Constitutional Rights, Moral Controversy, and the Supreme Court

Author(s):  
Michael J. Perry
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nirej Sekhon

The Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the Fourth Amendment gold standard for regulating police discretion. It has embraced a "warrant preference" on the premise that requiring police to obtain advance judicial approval for searches and seizures encourages accurate identification of evidence and suspects while minimizing interference with constitutional rights. The Court and commentators have overlooked the fact that most outstanding warrants do none of these things. Most outstanding warrants are what this article terms "non-compliance warrants": summarily issued arrest warrants for failures to comply with a court or police order. State and local courts are profligate in issuing such warrants for minor offenses. For example, the Department of Justice found that the municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri issued one warrant for every two of its residents. When issued as wantonly as this, warrants are dangerous because they generate police discretion rather than restrain it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, most recently in Utah v. Strieff, treated non-compliance warrants as if no different from the traditional warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment warrant preference. This article argues that non-compliance warrants pose unique dangers, constitutional and otherwise. Non-compliance warrants create powerful incentives for the police to conduct unconstitutional stops, particularly in poor and minority neighborhoods. Their enforcement also generates race and class feedback loops. Outstanding warrants beget arrests and arrests beget more warrants. Over time, this dynamic amplifies race and class disparities in criminal justice. The article concludes by prescribing a Fourth Amendment remedy to deter unconstitutional warrant checks. More importantly, the article identifies steps state and local courts might take to stem the continued proliferation of non-compliance warrants.


1972 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
Donal E.J. Macnamara ◽  
Edward Sagarin

Three important changes in American society were given impetus by decisions of the Supreme Court under Earl Warren. These were in the issues of desegregation; one-man, one-vote; and the administration of criminal justice. The accusation against the Warren Court that it was coddling criminals and handcuffing police, belied by statistics, may have been incited by hostility that the Court had aroused because of its decisions on integration and electoral apportionment. Analysis of impor tant decisions in the years before Warren reveals a hesitant and ambiguous Court, taking both forward and backward steps in defense of the constitutional rights of the accused. Some of the Warren decisions on issues of criminal justice were unani mous, and others were made by a split court. A study of the voting records of Warren's colleagues leads to the belief that the major thrust of that court will not be reversed by its successor, unless under the pressure of a precipitate change in America's social atmosphere.


1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 46 ◽  
Author(s):  
James (Sakej) Youngblood Henderson

This article explores the interpretive principle of sui generis treaties introduced by the Supreme Court of Canada since the repatriation of the Constitution in 1982. The article proceeds through an analysis of treaty rights as constitutional rights, contextual analysis of Indian Treaties, the intent of the treaty parties and the principles which govern the interpretation of treaty text. The author concludes that the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada are an attempt to affirm and enhance Aboriginal worldviews and cognitive diversity within the Constitution of Canada.


Author(s):  
Luis E. Delgado del Rincón

En el trabajo se analiza la responsabilidad civil de los magistrados del Tribunal Constitucional teniendo en cuenta dos resoluciones judiciales. La primera, una sentencia de la Sala Primera del Tribunal Supremo, de 23 de enero de 2004 que, extralimitándose de sus funciones, condenó a los magistrados del Tribunal Constitucional por responsabilidad civil por culpa grave. La segunda, la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 133/2013, de 5 de junio que, casi diez años después, anula la decisión de la Sala Primera del Supremo por vulneración de dos derechos fundamentales de los magistrados constitucionales: el derecho de acceso a las funciones y cargos públicos, al impedir su ejercicio sin perturbaciones ilegítimas y el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva, por dictar una resolución judicial con defectos constitucionales de motivación.The paper analyzes the civil liability of judges of the Constitutional Court considering two judicial decisions. The first, a judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of 23January 2004, exceeding their functions, condemned the Constitutional Court judges from civil liability for gross negligence. Second, the Constitutional Court133/2013, of 5 June, almost ten years later, annuls the decision of the First Chamber of the Supreme for violation of two fundamental constitutional rights of judges: the right of access to public offices, to prevent illegitimate exercise without interferenceand the right to judicial protection, to render a judgment on constitutional defects reasons.


Author(s):  
Brian Sang YK

ABSTRACT This article analyses the content and implications of the Supreme Court of Kenya’s judgment in Methodist Church in Kenya v Mohamed Fugicha and 3 Others. There, by majority decision, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s ruling that reasonable accommodation be made for the wearing of Islamic hijabs by female Muslim students in Kenyan schools. While Methodist Church in Kenya was expected to clarify the scope of the right to manifest religious belief in Kenya, the Supreme Court used specious logic based on legalism to avoid that issue. This article shows how the majority decision contradicts principles of enforcement of constitutional rights by focusing unduly on procedural technicalities, avoiding the core issue of permissible restrictions on religious expression and leaving key legal questions unresolved. It also highlights the well-reasoned dissenting opinion that addressed the core issue and which has crucial import for future development of religious freedom jurisprudence in Kenya


Author(s):  
Jud Mathews

This chapter explores the development of Canadian constitutionalism leading up to judicial engagement with the horizontal effect of rights. The Supreme Court of Canada already enjoyed an exceptionally broad jurisdiction when the enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 gave it an extensive set of constitutional rights to interpret. At the same time, the very breadth of the Court’s formal powers was a reason to use them carefully, especially because the Charter triggered anxieties about federalism among many advocates for provincial autonomy. This chapter shows how, in this context, the Supreme Court of Canada had little to gain from announcing a far-reaching constitutionalization of private law.


Author(s):  
Alec Stone Sweet ◽  
Jud Mathews

This chapter considers constitutional rights doctrines of the United States in light of the global spread of proportionality. It challenges the view that proportionality is alien to the American constitutional experience, showing that American courts have developed approaches to rights that closely resemble proportionality. In particular, the Supreme Court’s test for state laws that burdened interstate commerce, developed in the nineteenth century, resembled proportionality, and so did “strict scrutiny” review as it was initially applied by the Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century. The Supreme Court’s current approach to constitutional rights, relying heavily on separate tiers of review, is characterized by three pathologies: (i) judicial abdication, in the form of rational basis review; (ii) analytical incompleteness, when an explicit balancing stage is omitted; and (iii) instability, leading to reclassification and doctrinal incoherence. The chapter argues that proportionality can protect rights more consistently and coherently than the current American approach, and concludes by showing how courts courts could give proportionality greater expression in constitutional doctrine.


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