scholarly journals La voluntad libre en Hegel

2009 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesús Ezquerra Gómez
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

ResumenEste ensayo reexamina la concepción hegeliana de la voluntad libre tal como es expuesta, principalmente, en la introducción de los Fundamentos de la filosofía del derecho. Según Hegel la voluntad, en tanto que conciencia práctica, crea su objeto. Por eso puede reconocerse en él. Esa creación es la libertad. Lo que la voluntad libre quiere no es sino ella misma. Ser libre es, por lo tanto, quererse libre. En esta tesis alienta, a mi juicio, el carácter revolucionario del pensamiento político hegeliano.Palabras claveHegel, voluntad libre, libertad, derecho, conciencia práctica, autodeterminaciónAbstractThis paper re-examines the Hegelian conception of free volition as it is put forward mainly in the introduction of Elements of the Philosophy of Right. According to Hegel the will, being practical conscience, creates its object. For that reason the will can be recognized in this object. This creation is freedom. So what the free will wants is the free will itself. To be free is, therefore, the will to be free. In my opinion this thesis shows the revolutionary character of Hegel’s political thought.KeywordsHegel, free volition, freedom, right, practical conscience, selfdetermination

The Inferences of Right

Hegel's Value ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 78-104
Author(s):  
Dean Moyar
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
The Will ◽  
Basic Argument ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

This chapter provides the basic conceptual framework that guides Hegel’s account in his Philosophy of Right. It begins with an account of the final moves in “Subjective Spirit” through which Hegel deduces his conception of the free will. His key move is the unification of the rationality of inference (theoretical) with the purposiveness of the will (practical) to arrive at a conception of the practical inferences of the free will. It is shown how this conception is the basis of the account of the free will in the Philosophy of Right Introduction. The chapter argues for a conception of expressive validity to capture the normative character of the practical inferences of right. This account makes sense of Hegel’s conception of the immanent dialectical development of right. The template of the Basic Argument is refined to show how it guides the incorporation of particularity and contingency into the universality of right.

Recht und Pflicht – Einschränkungen von Freiheit?

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Klaus Vieweg
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
The Will ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Abstract Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice (Willkür) – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens.

Locke and the Nature of Political Authority

2015 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon Hoff
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Capacity To Consent ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Will

AbstractThis paper aims to illuminate the ongoing significance of Locke's political philosophy. It argues that the legitimacy of political authority lies, according to Locke, in the extent to which it collaborates with individuals so as to allow them to be themselves more effectively, and in its answerability to the consent such individuals should thereby give it. The first section discusses how the free will inevitably asserts its authority; the second shows the inevitability of the will's incorporation of authority as a kind of prosthesis, which in turn transforms the operation of the will; and the third treats the issue of consent, arguing that Locke is less interested in explicit acts of consent than in the norm of consent, in answerability to which structures of authority should be shaped so as to honor the beings whose capacity to consent is definitive for them.

scholarly journals Edwards on the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will

Sententiae ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Oleh Bondar ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Jonathan Edwards ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
The Past ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Theological Fatalism ◽  
Nelson Pike ◽  
Necessity Of The Past

In the book “Freedom of the Will”, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong ar-gument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike. The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that ~A is possible (Infallibility of God`s knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose ~A. The article argues that (i) the Edwards` inference Kgp → □p rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of ~p; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary. Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if Kgp is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose ~p. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.

Value in the Development and Conclusion of Abstract Right

Hegel's Value ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 105-149
Author(s):  
Dean Moyar
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
External World ◽  
Main Concept ◽  
Property Ownership ◽  
Philosophy Of Right ◽  
The Right ◽  
Moral Will

This chapter is a reading of “Abstract Right” that demonstrates the centrality of value and inference to the account. Hegel’s account unfolds private property as the immediate expression of the free will in the external world. When the argument turns toward the use of property, Hegel’s account of value comes to the fore as the universality of property ownership that is implicit in the right to use what one owns. While dealt with only briefly in the published Philosophy of Right, value gets a much more extensive treatment in the 1824–1825 lectures, where it becomes the main concept for understanding the process and result of the alienation of property. The chapter shows that the transition from alienation to contract brings Hegel’s account of mutual recognition to the fore along with an inferential equivalence form of value. Equivalence of value is a central dimension of punishment, but that equivalence can be secured only with the transition to the moral will.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Susanne Bobzien
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Continuum Theory ◽  
Second Century ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Moral Accountability ◽  
The Will ◽  
Main Component ◽  
Autonomous Agency ◽  
Hellenistic Philosophy

The cluster of problems around freedom, determinism, and moral responsibility is one of those themes in philosophy that are fascinating in both their complexity and their seemingly direct relevance to human life. Historians of ideas often assume that in Western philosophy this cluster of problems was the subject of an ongoing discourse from antiquity to the present day. This is, however, an illusion. Much of my research on ancient theories of determinism and freedom is devoted to showing that what commonly counts as this problem cluster today (often labelled as ‘the problem of free will and determinism’) is noticeably distinct from the issues that the ancients discussed—at least prior to the second century CE. It is true that one main component of the ancient discussion concerned the question of how moral accountability can be consistently combined with certain causal factors that impact human behaviour. However, it is not true that the ancient problems involved the questions of the compatibility of causal determinism with either our ability to do otherwise or a human faculty of a free will. Instead, we encounter questions about human autonomous agency and its compatibility with preceding causes, external or internal; with external impediments; with divine predetermination and theological questions; with physical theories like atomism and continuum theory, and with sciences more generally; with elements that determine character development from childhood—nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with necessity and modal theories generally; with folk theories of fatalism; and also with questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, to blame and praise. All these questions were discussed without reference to freedom to do otherwise or a faculty of the will—at least in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy. This volume of essays considers all of these questions to some extent....

Frankfurt and the Problem of Self-Control

2020 ◽  
pp. 421-433
Author(s):  
Ryan Cummings ◽  
Adina L. Roskies
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Structural Account ◽  
The Will

Frankfurt’s compatibilist account of free will considers an individual to be free when her first- and second-order volitions align. This structural account of the will, this chapter argues, fails to engage with the dynamics of will, resulting in two shortcomings: (1) the problem of directionality, or that Frankfurtian freedom obtains whenever first- and second-order volitions align, regardless of which desire was made to change, and (2) the potential for infinite regress of higher-order desires. The authors propose that a satisfying account of the genesis of second-order volitions can resolve these issues. To provide this they draw from George Ainslie’s mechanistic account of self-control, which relies on intertemporal bargaining wherein an individual’s self-predictions about future decisions affect the value of her current choices. They suggest that second-order volitions emerge from precisely this sort of process, and that a Frankfurt-Ainslie account of free will avoids the objections previously raised.

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