scholarly journals Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18, C-625/18

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 743-749
Author(s):  
Piotr Uhma

The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) announced on November 19, 2019 in response to a preliminary reference from the Polish Supreme Court is of fundamental importance for the independence of courts and judges in EU countries, establishing a pillar on which subsequent CJEU decisions have been based. The CJEU concluded that a national court is not an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of the European Union (EU) law where the objective circumstances in which that court was formed, its characteristics, and the means by which its members have been appointed are capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of that court to external interference. In particular, a court may cease to be seen as independent or impartial when it appears to be under the direct or indirect influence of the legislature and/or the executive, or where doubts emerge about their neutrality with respect to the interests before them. Such circumstances threaten the trust that justice in a democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law.

2020 ◽  
pp. 47-64
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter discusses Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 267 TFEU (ex Article 234 EC) gives the Court of Justice jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of EU law. The primary purpose of Article 267 is to ensure that EU law has the same meaning and effect in all the Member States. Where it considers a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable it to give judgment, any court may refer that question to the Court of Justice (the discretion to refer). Where a question of EU law is raised before a national court of last resort, that court must refer it to the Court of Justice (the obligation to refer).


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 82-96
Author(s):  
Carla Machado

This article aims to address the interpretation that has been made by Portuguese courts in relation to the concept of “communication of the work to the public” enshrined in Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, duly transposed into the Portuguese legal order by Law No. 50/2006 of 24 August, which culminated in the drafting of the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013. By verifying its content and analysing the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), concerning the interpretation of that concept, we conclude that the said case law unifying judgment does not comply with EU law. Therefore, we will list, on the one hand, the inherent consequences regarding the upkeep of the interpretation that has been held by the Portuguese judicial authorities and, on the other, we will suggest solutions for the resolution of similar cases by appealing to the principle of conforming interpretation.


Author(s):  
Daniel HALBERSTAM

Abstract This article provides a constitutionally grounded understanding of the vexing principle of ‘national procedural autonomy’ that haunts the vindication of EU law in national court. After identifying tensions and confusion in the debate surrounding this purported principle of ‘autonomy’, the Article turns to the foundational text and structure of Union law to reconstruct the proper constitutional basis for deploying or supplanting national procedures and remedies. It further argues that much of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union may be considered through the lens of ‘prudential avoidance’, ie the decision to avoid difficult constitutional questions surrounding the principle of conferral. As the last Part shows, a constitutional understanding of ‘national procedural authority’—not ‘autonomy’—helps clear up some persistent puzzles, and provides critical guidance for when deference to national procedures and remedies is appropriate, and when such deference is misplaced. Comparative references inform the argument along the way.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 731-738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jed Odermatt

On December 21, 2016, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dismissed an action brought by the Front Polisario challenging a decision of the Council of the European Union (EU) approving the conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom Morocco on the reciprocal liberalization of certain agricultural products. The CJEU held, based on the relevant rules of international law applicable between the EU and Morocco, that the agreement did not apply to the territory of Western Sahara. Apart from its obvious political overtones, the judgment is significant in further developing the CJEU's approach to the law of treaties and the principle of self-determination in international law.


Author(s):  
Morten Broberg ◽  
Niels Fenger

A reference for a preliminary ruling is a request from the national court of a Member State to the Court of Justice of the European Union to give an authoritative interpretation of an EU act or a decision on the validity of such an act. In this situation, the Court of Justice does not function as a court of appeal that rules on the outcome of the main proceedings before the referring court: it makes judgment neither on the facts in the main proceedings nor on the interpretation and application of national law. Moreover, in principle it does not itself pronounce on the concrete application of EU law in the main proceedings before the referring court. Finally, while a preliminary ruling is normally given in the form of a judgment, the ruling is addressed to the referring court and not to the parties to the main proceedings. Only the referring court’s subsequent decision can be enforced against those parties. The preliminary reference procedure is therefore an expression of the interplay and allocation of tasks between national courts and the Court of Justice.


Author(s):  
Albertina Albors-Llorens

This chapter provides an overview of the various procedural avenues to the Court of Justice of the European Union. It uses as a template the division between two main sets of proceedings: direct actions and preliminary references. Direct actions are brought directly either before the Court of Justice, the General Court, or the Civil Service Tribunal; these are dealt with in their entirety by these courts. By contrast, preliminary references begin before a national court. When this court encounters a question on the interpretation or the validity of EU law, it may (or sometimes must) make a preliminary reference on this particular point to the Court of Justice.


2020 ◽  
pp. 283-333
Author(s):  
Albertina Albors-Llorens

This chapter provides an overview of the various procedural avenues to the Court of Justice of the European Union. It uses as a template the division between two main sets of proceedings: direct actions and preliminary references. Direct actions are brought directly either before the Court of Justice or the General Court; these are dealt with in their entirety by these courts. By contrast, preliminary references begin before a national court. When this court encounters a question on the interpretation or the validity of EU law, it may (or sometimes must) make a preliminary reference on this particular point to the Court of Justice.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Sobotta

The article discusses the contribution of the ECJ to the reduction of compliance deficiencies with regard to European environmental law. The Court is not a specialised environmental court but the supreme court of the European multilevel legal system. Therefore its contribution is primarily characterised by a concern for effective and uniform application of EU law in general while specific environmental considerations do not figure as prominently.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 123-137
Author(s):  
Andrzej Torbus

The choice of court agreement (forum selection clause) is effectively concluded if there is no doubt that the party has actually become acquainted with its content. The Court of Justice of the European Union focuses on those aspects of the conclusion of the contract that allow the assessment that the other party is not surprised by the establishment of a subjective link. The compliance with formal requirements implies that the parties agreed on the conclusion of the contract. There are no objections about so understood “real consent of the parties” as a consequence of fulfilling not only the requirements as to the form, but above all as the way of the conclusion of the contract. The acceptance of the thesis that since the party expressed the undoubted consent to conclude the contract, there is thus no problem of the interpretation of the declaration of intent, is impossible. There is no dispute that the interpretation of a declaration of intent is a legal matter,since the methods of interpretation are determined by the law. According to the Polish Supreme Court, on the basis of Regulation 1215/2012 there is no problem of seeking of the applicable law, because the rules for the interpretation of a jurisdictional agreement should be interpreted from the provision of art. 25 of this regulation. This position is based on the main argument that any deviation from the autonomous rules of interpretation creates the danger that the courts of the Member States will differently determine the law applicable. The Court of Justice of the European Union accepts that an objective (normative) method of interpreting party’s statements should be used. In some situations, it is necessary to apply legis causae to effectuate a supplementary interpretation of the declarations of will.


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pål Wrange

In two recent cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the General Court (at first instance), the High Court of Justice of England and Wales and the Grand Chamber of the CJEU found that a trade agreement and a fisheries agreement between Morocco and the European Union cannot be applied to occupied Western Sahara without the consent of its people. In spite of the fact that it is the general view that Western Sahara is under belligerent occupation, none of the three courts invoked the law of occupation but based themselves instead on the principle of self-determination and the law governing the administration of non-self-governing territories, including the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. A possible implication of these judgments is that that law and the law of occupation are converging in certain respects, in particular as regards long-term occupation. This pertains not only to the substantive rules on the exercise of authority, which seem to require that the people are heard, but also to the basis for the establishment of that authority, namely bare control.


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