scholarly journals Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Puig ◽  
Gregory Shaffer
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Institutional Choice ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Comparative Institutional Analysis ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
Institutional Choices

AbstractThis Article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the trade-offs associated with alternative mechanisms for resolving investment disputes. We assess the trade-offs in light of the principle of accountability under the rule of law, which underpins the goals of fairness, efficiency, and peace that are attributed to investment law. The Article makes two recommendations: first, reforms should address complementarity between domestic and international institutions; second, institutional choices should respond to the different contexts that states face.

scholarly journals Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 410-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthea Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Institutional Choice ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Comparative Institutional Analysis ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
Alternative Processes

InImperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer introduce comparative institutional analysis to evaluate alternative processes for resolving investment disputes. The impetus for this article is clear: many states view investor-state arbitration as akin to a horse that has bolted from the barn. Wishing to close the stable door, a wide range of states are considering the merits of various reform proposals. Puig and Shaffer's comprehensive and balanced framework for assessing the tradeoffs involved in making different choices is thus a welcome and timely intervention in these (often highly polarized) debates.

scholarly journals Judicial authority, legitimacy and the (international) rule of law as essentially contested and interpretive concepts: Introduction to the special issue

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
KNUT TRAISBACH
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Final Point ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
International Rule

AbstractBeyond setting the stage, the Introduction makes three claims about the conceptual triangle of the rule of law, judicial authority and legitimacy. The first is that all three are essentially contested and interpretive concepts in the sense of Walter B. Gallie and Ronald Dworkin. In their expositions, the contested and interpretative nature of such concepts is nothing to be ‘solved’, rather the formulation of different conceptions and contestation about them are central functions of such concepts. The interpretive and essentially contested nature points us to the relevant ‘actors’ and to conflicts and trade-offs between contested competencies. Thus the second point is that arguments about the rule of law and judicial legitimacy are often a means of questioning or securing the authority of a particular actor or institution in relation to other actors and institutions. The final point is that transposing concepts from the domestic to the supranational is a constructive endeavour because it entails creating new conceptions and substituting old ones as well as legitimising new authorities and delegitimising old ones. Thus, this special issue also cautions against discourses that ultimately are more about legitimation than about legitimacy and more about new ways of ruling than the rule of law.

scholarly journals The Limitations of Comparative Institutional Analysis

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 255-260
Author(s):  
Sadie Blanchard
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Foreign Investment ◽  
Simple Technique ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Nation States ◽  
Comparative Institutional Analysis ◽  
Investment Law

Atul Gawande's Checklist Manifesto became a sensation in 2009 because it promised that a simple technique could powerfully discipline decision-making. Gawande had saved lives using hospital checklists, and he argued that checklists could improve outcomes in other complicated endeavors. Checklists, he explained, “provide a kind of cognitive net. They catch mental flaws.” Neil Komesar's method of comparative institutional analysis is by necessity messier than the checklist and does not claim to produce faultless policy-making. But Komesar similarly seeks to improve cognitive processing by imposing a disciplining framework on decision-making. Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer's effort to introduce Komesar's technique to the debate about foreign investment law reform is welcome. Their emphasis on tradeoffs among institutional alternatives helps us to appreciate the different contexts facing different nation states, the value of regime competition, and consequently, the importance of implementing reforms in ways that preserve a variety of options for states. If they persuade commentators and policy-makers to take stock of the tradeoffs among institutional alternatives, Puig and Shaffer will have made a meaningful contribution. Still, their analysis illustrates some of the weaknesses of comparative institutional analysis. In this essay, I identify those weaknesses and suggest that they also weigh in pluralism's favor.

scholarly journals The Global Laboratory of Investment Law Reform Alternatives

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 237-243
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Alschner
Keyword(s):  
Real Life ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
The Other ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Institutional Choice ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Policy Goal ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
Institutional Choices

There are two ways of thinking about institutional choice in the context of multilateral investment law reform. One starts from abstract principles, asking what policy goal investment law is supposed to achieve and what institutional choice most effectively advances that goal. The other draws on practical experimentation, asking what institutional choices states are making and how these choices perform in real life. Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer present a compelling analytical framework for the former, top-down approach to investment law reform. In this essay, I will scrutinize their analysis and argue that the latter, bottom-up approach is more promising.

scholarly journals Fair and Equitable Treatment Between the International and National Rule of Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Velimir Živković
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
International Investment ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
National Rule ◽  
Fair And Equitable Treatment ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
Equitable Treatment

Abstract Promoting the rule of law is a potentially strong legitimating narrative for international investment law. Illustrating the interlinkage, the ubiquitous ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) standard embodies distinctly rule of law requirements. But these requirements remain open-textured and allow understanding their meaning in either more ‘international’ or ‘national’ way. An ‘international’ understanding – detached from the host State’s vision on how the rule of law should look like – should remain dominant. But I argue that decision-making under the FET standard should also involve a systematic engagement with how these requirements would be understood in the host State’s law and how they were complied with from that perspective. Whilst not determinative for establishing a breach, this assessment better respects the expectations of the parties, strengthens the persuasiveness of findings and helps enhance the national rule of law as a key contributor to the ultimate goal of investment protection – economic development.

The Rule of Law and the Quest for Constitutional Substitutes in International Law

2014 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Collins
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Normative Authority ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
Sovereign Authority ◽  
Second World

The practice of modern international law seems inherently bound up with the quest for a rule of law in international affairs. This commitment to the rule of law at the international level finds expression not merely in academic literature, but has been regularly endorsed by states themselves, particularly in the context of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the pursuit of an international rule of law is an ambition which is constantly frustrated. The institutional structure of the international legal order seems incompatible with this vision, resulting in a constant sense of frustration about the apparently ‘primitive’ or otherwise constitutionally deficient institutional structure of modern international law. In fact, despite the intensification of ‘governance’ through international institutions in the years since the end of the Second World War, it seems like the proliferation and growing normative authority of international institutions more often than not gives rise to more concerns from a rule of law perspective. In this article I not only seek to understand the nature of this rule of law commitment and the reasons for this constant frustration, but in doing so I will argue that the institutional context implicit in the ideal of the rule of law is incompatible with the nature and functioning of international law. I seek to show, in fact, how the perpetual sense of frustration felt in international law’s failure to live up to this ideal stems from the fact that the rule of law is a notion which is implicitly bound up with the political context of sovereign authority within states. To attempt to impose the rule of law outside of this context will not only result in distortion and mischaracterisation, but runs the risk also of legitimising precisely the kind of arbitrary authority which is the main target of the rule of law itself.

scholarly journals Control, Capacity, and Legitimacy in Investment Treaty Arbitration

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 261-265
Author(s):  
Jeremy K. Sharpe
Keyword(s):  
International Investment ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Institutional Choice ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
States Experience ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

Arbitration has long been the default mechanism for resolving international investment disputes. The traditional consensus favoring arbitration, however, has now given way, and reform proposals abound. The articles by Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer, on institutional choice and investment law reform, and by Anthea Roberts, on incremental, systemic, and paradigmatic reform of investor-state arbitration, helpfully situate the current controversies, debates, and reform options for states. Both articles reveal just how far and fast the debate has shifted in recent years. They also confirm states’ desire to exercise greater control over the regime for resolving international investment disputes. Many states continue to struggle to fully comply with their investment treaty obligations, to efficiently defend against investor claims, and to properly keep abreast of and shape developments in international investment law. Puig and Shaffer provide a useful framework for comparatively assessing possible institutional alternatives in light of their relative trade-offs. But any reform recommendations should draw lessons from states’ experience with the existing regime, including states’ significant problems of capacity. The merits of any reform proposals, therefore, should be measured in part by their ability to improve states’ capacity to cope with the existing investment protection regime and rapidly changing developments.

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