scholarly journals Breathing Life into the Union’s Common Values: On the Judicial Application of Article 2 TEU in the EU Value Crisis

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 1182-1213
Author(s):  
Luke Dimitrios Spieker

AbstractThe EU faces one of the deepest crises since its formation. A dangerous rule of law backsliding in several Member States undermines the Union’s common values and puts Europe to the test. This raises the question of how to substantially address violations of EU values in judicial proceedings before the Court of Justice. Unfortunately, relying on fundamental freedoms, EU secondary legislation and even the Charter will not help much to resolve this value crisis. This Article takes a different path and calls for engaging with Article 2 TEU itself. Yet this proposal rests on a crucial premise: The judicial applicability of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Based on recent jurisprudential developments, this Article will elaborate a framework for the operationalization of Article 2 TEU values and demonstrate how their judicial applicability can be construed. The judgments of Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Minister for Justice and Equality (“L.M.”) and Commission v. Poland will be at the heart of this proposal.

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-70
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonelli

Abstract The EU has not yet found effective answers to constitutional crises in its Member States, in particular Hungary and Poland. Due to systemic problems of compliance with the common values of Art. 2, the legitimacy of the EU constitutional order and its smooth functioning are under threat, but the EU lacks instruments of direct enforcement and coercion. Several authors have therefore proposed to ‘federalize’ EU mechanisms and to guarantee to EU institutions, in particular the Court of Justice, more powers to intervene vis-à-vis Member States. However, the current Treaty framework presents a series of obstacles to federal-like enforcement. Solutions to national crises must ultimately respect the constitutional balance between the Union and the Member States.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 409-431
Author(s):  
Kirsten Schmalenbach

Abstract This contribution critically analyses the four limbs of the EU’s defence mechanism upholding the rule of law within the Union. The first being the individual post accession rule of law mechanism, introduced by the Commission in 2006 for the two new member states Bulgaria and Rumania. The second, and arguably most powerful limb, involves the EU Court of Justice conducting a judicial review of a member state’s rule of law situation, which is of far greater concern for reviewed members than the so-called “nuclear” last-resort option of Art. 7 teu ’s sanction mechanism (fourth limb) that is politically difficult to enact. With a view to the politically fraught Art. 7 teu, the Commission introduced a new “early warning” rule of law framework in 2014 which pre-emptively enables exploring dialogue-based solutions to rule-of law issues as they emerge (third limb).


Author(s):  
Irēna Kucina ◽  
◽  

Rule of law is one of the fundamental values of the European Union. Over time, Court of Justice of the European Union, national constitutional and supreme courts and legal science, which form the common European legal space, have come to a more sophisticated and refined understanding of this notion – a concept, which more or less represents a shared understanding of what the rule of law means among all Member States. European Union cannot allow any of its Member States to deviate from this principle. It must have efficient tools for preventing such acts. The purpose of the Regulation 2020/2092 of the European parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (the Regulation) is to give European Union a more efficient tool for ensuring Member States compliance with the rule of law. In addition to the existing legal instruments, it provides an entirely unique mechanism, which links the EU budget to the respect for the rule of law. This article analyses the already existing mechanisms for the enforcement of rule of law and then takes an in-depth look at the new mechanism established by the Regulation. It can be concluded that the Regulation represents a compromise, which is not perfect, but still workable. Although the process established by the Regulation is political, and there are certain risks to rule of law, guidelines adopted by the Council will precisely formulate the specific mandate of both political bodies (the European Commission and the Council of the EU) and align it with the legal purpose of the procedure. It will also enable Court of Justice to decide on specific cases, albeit post factum. Therefore, this Regulation should be considered as a step forward towards more efficient enforcement of rule of law in the European Union.


Author(s):  
Justyna Łacny

AbstractThe existing scale of violations of the rule of law by some Member States, including capturing judicial independence by their governments, is a relatively new phenomenon for the EU; the one for which the EU based on the EU common values (Article 2 TEU) originally was not prepared to effectively deal with. The EU reacts to current rule of law crisis by using different legal methods and instruments: it inter alia applies existing procedures (Article 7 TEU procedure and with more success general infringement procedure under Articles 258-260 TFEU) and struggles to develop new ones. This contribution is focused on the new EU legislative initiative of connecting in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 transfers of EU funds to Member States with their observance of the rule of law. Or to put it differently, this legislative initiatives would authorize the EU institutions to suspend regular transfers of EU funds to Member States that systematically breach the rule of law.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


Author(s):  
Barbara Marchetti

Several important features characterize administrative liability within the EU. First and foremost, not only is liability affirmed, but it is also based on the general principles of law common to the laws of the Member States. Second, and consequently, those principles have been defined and refined by EU courts. Third, the mere fact of a serious and manifest infringement of any rule of law may be enough for liability to arise and it is for EU courts to judge about it, without any preliminary appeal. It must be observed that the European administration—functionally intended—does not have the panoply of powers that characterizes national authorities and, in particular, is seldom involved in material activities. However, the exercise of its powers is subject to duties of legality and procedural fairness and propriety.


Author(s):  
Elena Sorokina

The preliminary ruling procedure is an essential feature of the EU legal system, which is a unique cooperation tool as part of the dialogue between the Court of Justice of the EU and national courts of the Member States. Its main purpose is to ensure uniform interpretation and application of the provisions of EU law with all Member States and to preserve the uniformity of the European legal system. The continuous use by national courts of the Member States of the mechanism of preliminary ruling and constructive inter-judicial cooperation, the Court of Justice has developed an extremely extensive case law on the prohibition of discrimination and with the result to introduce substantial changes in European anti-discrimination law.The preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice have shown its inclination to expand notions of what constitutes discrimination and in most cases the Court prompt by the desire to interpret the provisions of European law so as to ensure the full effectiveness of the law, as well as a willingness to promote and strengthen protection against discrimination in Europe. While the protection against discrimination on some grounds is stronger than others, however, the preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice are important contribution to the transformation of anti-discrimination law, promote change in the national legislation of the Member States and provide the more effective protection of human rights in general.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442110276
Author(s):  
Tricia Harkin

The case law of the Court of Justice from 2016 to 2019 on the interpretation of ‘judicial authority’ in Article 6(1) FD-EAW essentially examines whether a public prosecutor can be an issuing judicial authority and if so, how Member States’ systems for issuing EAWs ensure effective judicial protection for the person concerned. For the Advocate General, applying the Court’s ‘rule of law’ jurisprudence, effective judicial protection when deprivation of liberty is involved can only be assured by a body with the highest level of judicial independence, being a court. The Court’s broader approach of including public prosecutors with sufficiency of independence from the executive and requiring their decisions to be amenable to review by a court, when applied in practice arguably falls short of the requisite standard of effective judicial protection. There is also a lack of clarity about access to the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court by public prosecutors acting as judicial authorities. Effective judicial protection and EU cooperation in criminal matters would now be better served by the designation in all Member States of a court as the issuing judicial authority for the FD-EAW. This is against the background of the uniquely coercive nature of the EAW in terms of deprivation of liberty; the differences in Member States’ institutional arrangements for public prosecutors and the post-Lisbon effective constitutionalisation of judicial protection of rights of individuals.


Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


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