Direct perception and other minds

2015 ◽  
pp. 222-242
Author(s):  
Alexander Wendt
2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-201
Author(s):  
Patrizio Lo Presti

Direct perception and theory–theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This article argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one in which both sides can be right. The argument, then, is that inferentialism should not be called on to witness in favor or disfavor of advocates of either direct or indirect social cognition.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Erik Rietveld

Abstract Veissière and colleagues make a valiant attempt at reconciling an internalist account of implicit cultural learning with an externalist account that understands social behaviour in terms of its environment-involving dynamics. However, unfortunately the author's attempt to forge a middle way between internalism and externalism fails. We argue their failure stems from the overly individualistic understanding of the perception of cultural affordances they propose.


PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Oatley
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Susanne Schmetkamp

Narrative Empathie liegt dann vor, wenn der empathische Nachvollzugsprozess der (emotionalen, epistemischen) Situationen anderer Personen oder fiktiver Figuren durch ein Narrativ, das heißt eine sinnzusammenhängende Erzählung, ausgelöst und strukturiert wird. Der Aufsatz knüpft an den phänomenologischen Ansatz von Empathie als direkte Wahrnehmung an, vertritt aber die These, dass gerade bei Narrativen die Imagination und die Perspektiveneinnahme hinzukommen müssen, damit retrospektiv, prospektiv oder gegenwärtig die Situation des Anderen und seiner individuellen Perspektive vergegenwärtigt und verstanden werden kann. Der narrativen Empathie wird ein indirekter ethischer Wert zugeschrieben: Durch das empathisch anschauliche Anteilnehmen am Narrativ des Anderen und einen damit verbundenen Perspektivwechsel können auch unsere eigenen Perspektiven erweitert werden; dies kann zu besserem Verständnis ungewohnter Sichtweisen führen und moralische Gefühle und Handlungen motivieren. Narrative empathy is the complex re-presentation of an (emotional, epistemic) situation of another person or a fictional character by means of a narrative, which is a structured and perspectively colored context of meaning. The paper sympathizes with the phenomenological approach of empathy as direct perception though at the same time arguing that in cases of (literary, filmic, dramatic) narratives imagination and perspective-taking is also needed in order to be able to comprehend and to understand the other’s situation retrospectively, prospectively or at present. According to the author, narrative empathy has an indirect moral value: the vivid empathetic participation in the other’s narrative and the process of perspective-taking can help to broaden one’s horizons; this can lead to a better understanding of unfamiliar and other worldviews and motivate moral emotions and actions.


2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-243
Author(s):  
Verena Mayer

How do we understand other minds? The current debate uses the iridescent term “empathy” to explain our quite different mindreading capacities. Since no alternatives seemed to be available the discussion has been mostly in a deadlock between “simulation theory” and “theory theory”. Only recently the relevance of phenomenological findings on the issue has been brought forward. In this paper Husserl’s two concepts of “Einfühlung”, as developed in the second volume of his Ideas, are set against the background of the latest discussion. Husserl’s explanation of empathy in terms of analogical experience highlights the transcendental role of empathy in the context of constitution. At the same time it may solve some of the many riddles left by the recent debate.


Author(s):  
Carrie Figdor

Chapter 4 elaborates and provides an initial defense of Literalism. Updated versions of the inference to the best explanation argument for other minds provide a familiar framework for thinking about the plausibility of Literalism, as well as an additional argument for it as the default interpretation of the predicates as they are used in contemporary science. The chapter articulates what Literalism does not claim and what would falsify it. It also presents a series of initial objections to Literalism by means of a dialogue between the Literalist and an imaginary interlocutor, the Implicit Scare Quoter. The ISQ represents the broad range of intuitive objections to Literalism that follow from the initial response that the uses involve implicit scare quotes, indicating an implicit difference in meaning. The dialogue shows the strength of the Literal position in response to common objections.


Author(s):  
Mark Kaplan

Begins with Barry Stroud’s reconstruction of Descartes’s dream argument; lays out the critique of the argument that emerges from what Austin wrote in “Other Minds”; describes the long-standing consensus on how, and why, Austin’s way with skepticism goes wrong; shows how poorly this consensus view, of why Austin wrote as he did, fits with what Austin said about why he wrote as he did; explains how Austin’s requirement, that our epistemology be faithful to what we would ordinarily say and do, is properly to be understood, and why he endorsed it; defends Austin’s fidelity requirement against the charge that it fails to take proper account of (i) our failure to agree on what we would ordinarily say, (ii) the pragmatic factors that influence what we ordinarily say, (iii) the attitude of philosophical detachment with which epistemology is conducted, and (iv) the role intuitions play in epistemology.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document