Hegel's philosophical theory of action: the concept of action in Hegel's practical philosophy and aesthetics

2013 ◽  
pp. 23-45
Author(s):  
Klaus Vieweg
Author(s):  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Andrey Breus

Paul Ricœur’s essay “Practical Reason” was initially published in 1979, and later became part of the book Du texte à l’action: essais d’herméneutique II (1986), marking Ricœur’s transition from the general problems of the justification of hermeneutics as a legitimate philosophical discipline to the problems of practical philosophy in a broad sense. Relying on the analytical theory of action, the interpretative sociology of M. Weber, and the Hegelian critique of Kantian ethics, Ricœur seeks to restore the Aristotelian concept of phronesis or “practical wisdom” in the context of modern philosophizing. This turns out to be unexpectedly relevant where neither Kant’s deontology nor the Hegelian Sittlichkeit can adequately express the entirety of human practical experience in a world where ideology and alienation have become inevitable components of social life.


2014 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerd Irrlitz

AbstractThis paper interprets Fichte’s transformation of the Enlightenment’s idea of self-consciousness into the concept of the ego as a transformation of transcendental logic into a philosophical theory of action. This transformation was of central importance for his critique of Kant as well as his rejection of both Schelling’s and Hegel’s ontologies of spirit, whose post-revolutionary determinism Fichte repudiated. Fichte developed his theory of action under the social premise of preindustrial labor, accentuating that social symmetry should be maintained against the tendency of property concentration amongst private property owners. His transformation of the concept of rationality (attained through transcendental logic) into a relational differentiation of the subject (1), its objectification (2), and the synthesis of both as an alteration between acting and suffering (3) open the path from an as yet - in terms of its presuppositions - monological concept of self-consciousness to a structural concept of action.


2001 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-142
Author(s):  
Jens Kulenkampff

In the first part of this paper, it is shown in what a conspicuous way the story of Oedipus illustrates a central feature of human agency, namely, that any action may turn out to be of quite another nature than it was thought, or intended, to be. The story of Oedipus provides further insight on comparing ancient and modern man's outlook on agents, their actions, and the world. It emerges that we moderns are lacking an adequate conceptual scheme for an understanding of human agency that lives up to the demands of an enlightened picture of the world. This problem should be one of the central topics of a philosophical theory of action, rather than the misguided questions, e.g. about the causal nature of reasons for action that are usually treated there. Accordingly the sketch of a critique of action theory is being offered.


1996 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Materska

Tadeusz Tomaszewski, born in 1910, graduate of the Jan Kazimierz University, Lvov, doctor honoris causa of Marja Sklodowska-Curie University, Lublin, is an exceptional figure in the history of Polish psychology. His scientific accomplishments and organizational talents, multipled by the achievements of his students, had a decisive impact on the shape and prestige of Polish psychology among other scientific disciplines and determined the rank of Polish psychology in the international arena.


1912 ◽  
Vol 3 (8) ◽  
pp. 465-465
Author(s):  
C. E. S.
Keyword(s):  

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