FRAND Defences Against the Grant of Injunctive Relief: Applying Huawei v ZTE in Singapore and China

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-60
Author(s):  
Joseph Lau

AbstractFrom the size of A4 paper to 5G in the telecommunications sector, standards are ubiquitous. Standard essential patents (SEPs), which protect technology essential to standards, enable their proprietors to gain significant market power. Antitrust authorities therefore scrutinize the exercise of SEPs for breaches of competition law. In this regard, the ability of SEP proprietors to obtain injunctions against implementers as a remedy for infringement of SEPs where licensing negotiations have broken down or are ‘ongoing’ has proven controversial. Some fear that this enables SEP proprietors to threaten injunctions unless implementers agree to unfair, unreasonable, or discriminatory terms. In Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, the Court of Justice of the European Union identified circumstances where a SEP proprietor's application for injunctive relief as a remedy for infringement of its SEP constitutes an abuse of a dominant position, with the classification of the SEP proprietor's application as being abusive forming a ‘FRAND Defence’ which implementers may invoke against the grant of the injunction requested. This article analyzes whether this approach can be replicated by the Singapore Courts and whether the Chinese Courts, which have already dealt with SEP licensing disputes, adopt a similar approach.

2021 ◽  
pp. 717-778
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter assesses the EU competition law on private undertakings. The relevant Treaty section is here built upon three pillars. The first pillar deals with anticompetitive cartels and can be found in Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The second pillar concerns situations where a dominant undertaking abuses its market power and is found in Article 102. The third pillar is unfortunately invisible, for when the Treaties were concluded, they did not mention the control of mergers. This constitutional gap has never been closed by later Treaty amendments, yet it has received a legislative filling in the form of the EU Merger Regulation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 27-46
Author(s):  
Afroza Bilkis ◽  
Supravat Halder

When a dominant company exploits its market power and that harms fair competition in the marketplace, average consumers remain in the most vulnerable condition having vital influence on but no active participation in the functioning of the market. The actions of a business that has market power can have serious effects on the operation of a market. An undertaking in a dominant position may use its market power in several ways, the most common being exploiting consumers by artificial scarcity and increasing prices. Moreover, there may be diverse interpretation as to the nature of an undertaking while considering market power abuse cases for the purposes of European Union (EU) Competition law. It is significant to consider the status of consumers in a market to see if dominant entities are abusing their powers and therefore test the level of commercialization.Northern University Journal of Law Vol.IV 2013; p.27-46


Teisė ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 8-20
Author(s):  
Virgilijus Valančius

This article presents some general aspects of the scope of judicial review applied by the Court of Justice of the European Union as well as its particularities in competition (the research comprises cases concerning agreements restricting competition and the abuse of a dominant position) and civil service cases. As legal texts of the European Union do not provide the precise scope of judicial control, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union is one of the main sources giving clarifications on this issue. This article focuses accordingly on the presentation of the relevant jurisprudence, which analyzes the subject matter in general and reflects the evolution of this Court’s approach in the said competition and civil service cases.


Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter focuses on Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade. Like Article 101, Article 102 is enforced by the European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003.


Author(s):  
Lorna Woods ◽  
Philippa Watson ◽  
Marios Costa

This chapter examines the core elements of competition law in the European Union (EU) and its impact on the internal market, focusing on anti-competitive agreements, abuse of market power and controls over concentrations. It discusses the provisions and enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).


2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 786-805 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rupprecht Podszun

In the 2015 case Huawei/ZTE, the Court of Justice of the European Union took one of its rare opportunities to rule on the interface of antitrust and patent law. The question before the Court was whether the holder of a standard-essential patent abuses a dominant position by seeking an injunction against a potential licensee. Regarding a previous line of cases under European law, the Court took a surprisingly easy solution by forcing the companies to get back to the negotiation table. This may be attributed to a new methodological balancing approach of the Court. While acknowledging the problem of patent thickets, the Court restrains the role of antitrust authorities in this field.


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