scholarly journals Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD D. MANSFIELD ◽  
HELEN V. MILNER ◽  
B. PETER ROSENDORFF
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
International Bargaining

Our earlier article established that pairs of democracies trade more freely than country-pairs composed of a democracy and an autocracy (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000). Xinyuan Dai (2002) incorrectly asserts that our conclusion depends on the preferences of the decision makers who formulate trade policy. We show that Dai fails to accurately replicate our model, and hence erroneously claims that the new equilibria she deduces are consistent with it. In addition, we demonstrate that in altering one of our assumptions, Dai offers a model that is less realistic as well as inconsistent with the substantive literature on international bargaining. Finally, we question the robustness of her approach. Due to these problems of replication, realism, and robustness, we conclude that Dai's model is of limited utility.

scholarly journals The Politics of International Trade

2019 ◽  
pp. 652-683
Author(s):  
Wilfred J. Ethier ◽  
Arye L. Hillman
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
First Generation ◽  
Second Generation ◽  
Terms Of Trade ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Political Preference ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Self Interest

Traditional international trade models explain the sources of comparative advantage and show how a country as a whole gains from trade and from terms-of-trade improvement. The traditional models assumed competitive market-determined outcomes with passive or benevolent government. Income-distribution consequences of trade policy were noted. The models did not address the politics of trade policy, the study of which requires two premises consistent with public-choice principles: (1) that political self-interest underlies policy decisions rather than benevolent-government social-welfare objectives, and (2) political decision makers prefer creation of politically assignable rents to non-assignable budgetary revenue or aggregate country-wide gains from free trade or terms-of-trade improvement. These two premises are acknowledged in the first-generation of models of politicized trade policy. A second generation of models includes the first but not the second premise. It is documented that public-choice premises have not always been included in mainstream economic models. The second-generation models devoid of the primacy of rents in trade-policy determination are mainstream for many members of the academic international trade community. The chapter explains how, by not including the political preference for rents over budgetary revenue, the second-generation models are at variance with the actual conduct of trade policy. Public-choice concepts are also used to re-evaluate a wide range of traditional trade-policy conclusions and recommendations. Empirical evidence is reviewed and interpreted.

scholarly journals Political Regimes and International Trade: The Democratic Difference Revisited

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
XINYUAN DAI
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Trade Negotiations ◽  
Trade Barriers ◽  
Political Regimes ◽  
Mixed Pair ◽  
Domestic Political Institutions ◽  
Problematic Aspect

How do domestic political institutions affect the outcomes of international trade negotiations? Specifically, are the aggregate trade barriers agreed upon by a democratic pair lower than those by a pair composed of a democracy and an autocracy? I revisit these important questions by highlighting some problematic aspect of the analysis by Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000). Contrary to their central conclusion, I find that whether the aggregate trade barriers are lower for a democratic pair than those for a mixed pair depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved. Thus, although domestic political institutions are important, they alone are insufficient to predict a higher level of cooperation among democracies.

An exposition of trade policy formulation through the issuing of "Trade Policy Directives" by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition under the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clive Vinti
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Procedural Rationality ◽  
Abstract Section ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Republic ◽  
A Charge

ABSTRACT Section 5 of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 (ITAA) provides that the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition has the power to issue "Trade Policy Directives" subject to the procedures and requirements of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution) and other laws. However, there is uncertainty as to how trade policy is formulated under section 5 of the ITAA and the rights of affected parties in this regard. Thus, this article offers an exposition of the process of trade policy formulation under section 5 of the ITAA. To this end, it is my view that trade policy formulation under section 5 must be guided by section 195 of the Constitution, which requires that the public must be "encouraged" to participate in policy formulation and that this must occur in a climate of openness, transparency and accountability. In the narrower sense, it is also my view that interested parties must be given an opportunity to participate in trade policy formulation on the ground of procedural rationality and to avoid a charge of arbitrariness as twin components of the rule of law. Keywords: Trade policy; International Trade Administration Act; rule of law; legality; rationality; arbitrariness; transparency; accountability; governance.

The Impact of Unilateral Trade Policy on International Trade Structure

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moon hee Cho ◽  
Chankwon Bae ◽  
Kyu Yub Lee ◽  
Jungu Kang ◽  
Jihyeon Kim
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Trade Structure ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals The Analysis of Section 301's of the US Trade Policy in International Trade and The Impact to GATT Rules (What Can be learned as an Indonesian Trader)

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 38
Author(s):  
Victor Purba
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Trade Policy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Section 301

"Section 301" memberikan wewenang luas kepada Presiden AS untuk mengambil tindakanpembalasan terhadap praktek-praktek perdagangan negara asing yang dianggap merugikan AS. Keampuhan Section 301 ini antara lain berhasil membuka pasar bagi barang-barang Amerika di luar negeri. Umpamanya Jepang, yang akhirnya bersedia menerima penjualan alat-alat telekomunikasi, jeruk dan daging asal AS. Namun, ancaman Section 301 tidak selalu berhasil membuka pasar luar negeri. Sengketa kemudian diselesaikan dalam pertemuan-pertemuan GATT.

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