From the Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Right: Hegel's Concept of the Will and the Possibility of Modern Ethical Life

2001 ◽  
pp. 122-136
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Life ◽  
The Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

The Problem of Nature in Hegel's Philosophy of Right

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Simon Lumsden
Keyword(s):  
Political Thought ◽  
Blind Spot ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Ethical Life ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Philosophy Of Right ◽  
Objective Structures ◽  
External Powers ◽  
At Home

Abstract The notion of being-at-home-in-otherness is the distinctive way of thinking of freedom that Hegel develops in his social and political thought. When I am at one with myself in social and political structures (institutions, rights and the state) they are not external powers to which I am subjected but are rather constitutive of my self-relation, that is my self-conception is mediated and expanded through those objective structures. How successfully Hegel may achieve being-at-home-in-otherness with regard to these objective structures of right in the Philosophy of Right is arguable. What is at issue in this paper is however to argue that there is a blind spot in the text with regard to nature. In Ethical Life the rational subject's passions and inclinations are brought into the subject such that she is ‘with herself’ in them; with regard to external nature no such reconciliation is achieved or even attempted. In Abstract Right external nature is effectively dominated by and subsumed into the will and it is never something in which one is with oneself. It remains outside the model of freedom that Hegel develops in the Philosophy of Right. There is something troubling about this formulation, since it excludes nature from freedom, but also something accurate, as it reflects the unresolved attitude of moderns to the natural world.

scholarly journals Comunidade (Gemeinde) entre Lógica e Política nas Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião de Hegel

Problemata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 214-233
Author(s):  
Rodrygo Rocha Macedo
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Sense Of Belonging ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
The State ◽  
Ethical Life ◽  
Political Role ◽  
The Will ◽  
Different Dimensions ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

This article aims to explain how the political project of State that Hegel outlines in the Philosophy of Right (1821) is recovered by the concept of “community” (Gemeinde) in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1821-1832) with the use of syllogisms of creation and redemption of world as they are presented in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1830). Once the rational State is grounded on different dimensions of human life, it recognizes them as its own, materializing a viable collective project only when individual freedoms are warranted. According to Philosophy of Right, the effectiveness of the State occurs through the collecting of previous stages concerning the actualization of freedom. It is applied to the will, which paves the way for morality and ethical life. On the other hand, Hegel, in the classes that constitute the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, will focus on the concept of “community”. In the same way as the State, the community is also a social arrangement, with its own rites and rules, whose participants acquire a sense of belonging and unity. By evidencing similar purposes to the State, the community's goal is to maintain the group based on a constituted and collectively assimilated order. Whether the community has a political role, therefore, this aspect is best seen when Hegel's political theory is connected with the philosophy of religion in accordance with the elements "freedom", "finite", "infinite", "concept" and “truth" identified in Hegel’s logic.

Bad Habits: Habit, Idleness, and Race in Hegel

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Rocío Zambrana
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Life ◽  
Second Nature ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

Abstract Recent discussions of Hegel's conception of second nature, specifically focused on Hegel's notion of habit (Gewohnheit), have greatly advanced our understanding of Hegel's views on embodied normativity. This essay examines Hegel's account of embodied normativity in relation to his assessment of good and bad habits. Engaging Hegel's account of the rabble (Pöbel) in the Philosophy of Right and Frank Ruda's assessment of Hegel's rabble, this essay traces the relation between ethicality, idleness and race in Hegel. In being a figure of refusal in its affirmation of idleness, the rabble disallows the progressive revision of the project of modernity central to Hegel's philosophy. Hegel's discussion of the rabble is thus key to assessing the production of race within Hegel's notion of ethical life.

Ethical Life and the Demands of Conscience

1998 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 35-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Neuhouser
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
The State ◽  
Ethical Life ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Critical Relation ◽  
Philosophy Of Right ◽  
The Individual

My aim in this paper is to investigate Hegel's claim that ethical life (Sittlichkeit) does not simply negate but rather incorporates, or preserves, crucial elements of the Enlightenment conception of moral subjectivity that Hegel associates with the standpoint of Morality (Moralität). More specifically, the part of Hegel's view I want to examine here is his claim that individual moral conscience (Gewissen) has its place within the rational social order as depicted in Part III of The Philosophy of Right, “Ethical Life”. There is a widespread perception among Hegel's liberal critics that his vision of the rational social order allows no place for the genuine expression of moral conscience. This is the view expressed, for example, in Ernst Tugendhat's recent charge that Hegel's view excludes the possibility of “adopting a rational perspective” on a society's prevailing norms and practices’: “Hegel does not allow for the possibility of a responsible, critical relation to the … state. Instead he tells us that existing laws have an absolute authority. The independent conscience of the individual must disappear, and trust takes the place of reflection. This is what Hegel means by the Aufhebung of morality into ethical life”.

scholarly journals La voluntad libre en Hegel

2009 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesús Ezquerra Gómez
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

ResumenEste ensayo reexamina la concepción hegeliana de la voluntad libre tal como es expuesta, principalmente, en la introducción de los Fundamentos de la filosofía del derecho. Según Hegel la voluntad, en tanto que conciencia práctica, crea su objeto. Por eso puede reconocerse en él. Esa creación es la libertad. Lo que la voluntad libre quiere no es sino ella misma. Ser libre es, por lo tanto, quererse libre. En esta tesis alienta, a mi juicio, el carácter revolucionario del pensamiento político hegeliano.Palabras claveHegel, voluntad libre, libertad, derecho, conciencia práctica, autodeterminaciónAbstractThis paper re-examines the Hegelian conception of free volition as it is put forward mainly in the introduction of Elements of the Philosophy of Right. According to Hegel the will, being practical conscience, creates its object. For that reason the will can be recognized in this object. This creation is freedom. So what the free will wants is the free will itself. To be free is, therefore, the will to be free. In my opinion this thesis shows the revolutionary character of Hegel’s political thought.KeywordsHegel, free volition, freedom, right, practical conscience, selfdetermination

The Role of Modern Irony in Hegel's Philosophy of Right

2004 ◽  
Vol 25 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 127-138
Author(s):  
David James
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Life ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Romantic Irony ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

In what follows I shall attempt to explain why Hegel includes an account of modern, or Romantic irony in the Philosophy of Right, even though a discussion of this type of irony might be thought to belong more properly to the realm of aesthetics than to a work which deals with ethical and political issues. I shall identify two main reasons for the inclusion of modern irony in the Philosophy of Right. The first reason is a fairly obvious one, and I shall therefore not spend much time on it. The second reason is, however, far less obvious, since it concerns a problem with modern irony which Hegel does not make explicit in his brief account of modern irony in the Philosophy of Right. I shall nevertheless argue that Hegel elsewhere provides us with the resources that are needed for identifying this problem with modern irony. We shall see that the problem in question is one that serves to undermine the modern ironist's claim to be absolutely free, thus showing the need for an alternative account of freedom, such as Hegel's theory of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), which in the Philosophy of Right directly follows his remarks on modern irony.

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