scholarly journals Tying as a form of abuse of dominant position in competition law of the European Union

2011 ◽  
Vol 83 (9) ◽  
pp. 354-366
Author(s):  
Siniša Domazet
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

This chapter focuses on Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade. Like Article 101, Article 102 is enforced by the European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-60
Author(s):  
Joseph Lau

AbstractFrom the size of A4 paper to 5G in the telecommunications sector, standards are ubiquitous. Standard essential patents (SEPs), which protect technology essential to standards, enable their proprietors to gain significant market power. Antitrust authorities therefore scrutinize the exercise of SEPs for breaches of competition law. In this regard, the ability of SEP proprietors to obtain injunctions against implementers as a remedy for infringement of SEPs where licensing negotiations have broken down or are ‘ongoing’ has proven controversial. Some fear that this enables SEP proprietors to threaten injunctions unless implementers agree to unfair, unreasonable, or discriminatory terms. In Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, the Court of Justice of the European Union identified circumstances where a SEP proprietor's application for injunctive relief as a remedy for infringement of its SEP constitutes an abuse of a dominant position, with the classification of the SEP proprietor's application as being abusive forming a ‘FRAND Defence’ which implementers may invoke against the grant of the injunction requested. This article analyzes whether this approach can be replicated by the Singapore Courts and whether the Chinese Courts, which have already dealt with SEP licensing disputes, adopt a similar approach.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 265-277
Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino

On 17th December 2015, the General Court of the European Union (GC) confirmed a fine of over EUR 127 million imposed by the European Commission (hereinafter the Commission) on the Polish telecommunications company Orange Polska (hereinafter OP), formerly known as Telekomunikacja Polska. According to the fining decision, issued in 2011 (hereinafter the Commission decision), OP abused its dominant position by refusing access to its wholesale broadband services to new entrants, acting in contravention of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Rita Leandro Vasconcelos

In its judgment of 15 September 2016, the General Court ruled on whether the commitments offered by Thompson Reuters to the European Commission during an investigation of a possible abuse of dominant position were sufficient to address the competition concerns identified by the Commission. This is only the second time the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on Commission decisions rendering binding the commitments offered by an undertaking Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. With regard to standing, the General Court ruled the appeal lodged by a competitor admissible. As for substance, the General Court generally confirmed the previous case law. It ruled on the commitments meet the competition concerns identified by the institution, the different proportionality standard in Article 9 decisions as compared to Article 7 Regulation 1/2003 decisions (formal decision finding an infringement), and the limited scope of judicial review of the Court of Justice of the European Union in these appeals.


2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 231
Author(s):  
Valentine Korah

Drawing on recent developments in Australian, United Kingdom and United States jurisprudence, Professor Korah casts doubt on the approach recently taken by New Zealand courts in one of the most controversial areas of competition law: the access to its facilities that a corporation in a dominant position must give to its would-be competitors.  She argues that before imposing such obligations courts ought to be more sophisticated in assessing the economic effects of such obligations and especially the need to preserve an incentive to make the considerable investment required to create such facilities.  Professor Korah was the 1999 Chapman Tripp Fellow. This article is an edited version of a paper presented at the offices of Chapman Tripp during the tenure of the Fellowship.  


Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter sketches the history of the EU and its institutions in order to set the competition rules in context. It then discusses the competition provisions themselves, and explains the way in which those rules are applied and enforced. The EU competition rules are primarily contained in Title VII, Chapter 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The two main competition articles are Article 101 TFEU, which applies to agreements between undertakings, and Article 102, which applies to the conduct of undertakings in a ‘dominant position’. Articles 101 and 102 are supplemented by Article 106 (public undertakings and undertakings with special or exclusive rights), and by articles concerned with powers and procedures.


Arena Hukum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 222-244
Author(s):  
Sih Wahyuningtyas

The role of patents is complex when dealing with the problem of technological interoperability in cases where patented technology becomes standard. In such cases, a balance is needed between the protection of the interests of the inventor, i.e. the standard essential patent (SEP) holder, and of users who need the technology to enter the market. There is a susceptibility to restrictions on competition to create markets (competition for the market). Market dominance can be created by the adoption of SEP holder technology as a standard and hence, a key for other business actors to enter the market. With the potential for the formation of a dominant position in the relevant market, the competition law intervention is required when patent abuse occurs, as it appears typical in the pharmaceutical and information technology industries. The normative research examines how competition law in the European Union deals with SEP cases in comparison to Indonesian competition law.


Author(s):  
Wojciech Paweł SZYDŁO

Aim: The paper discusses cases in which a refusal by an energy enterprise to connect other enterprises to the network is treated as a prohibited abuse of the enterprise's dominant position and, equally, will represent behavior prohibited by art. 12 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by art. 9 par. 2 item 2 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Law as well as legal consequences of such refusal. It is important to pinpoint such cases since the EU sectoral regulation does not provide for obligating any undertakings which manage and operate oil pipelines to enter into contracts with other undertakings such as contracts on connecting into their network or contracts on providing crude oil transfer services. Conditions for accessing oil pipelines and selling their transfer capacities are determined by the owners of the networks: private oil companies in the countries across which the pipelines are routed. These conditions are not governed by the EU law.  Furthermore, the very obligation of connecting other entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector in Poland will only arise from generally applicable provisions of the Polish competition law.  Design / Research methods: The purpose of the paper has been reached by conducting a doctrinal analysis of relevant provisions of Polish and EU law and an analysis of guidelines issued by the EU governing bodies. Furthermore, the research included the functional analysis method which analyses how law works in practice. Conclusions / findings: The deliberations show that a refusal to access the network will be a manifestation of a prohibited abuse of a dominant position and will be a prohibited action always when the dominant's action is harmful in terms of the allocation effectiveness. It will be particularly harmful when delivery of goods or services objectively required for effective competition on a lower level market, a discriminatory refusal which leads to elimination of an effective competition on the consequent market, a refusal leading to unfair treatment of consumers and an unjustified refusal. Originality / value of the article: The paper discusses the prerequisites which trigger the obligation to connect entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector. The obligation has a material impact on the operations of the oil transmitting undertakings, in particular on those who dominate the market. The regulatory bodies in the competition sector may classify a refusal of access to own network by other enterprises as a prohibited abuse of the dominant position, exposing such undertakings to financial consequences.Implications of the research: The research results presented in the paper may be used in decisions issued by the President of the OCCP and in judgement of Polish civil courts and EU courts. This may cause a significant change in the approach to classifying prohibited practices to prohibited behavior which represent abuse of the dominant position. The deliberations may also prompt the Polish and EU legislator to continue works on the legislation.


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