transcendental logic
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2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Schulting
Keyword(s):  


2021 ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Dennis Schulting
Keyword(s):  


2021 ◽  
pp. 50-59
Author(s):  
Mirja Hartimo
Keyword(s):  




2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Oleg V. Moroz

In this paper, Kant's philosophical doctrine of the categories of the reason is used to substantiate the conceptual model of knowledge representation, based on the collective interaction of a lot of intellectual atomic elements of knowledge (knowledge quanta), which are combined into clusters like neurons in the brain; and also a phenomenological description of the corresponding universal ontology, proceeding from the philosophical premise of Husserl-Heidegger that the meaning of intelligence is not so much in knowing the absolute truth as in survival, is presented. In the process of cognizing the surrounding world, a person uses both a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge, but the transcendental content of a priori forms of thinking does not allow them to be used directly in logical judgments. Nevertheless, one can try to use them as "ontological predicates" following the advice of I. Kant, what was done in this article. Heuristic ontological relations that directly follow from the categories of Kant are easy to use and sufficient to describe any ontology. Offered knowledge representation model, the key idea of which is the primacy of knowledge to logical inference and their emergent ability to self-organize, in conjunction with the transcendental logic-based ontology of empirical knowledge can be used to create a universal inference engine.



2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-50
Author(s):  
Rudolf Meer

Both the categories and principles of understanding as well as the ideas and principles of reason build transcendental elements to conceive transcendental philosophy as a philosophical system. Accordingly, in addition to the “Transcendental Analytic”, Kant develops in the “Transcendental Dialectic” an expanded concept of the transcendental. The transcendental ideas do not denote object-constitutive principles but, in a weaker sense, conditions of the possibility of experience. The relation between Division One and Division Two of the “Doctrine of Elements” can be demonstrated exemplarily with regard to Kant’s references to astronomy. Based on the constitutive principles of understanding, which are directed towards the field of possible experience and provide a connection of cognition through reasons and consequences, as well as the regulative principles of reason, which form maxims of research, astronomy is a proper and rational natural science. The analysis of the case studies of astronomy shows that Kant uses the term transcendental within the framework of the “Transcendental Logic” of the Critique of Pure Reason to denote conditions that are constitutive for the possibility of an object in general and for describing necessary regulative conditions of experience. With these reflections, Kant places his transcendental philosophy in a long tradition of philosophical thought in which the celestial bodies are the preferred subject.



Author(s):  
Nina A. Dmitrieva ◽  
◽  

In this research I focuse on Sergey L. Rubinstein’s German dissertation “A Study on the Problem of Method” (1913–1914), which aimed at solving the problem of method in transcendental philosophy as distinguished from Hegel’s philosophy and dualistic philosophical systems. After a brief description of the context in which this problem emerged in the 1910s, I reconstruct its general original in­tent from the archive copy of the dissertation. Further I show that the published part of Rubinstein’s study was the first serious attempt to explain the difference between the transcendental logic of Cohen and Natorp and what the Neo-Kan­tians called Hegel’s “absolute rationalism”. This issue has become one of the most difficult questions in the philosophical self-reflection of Marburg Neo-Kantianism. I reveal that in his critique of Hegel Rubinstein is based on the Co­hen’s thesis on the immanence of thinking and being, which means that all being in sense of its substantive determination is a function of thinking. In Hegel’s “Science of Logic” Rubinstein finds a violation of this principle, namely dualis­tic features expressed in the independence of being and thinking. From Rubin­stein’s further reflections it becomes clear that his critical thesis against Hegel about the transcendence of being in relation to all other logical definitions is ori­ented on Cohen’s conception of the last ground and his own project of an open system of categories. However, Rubinstein has overlooked that the epistemologi­cal differences between the concept and the object of the concept, thinking and being, are overcome on the last pages of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” by the concept of absolute knowledge, and “The Science of Logic” is a theory of pure thinking which seeks to justify the substantivity of thinking on the basis of a methodological rule, by means of which both the difference of being and think­ing, and their unity with the concept of pure thinking are revealed simultaneously.



Author(s):  
Yu.G. Sedov ◽  

The article substantiates the need to create a pure egology in order to analyze the structures of consciousness. The relevance of egological research is to form the foundation for disparate cognitive sciences. On the basis of the historical and philosophical approach, the idea of transcendental logic is considered and it is concluded that it is essentially correlated with the analysis of consciousness. Transcendental logic takes into account the pure content of human thinking, which is not reduced to an empirical composition. Results. 1. The question of the dual nature of logic was first raised by the ancient Stoics, who included in it a section devoted to the analysis of impressions and the formulation of criteria for knowledge. 2. The idea of transcendental logic is presented in its expanded form in the works of Kant, who divided it into analytics and dialectics. In the analytical section, Kant is confronted with a paradox — with the division of the pure I into two parts: active subject and passive object. The identity of these parts does not give any knowledge of how the pure I exist in itself. As a result of the transcendental analysis, a distinction is introduced between the pure and the empirical subject. 3. Hegel’s critical reinterpretation of the idea of transcendental logic leads to a new division, in which it corresponds to an objective logic that takes into account the content of knowledge and its origin. 4. The connection between logic and egology was found in Husserl’s later works, most systematically in “Formal and Transcendental Logic”. Transcendental logic is a subjectively oriented study that clarifies the constitutive activity of pure consciousness. The scientific novelty of the research consists in the fact that the pure I as a subject of egology contains and produces objective logical formations. Formal logic is concerned with inference and proof, being a demonstrative rather than descriptive discipline. This lack of formal logic can only be eliminated by transcendental logic, which directly addresses the experience of pure consciousness. It should be used to study the subjective structures that underlie theoretical reason. Thanks to the experience of egology, there is a real opportunity in the future to solve the question of reason in its relevance and live performance, in which objective formations find their source.



Author(s):  
O.V. Shalygina

We present here sections XV–XVI of A. Volynsky’s article “Critical and Dogmatic Elements in Kant’s Philosophy”, which are devoted to an analysis of such categories of Kant’s aesthetics as “the beautiful” and “the sublime.” Volynsky emphasizes the special significance of the problem of the unity of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic, as well as the unity of the critical and dogmatic foundations of his philosophy. This article is included in full in Volynsky’s A Book of Great Anger, which constructs on the basis of Kant’s categories of “the beautiful” and “the sublime” a picture of the development of Russian literature at the turn of the century, as well as a theory of the Russian ballet of the 1920s.



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