scholarly journals Wykładnia umowy jurysdykcyjnej zawartej na podstawie art. 25 Rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady (UE) Nr 1215/2012. Glosa do postanowienia Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 5 października 2018 r., I CSK 611/17

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 123-137
Author(s):  
Andrzej Torbus
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Law ◽  
Formal Requirements

The choice of court agreement (forum selection clause) is effectively concluded if there is no doubt that the party has actually become acquainted with its content. The Court of Justice of the European Union focuses on those aspects of the conclusion of the contract that allow the assessment that the other party is not surprised by the establishment of a subjective link. The compliance with formal requirements implies that the parties agreed on the conclusion of the contract. There are no objections about so understood “real consent of the parties” as a consequence of fulfilling not only the requirements as to the form, but above all as the way of the conclusion of the contract. The acceptance of the thesis that since the party expressed the undoubted consent to conclude the contract, there is thus no problem of the interpretation of the declaration of intent, is impossible. There is no dispute that the interpretation of a declaration of intent is a legal matter,since the methods of interpretation are determined by the law. According to the Polish Supreme Court, on the basis of Regulation 1215/2012 there is no problem of seeking of the applicable law, because the rules for the interpretation of a jurisdictional agreement should be interpreted from the provision of art. 25 of this regulation. This position is based on the main argument that any deviation from the autonomous rules of interpretation creates the danger that the courts of the Member States will differently determine the law applicable. The Court of Justice of the European Union accepts that an objective (normative) method of interpreting party’s statements should be used. In some situations, it is necessary to apply legis causae to effectuate a supplementary interpretation of the declarations of will.

Article 262 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Schima
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The Other ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Legislative Procedure

Article 229a EC Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, may adopt provisions to confer jurisdiction, to the extent that it shall determine, on the Court of Justice of the European Union in disputes relating to the application of acts adopted on the basis of the Treaties which create European intellectual property rights. These provisions shall enter into force after their approval by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

scholarly journals European Union citizenship: The acquisition of nationality and the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bridgette K. McLellan
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Union Citizenship ◽  
The Law ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality

<p>European Union citizenship was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Intended to fall within the exclusive prerogative of the Member States, it soon became clear that the autonomy of Member States to determine matters relating to nationality would be restricted by the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice. As such, the European Court of Justice transformed the law on citizenship in the 2010 case of Rottmann where measures affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the European Union were held to fall within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law. While Rottmann affirmed the law as to the deprivation of European Union citizenship, it left unanswered the question whether the acquisition of nationality also falls within the scope of European Union law. This paper aims to identify and analyse the law arising post-Rottmann to determine whether the acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of European Union law. It shall then analyse whether fundamental principles of European Union law, namely the principle of proportionality, could be applied in order to regulate the conditions imposed by Member States in relation to the acquisition of nationality.</p>

scholarly journals The interpretation complying with EU law manifested in the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013 of the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 82-96
Author(s):  
Carla Machado
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One

This article aims to address the interpretation that has been made by Portuguese courts in relation to the concept of “communication of the work to the public” enshrined in Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, duly transposed into the Portuguese legal order by Law No. 50/2006 of 24 August, which culminated in the drafting of the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013. By verifying its content and analysing the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), concerning the interpretation of that concept, we conclude that the said case law unifying judgment does not comply with EU law. Therefore, we will list, on the one hand, the inherent consequences regarding the upkeep of the interpretation that has been held by the Portuguese judicial authorities and, on the other, we will suggest solutions for the resolution of similar cases by appealing to the principle of conforming interpretation.

20. Free movement of payments and capital

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorna Woods ◽  
Philippa Watson ◽  
Marios Costa
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
The Other ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Free Movement Of Capital

This chapter examines the rules concerning free movement of payment and capital within the European Union provided in Articles 63–6 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains the scope of and exceptions to the free movement of capital. The chapter also considers restrictions on free movement of capital between Member States and third countries. It highlights the willingness of the Court of Justice (CJ) to borrow principles from the other freedoms. This chapter also considers briefly the provisions relating to monetary union and the developments in the light of the financial crisis.

scholarly journals Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18, C-625/18

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 743-749
Author(s):  
Piotr Uhma
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
National Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
External Interference ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Law ◽  
Grand Chamber

The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) announced on November 19, 2019 in response to a preliminary reference from the Polish Supreme Court is of fundamental importance for the independence of courts and judges in EU countries, establishing a pillar on which subsequent CJEU decisions have been based. The CJEU concluded that a national court is not an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of the European Union (EU) law where the objective circumstances in which that court was formed, its characteristics, and the means by which its members have been appointed are capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of that court to external interference. In particular, a court may cease to be seen as independent or impartial when it appears to be under the direct or indirect influence of the legislature and/or the executive, or where doubts emerge about their neutrality with respect to the interests before them. Such circumstances threaten the trust that justice in a democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law.

scholarly journals European Union citizenship: The acquisition of nationality and the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bridgette K. McLellan
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Union Citizenship ◽  
The Law ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality

<p>European Union citizenship was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Intended to fall within the exclusive prerogative of the Member States, it soon became clear that the autonomy of Member States to determine matters relating to nationality would be restricted by the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice. As such, the European Court of Justice transformed the law on citizenship in the 2010 case of Rottmann where measures affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the European Union were held to fall within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law. While Rottmann affirmed the law as to the deprivation of European Union citizenship, it left unanswered the question whether the acquisition of nationality also falls within the scope of European Union law. This paper aims to identify and analyse the law arising post-Rottmann to determine whether the acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of European Union law. It shall then analyse whether fundamental principles of European Union law, namely the principle of proportionality, could be applied in order to regulate the conditions imposed by Member States in relation to the acquisition of nationality.</p>

18. Free movement of payments and capital

2020 ◽  
pp. 417-435
Author(s):  
Marios Costa ◽  
Steve Peers
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
Free Movement Of Capital

This chapter examines the rules concerning free movement of payment and capital within the European Union provided in Articles 63, 64, 65 and 66 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains the scope of and derogations to the free movement of capital. The chapter also considers restrictions on free movement of capital between Member States and third countries. It highlights the willingness of the Court of Justice (CJ) to borrow principles (i.e. rule of reason) from the other freedoms. This chapter also considers briefly the provisions relating to monetary and economic union and the developments in the light of the financial crisis.

Article 265 TFEU

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernhard Schima
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
The Other ◽  
European Council ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice

Article 232 EC Should the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission or the European Central Bank, in infringement of the Treaties, fail to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Union may bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union to have the infringement established. This Article shall apply, under the same conditions, to bodies, offices and agencies of the Union which fail to act.

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

scholarly journals Castaño avoids a clash between the ECtHR and the CJEU, but erodes Soering. Thinking human rights transnationally

2020 ◽  
pp. 203228442097974
Author(s):  
Sibel Top ◽  
Paul De Hert
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Union Member ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Criminal Matters ◽  
European Union Member States

This article examines the changing balance established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) between human rights filters to extradition and the obligation to cooperate and how this shift of rationale brought the Court closer to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in that respect. The article argues that the ECtHR initially adopted a position whereby it prioritised human rights concerns over extraditions, but that it later nuanced that approach by establishing, in some cases, an obligation to cooperate to ensure proper respect of human rights. This refinement of its position brought the ECtHR closer to the approach adopted by the CJEU that traditionally put the obligation to cooperate above human rights concerns. In recent years, however, the CJEU also backtracked to some extent from its uncompromising attitude on the obligation to cooperate, which enabled a convergence of the rationales of the two Courts. Although this alignment of the Courts was necessary to mitigate the conflicting obligations of European Union Member States towards both Courts, this article warns against the danger of making too many human rights concessions to cooperation in criminal matters.

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