scholarly journals Comunidade (Gemeinde) entre Lógica e Política nas Lições sobre a Filosofia da Religião de Hegel

Problemata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 214-233
Author(s):  
Rodrygo Rocha Macedo

This article aims to explain how the political project of State that Hegel outlines in the Philosophy of Right (1821) is recovered by the concept of “community” (Gemeinde) in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1821-1832) with the use of syllogisms of creation and redemption of world as they are presented in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1830). Once the rational State is grounded on different dimensions of human life, it recognizes them as its own, materializing a viable collective project only when individual freedoms are warranted. According to Philosophy of Right, the effectiveness of the State occurs through the collecting of previous stages concerning the actualization of freedom. It is applied to the will, which paves the way for morality and ethical life. On the other hand, Hegel, in the classes that constitute the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, will focus on the concept of “community”. In the same way as the State, the community is also a social arrangement, with its own rites and rules, whose participants acquire a sense of belonging and unity. By evidencing similar purposes to the State, the community's goal is to maintain the group based on a constituted and collectively assimilated order. Whether the community has a political role, therefore, this aspect is best seen when Hegel's political theory is connected with the philosophy of religion in accordance with the elements "freedom", "finite", "infinite", "concept" and “truth" identified in Hegel’s logic.

2006 ◽  
pp. 29-56
Author(s):  
Michal Sládecek

In first chapters of this article MacIntyre?s view of ethics is analyzed, together with his critics of liberalism as philosophical and political theory, as well as dominant ideological conception. In last chapters MacIntyre?s view of the relation between politics and ethics is considered, along with the critical review of his theoretical positions. Macintyre?s conception is regarded on the one hand as very broad, because the entire morality is identified with ethical life, while on the other hand it is regarded as too narrow since it excludes certain essential aspects of deliberation which refers to the sphere of individual rights, the relations between communities, as well as distribution of goods within the state.


1998 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 35-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Neuhouser

My aim in this paper is to investigate Hegel's claim that ethical life (Sittlichkeit) does not simply negate but rather incorporates, or preserves, crucial elements of the Enlightenment conception of moral subjectivity that Hegel associates with the standpoint of Morality (Moralität). More specifically, the part of Hegel's view I want to examine here is his claim that individual moral conscience (Gewissen) has its place within the rational social order as depicted in Part III of The Philosophy of Right, “Ethical Life”. There is a widespread perception among Hegel's liberal critics that his vision of the rational social order allows no place for the genuine expression of moral conscience. This is the view expressed, for example, in Ernst Tugendhat's recent charge that Hegel's view excludes the possibility of “adopting a rational perspective” on a society's prevailing norms and practices’: “Hegel does not allow for the possibility of a responsible, critical relation to the … state. Instead he tells us that existing laws have an absolute authority. The independent conscience of the individual must disappear, and trust takes the place of reflection. This is what Hegel means by the Aufhebung of morality into ethical life”.


Napredak ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-56
Author(s):  
Milan Brdar

In this article author presents an apology of the state in relation to modern political theory and humanity scholars and persistent criticism of such an important institution. The first section of the article provides a reconstruction of the origins of the negative attitude toward the state in liberalism, Marxism and conservativism, which have resulted in ridiculous predictions regarding the disappearance of the nation state in the context of globalization. In the second part the author asserts that the state is the unavoidable medium of modern social synthesis and deals with the problem of the one-sidedness modern ideologies and their programs of social synthesis. The principles necessary to perform this task are divided amongst ideologies (freedom - liberalism, equality - Marxism, community - conservativism), and due to this historical fact, we have conflict between them instead of complementarity. This leads to the conclusion that we ought to get rid of devotion to one ideology in favor of reform of our way of thinking. The final section of the article provides a description of the phenomena present transitional societies and the leading political role of intellectuals. In the author's view this unhappy occurrence is due to inadequate education in the area of modern political theory, which due to its negative attitude toward the state reduces our political skill. The first step to avoiding this requires the abandonment of negative attitudes toward the state and the fostering of respect of the state as the protector of the "common good" and the guarantor of liberty, necessary for the improvement of people's lives, in keeping with Aristotle's statement.


1968 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Pranger

This is a political world of power and competition for power, together with, hopefully, the legitimate authority that goes with such power; a world where ability to dominate the will of others is prized either in itself or for other ends. Politics is associated with the quest for power, as an end or means. It is not surprising, therefore, that in looking at those thinkers in the past who have focused on human relationships and organized associations, commentators should be facinated with how they looked at domination, and also, secondarily, how they viewed freedom from such domination (for example, the limits of power). In the measure that these thinkers dealt with politics, one might say, they concerned themselves with power, authority, leadership, and, coincidentally, with freedom. put another way, what is typically “political” about their views about the “political system”; that is, how they looked at the process whereby valued goods are allocated authoritatively. This “system” includes formal, publlic institutional arrangements, such as the “State”, and processes within these institutions, such as “conflict” and“conciliation”.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Simon Lumsden

Abstract The notion of being-at-home-in-otherness is the distinctive way of thinking of freedom that Hegel develops in his social and political thought. When I am at one with myself in social and political structures (institutions, rights and the state) they are not external powers to which I am subjected but are rather constitutive of my self-relation, that is my self-conception is mediated and expanded through those objective structures. How successfully Hegel may achieve being-at-home-in-otherness with regard to these objective structures of right in the Philosophy of Right is arguable. What is at issue in this paper is however to argue that there is a blind spot in the text with regard to nature. In Ethical Life the rational subject's passions and inclinations are brought into the subject such that she is ‘with herself’ in them; with regard to external nature no such reconciliation is achieved or even attempted. In Abstract Right external nature is effectively dominated by and subsumed into the will and it is never something in which one is with oneself. It remains outside the model of freedom that Hegel develops in the Philosophy of Right. There is something troubling about this formulation, since it excludes nature from freedom, but also something accurate, as it reflects the unresolved attitude of moderns to the natural world.


2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sari Roman-Lagerspetz

”Thinking publicly otherwise” is one of the foundations of democracy. The task of the opposition in a democratic system is to express distrust, to criticize the actions of the government and to provide an alternative. The opposition institutionalizes distrust, and, paradoxically, the presence of this institutionalized distrust is, for the citizens, one important reason to trust the democratic system. The claim defended here is that the relationship between the government and the opposition can be understood in terms of Hegel’s dialectics. Although Hegel’s political theory as formulated in his Philosophy of Right emphasizes the unifying role of the State, his earlier philosophy contains more democratic potential.


1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 1086-1092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter G. Stillman

In “Abstract Right,” the first part of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel criticizes the usual content and formulations of liberal theories of rights. In terms of content, Hegel argues that the subject of rights is only a narrow abstraction from the full human being; that he has limited self-determination and limited political freedom; and that, when he acts on his rights, he produces terror and destruction. In terms of formulations, Hegel argues that the pervasiveness of contract relations is inaccurate and undesirable; that the state cannot be derived from the natural man's alienating his right to punish; and that it is inaccurate to conceptualize civil society as only limiting natural man's freedoms. By transforming natural to abstract rights, Hegel retains much of the substance of rights, while concurrently preparing for the later sections of his text which try to overcome the inadequacies of a political theory based only on rights.


2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-201
Author(s):  
Simon Lumsden

AbstractIn the Philosophy of Right Hegel argues that modern life has produced an individualized freedom that conflicts with the communal forms of life constitutive of Greek ethical life. This individualized freedom is fundamentally unsatisfactory, but it is in modernity seemingly resolved into a more adequate form of social freedom in the family, aspects of civil society, and ultimately the state. This article examines whether Hegel’s state can function as a community and by so doing satisfy the need for a substantial ethical life that runs through Hegel’s social thought. The article also examines why Hegel does not provide a detailed analysis of community, as a distinct sphere between the private and the public political sphere in the Philosophy of Right, and why it is not a key platform of his social freedom.


Author(s):  
Paul Redding

Politically, idealism would eventually be replaced by “materialism” in Karl Marx's transformation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's “absolute idealism,” while philosophically idealism was replaced by various anti-idealist doctrines in the twentieth century. But idealism still has its advocates, one recent supporter, in claiming “idealism as modernism,” essentially reinstating Friedrich Schlegel's assessment. For such a view, idealist philosophy, like the French Revolution and modern literature, is grounded in the characteristically modern idea of human freedom. This article discusses some of the implications for political thought to be found in three leading idealists from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Hegel. It examines Kant's “idealist” philosophy and its consequences for political theory, his transformation of the natural law and social contract traditions, Fichte's application of the “Wissenschaftslehre” to political philosophy and his views on intersubjective recognition, Hegel and the logical foundations of political philosophy, the will and its right, ethical life and the structure of the modern state, and Hegel's political solution of constitutional monarchy.


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