democratic women and men, and Republican women and men on the specific issue of harassment. We present supporting evidence from two survey experiments and a third associational study to show that Democratic women are most likely to electorally punish sexual harassers. Experimental evidence also shows that Republican men are least likely to electorally punish candidates accused of harassment.

The Role of Public Broadcasting in Media Bias: Do People React Differently to Pro-government Bias in Public and Private Media?

People often reject new information, especially when it does not fit their prior beliefs. But do publics in advanced democracies reject information from public and private media outlets in the same way? We examine this question in the form of the media’s pro-government bias in the under-examined case of Japan. By combining unique textual data with an original survey experiment, we document that (1) people generally tend to reject pro-government biased information that overly praises government actions; but (2) the reasons why people reject the same biased information vary—based on their expectations of neutrality for public media, and on expectations derived from political ideology for private media. Our study suggests that the basis of people’s motivated reasoning differs when they evaluate content from public and private media.