Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Charter

2018 ◽  
pp. 322-328 ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 39-47
Author(s):  
Larysa BATIUK

Introduction. The article deals with the peculiarities of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the implementation conditions of the Basel Committee requirements on Banking Supervision "Basel III". The problem of the mechanism violation of the classical monetary multiplier, the imbalance of the monetary circulation system, the frequency increase of debt defaults and the amplitude of macroeconomic fluctuations in the global economic system are marked as a study result of the effects of the credit mitigation policy conducted by the US Federal Reserve amid the global financial crises of the last decade and changes in the nature of financial intermediation based on the synthesis of asset securitization and structured finance instruments. The purpose of this article is to investigate changes in monetary policy and financial intermediation in the implementation context of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel III as a source of imbalance in the global economy. Research methodology. The system method, method of scientific abstraction, methods of analysis and synthesis, statistical, comparison, generalization, scientific prediction were used. Results. The article deals with the implications of implementing the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Basel I and Basel II in the area of monetary policy and financial intermediation; peculiarities of monetary multiplier mechanism operation in modern conditions are revealed; the possible consequences of implementing Basel III requirements for the mechanism of monetary supply formation in the world economy are analysed; the change in the role of gold as monetary metal in central bank foreign exchange reserves and the implications of these changes in terms of price dynamics and the distribution of real wealth in the global economy are examined. Conclusions. It is proposed to consider the requirements of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision "Basel III" as such, which will exacerbate the volatility of global financial markets, increase the likelihood of increasing the frequency of debt defaults and, given the possibility of using gold as a means of redistribution of real wealth in the global economy, will cause an increase in the amplitude of macroeconomic fluctuations. Keywords: monetary policy; financial intermediation; the central bank; US Federal Reserve; Basel III; bank capital structure, monetary base; money multiplier, correspondent accounts; money supply; monetary gold; global economy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 59
Author(s):  
Norzitah Abdul Karim ◽  
Amirul Afiff Muhamat ◽  
Azreen Roslan ◽  
Sharifah Faigah Syed Alwi ◽  
Mohamad Nizam Jaafar

The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis showed that despite reported as ‘healthy’ financial institution prior to crisis had indeed suffered many problems including liquidity during the crisis. Thus, there is confusion on the healthy financial institutions, leading to loss of confidence on the overall stability of the banking system. Thus, there is an urgent need to review the current measures of financial as well as banking stability. This paper aims to look at the definition of ‘stability’ used in the academic researches and by different regulatory bodies, like International Monetary Fund, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) and central banks in selected countries with dual banking systems. It is then, critically review indicators used as measures of financial as well as banking stability. This review is hope to identify areas of strengths as well as weaknesses of the current measures of stability and serves as foundation for further research in future.


Author(s):  
Mccormick Roger ◽  
Stears Chris

This chapter discusses the various laws, regulations, and comparable measures that were passed or proposed in response to the financial crisis in the EU and elsewhere. It covers the responses of the de Larosière Report, G20, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the Financial Stability Board. The de Larosière Report, for instance, was commissioned by the President of the European Commission in October 2008 and delivered on 25 February 2009. The report sought ‘to give advice on the future of European financial regulation and supervision’ and has formed the basis of many of the responses to the financial crisis at EU level. The G20 issued a comprehensive communiqué on the crisis at the London ‘Summit’ of 2 April 2009, covering a number of macro-economic and other ‘architectural’ issues.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-260
Author(s):  
Jose Gustavo Prieto Muñoz

ABSTRACT This article explores the question of legitimacy that underpins Basel III. First, I present a general framework for assessing how legitimacy operates within the global financial system through an analysis of the internal and external dimensions. I next address the internal dimension, exploring the legitimacy of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as a body that exercises a type of public authority through the generation of norms/standards. I then analyse how the public law standards of transparency and accountability are currently being implemented within the BCBS system. Finally, I examine the external dimension, considering how the legitimacy of the BCBS is related to the international system. In particular, it is argued that because of the direct link between bailouts and human rights violations, the legitimacy of the BCBS is also tied to its role in promoting financial stability in the post-crisis architecture by protecting social rights within states.


Author(s):  
Maziar Peihani

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (bcbs) was established in 1974 as an informal group of central bankers and bank supervisors with the mandate to formulate supervisory standards and guidelines. Although the Committee does not have any formal supranational authority, it is the de facto global banking regulator and its recommendations have been widely implemented by member and non-member states. This project investigates the bcbs’s governance, operation, and policy outcomes to determine the extent to which it is and has been legitimate. The project is comprised of two parts. This part overviews the literature on the bcbs, outlines its contribution, and provides a primer on the Committee’s governance and functions. In addition, it engages with the current theories on legitimacy and discusses what legitimacy means for the global governance of banking and how it can be assessed.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-85
Author(s):  
Bronislava Coufalová

Abstract Article reflects the recent developments in the field of internal audits within the banks (the document on the internal audit function in banks issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2012). It covers the processes of the internal audits, the relations between supervisors and auditors and the main principles covering the internal audits in banks.


2005 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-32
Author(s):  
H. A. Benink

Op 26 juni 2004 publiceerde het Basel Committee on Banking Supervision het lang verwachte Basel II Akkoord. In dit artikel zal een overzicht worden gegeven van de belangrijkste punten van Basel II en zullen enkele actuele issues worden besproken. Het zal blijken dat Basel II belangrijke positieve incentive-effecten genereert die banken ertoe aanzet hun meting van kredietrisico te verfijnen via het gebruik van geavanceerde risicomanagementsystemen. Tegelijkertijd zal in dit artikel worden beargumenteerd dat Basel II bij sommige banken prikkels kan creëren om het kredietrisicoprofiel te overoptimistisch in te schatten ten einde de vereiste hoeveelheid eigen vermogen te reduceren en dat er redelijk grote onzekerheid lijkt te bestaan ten aanzien van de betrouwbaarheid van de interne risicomodellen. Het recente Basel II Akkoord vertrouwt met name op de toezichthouders om genoemde effecten van verkeerde inschatting van kredietrisico te mitigeren. In dit artikel zal deze benadering als te eenzijdig worden aangemerkt en zal worden bepleit om de risico-inschatting van de toezichthouders te complementeren met de risico-inschatting van professionele beleggers op financiële markten. Hiertoe is een geloofwaardiger invulling van de marktdiscipline (‘pillar 3’ van het Akkoord) vereist. Ten slotte zal in dit artikel aandacht worden besteed aan de consequenties van Basel II voor de bereidheid van banken om leningen te verstrekken aan ondernemingen, en het MKB in het bijzonder, en aan de mogelijke procyclische werking van Basel II.


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