Travauxto the EU Treaties: Preparatory Work as a Source of EU Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 145-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuli MIETTINEN ◽  
Merita KETTUNEN

AbstractThe Court of Justice of the European Union has historically rejected references to preparatory work in the interpretation of EU Treaties. However, the preparatory work for the EURATOM, Maastricht, and Constitutional Treaties have played a role in recent judgments. The ‘explanations’ to the Charter of Fundamental Rights are expressly approved in the current Treaties. We examine the emerging case law on preparatory work. Reference to the drafters’ intent does not necessarily support dynamic interpretation, and may potentially even ossify historical interpretations. Even if the consequence of their introduction is a conservative interpretation, their use raises questions of transparency and democracy, and complicates the already difficult task of interpreting the EU constitution.

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 174-182
Author(s):  
Kaie Rosin

Although the EU lacks explicit competence to harmonise national principles of criminal law, there are many ways in which EU law and national criminal law are interconnected on a level deeper than mere minimum standards adopted from directives. The article analyses these intersections between EU law and fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law, explaining how the principles of criminal law recognised and interpreted in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and covered by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union exhibit the capacity to affect fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law. The article focuses on five principles specific to substantive criminal law, which are derived from the fundamental principles of the Estonian Constitution and have equivalents in human-rights law: the principle of legality of criminal law, the principle of retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, proportionality, ultima ratio, and the principle of individual guilt. The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between EU law and the various principles of substantive criminal law is not uniform because the principles of substantive criminal law are not developed evenly at European Union level.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


Author(s):  
Berthold Rittberger

This chapter examines how the European Union acquired distinctive constitution-like features. It begins with a discussion of three routes to constitutionalization: the first is through changes in the EU's primary law; the second focuses on ‘in between’ constitutionalization; and the third leads directly to the European Court of Justice and its jurisprudence. The chapter proceeds by discussing two developments that have shaped the EU constitutional order almost since the beginning: the emergence of a body of EU law constituting a set of higher-order legal rules, and the consolidation of the constitutional principle of representative democracy. It explains how the supremacy and direct effect of EU law, as well as the EU court's concern with the protection of fundamental rights, helped transform the EU into a constitutional polity. It also considers how the extension of the legislative, budgetary, and other powers of the European Parliament animated the constitutional principle.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

AbstractWhile investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-52
Author(s):  
Marco Galimberti

Twenty years after its drafting and more than one decade after its entry into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has ceased to be part of British law as a consequence of Brexit. Looking into this issue raised by the UK withdrawal from the European Union, the essay sheds some light on the legal status and impact of the EU Bill of Rights in the British legal order. Against this background, the article detects a connection between the UK Supreme Court’s case law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the direct effect of the Charter. From this perspective, the analysis highlights the implications of the UK departure from the Charter and disentanglement from the Luxembourg case law, thus arguing that they may weaken the standards of fundamental rights protection.


Author(s):  
Rupert Dunbar

Article 3(5) of the Treaty on the European Union concerns EU external relations and was a new provision of the Lisbon Treaty. It has been seized upon by scholars for its reference to ‘strict observance of international law’ by the EU in its relations with the wider world. However, recent case law in the Court of Justice of the European Union has demonstrated little movement towards this supposed ideal. This article supports the fact that rigid and unquestioning adherence to international law has not emerged in case law, particularly as Article 3(5) TEU also mandates that the Union ‘uphold and promote its values and interests’. By taking a broader view of both the text and context of Article 3(5) TEU in EU law as a whole, and through consideration of the limited demands international law places on domestic courts, the article argues that – contrary to current literature – a more expressly balanced approach towards respect for international law is required and should be nurtured in the case law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-511
Author(s):  
Stephen Brittain

European Convention on Human Rights and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: relationship – Teleological method of interpretation of the European Court of Justice: meaning, justifications, and criticisms – Originalist method of interpretation: meaning, justifications, and criticisms – Original meaning of Article 52(3) of the Charter: text, drafting history, case law – Conclusion: case law of European Court of Human Rights not strictly binding on the Court of Justice of the European Union.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Ippolito

This article explores the various guarantees embedded in the eu Charter of Fundamental Rights for eu citizens and third country nationals, following the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of freedom, security and justice. In particular, it highlights the potential and limits to the impact of the Charter in immigration or asylum cases before the cjeu.


Author(s):  
Emily HANCOX

Abstract Article 6 Treaty on European Union sets out two sources of fundamental rights in the EU—the Charter and the general principles of EU law—without specifying a hierarchy between them. Even though the Charter became binding over a decade ago, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is yet to clarify unequivocally how these two sources interact. In this article I argue based upon the relevant legal framework that the Charter ought to replace the general principles it enshrines. This leaves a role for general principles in the incorporation of new and additional rights into the EU legal framework. Such an approach is necessary to ensure that the Charter achieves its aims in enhancing the visibility of the rights protected by EU law, while also providing the impetus for more coherent rights protection within the EU. What an extensive survey of CJEU case law in the field of non-discrimination shows, however, is that the CJEU has struggled to let its general principles case law go, potentially hampering the transformative potential of the Charter.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-115
Author(s):  
Márk Némedi

Abstract This paper analyses the case-law of the European Court of Justice on the substantive scope of ne bis in idem in transnational cases and evaluates the findings in light of the different concepts of legal interests inherent in the concept of crime as a material notion. I argue that the application of the interpretation of the ECJ to crimes against collective interests is insufficiently justified. As a result, the interpretation of ne bis in idem based on material facts appears only partially correct and a sense of distrust seems to be cemented between member states creating obstacles to a successful reform of the principle. Part one attempts to defend that the reasoning put forward by the court lacks relevance and evaluates how this affects mutual trust. Part two analyses this interpretation in the light of different forms of legal interest. Part three examines how later case-law has tried to explain the problematic interpretation of early cases and its relationship with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The article will conclude by summarising the findings which may put into perspective the more general challenges of cooperation in criminal matters within the EU.


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