Rationality and social norms

1991 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Elster

One of the most persisting cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Émile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. The former is ‘pulled’ by the prospect of future rewards, whereas the latter is ‘pushed’ from behind by quasi-inertial forces (Gambetta 1987). The former adapts to changing circumstances, always on the lookout for improvements. The latter is insensitive to circumstances, adhering to the prescribed behavior even if new and apparently better options become available. The former is easily caricatured as a self-contained, asocial atom, and the latter as the mindless plaything of social forces. In this paper I characterize this contrast more fully, and discuss attempts to reduce norm-oriented action to some type of optimizing behavior.

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Elster

One of the most persistent cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Emile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. In this paper I characterize this contrast more fully, and discuss attempts by economists to reduce normoriented action to some type of optimizing behavior. Social norms, as I understand them here, are emotional and behavioral propensities of individuals. Are norms rationalizations of self-interest? Are norms followed out of self-interest? Do norms exist to promote self-interest? Do norms exist to promote common interests? Do norms exist to promote genetic fitness?


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-54
Author(s):  
Richard Boyd

AbstractFor all the recent discoveries of behavioral psychology and experimental economics, the spirit of homo economicus still dominates the contemporary disciplines of economics, political science, and sociology. Turning back to the earliest chapters of political economy, however, reveals that pioneering figures such as Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and Adam Smith were hardly apostles of economic rationality as they are often portrayed in influential narratives of the development of the social sciences. As we will see, while all three of these thinkers can plausibly be read as endorsing “rationality,” they were also well aware of the systematic irrationality of human conduct, including a remarkable number of the cognitive biases later “discovered” by contemporary behavioral economists. Building on these insights I offer modest suggestions for how these thinkers, properly understood, might carry the behavioral revolution in different directions than those heretofore suggested.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Billingsley

This essay examines narratives of fundamental change, which portray a break in the continuity between a pre-transition and post-transition transgender subject, in accounts of transgender transitions. Narratives of fundamental change highlight the various changes that occur during transition and its disruptive effects upon a trans subject’s continuous identity. First, this essay considers the historical appearance of fundamental change narratives in the social sciences, the media, and their use by families of trans people, partners of trans people, and trans people themselves. After this is a consideration of Mark Johnson’s account of narrative as a meaning-making activity that occurs in the context of social norms. Johnson’s account is then applied to narratives of fundamental change to explain why these narratives occur, especially in relation to social norms and lived experience. The essay concludes by considering the trajectory of fundamental change narratives, looking at emerging transgender narratives, which stress a more integrated, complex account of transgender lives.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Wintrobe

Economics is a powerful way of thinking. While there may occasionally be major errors in its application, at its core the principles of economics remain the strongest paradigm in the social sciences. Buddhism is also a powerful way of thinking. The central question in Buddhist philosophy is the same as that in economics: what is the key to human happiness? How can human suffering be reduced? But the answer to this question in the Buddhist way of thinking is exactly the opposite of that given by economics. Can Adam Smith learn from the Buddha? Can Buddhism learn from economics? This essay explores these topics. I first present an interpretation of what I take to be the core of Buddhist thinking in economic terms, and then show how that could be incorporated into economic thinking, and how economics would change as a result. I then try to do the reverse, and show how the economic way of thinking can clarify Buddhist thinking. I apply simple economic theory to develop a model of rational Zen Buddhism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Paterson

This commentary seeks to extend and interrogate the notion of ‘climate-as-condition’ deployed in Bulkeley’s paper. It does so by proposing that we complement the focus on how climate change is currently being made and remade, rather than appearing as a problem to which we respond, with an interrogation of the historical production of climate change by particular social forces and processes. In doing this, it seeks another way to insist on the centrality of the social sciences in understanding climate change. But it also suggests that the sorts of vignettes that Bulkeley develops may be understood differently if they are situated historically.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-34
Author(s):  
Robert Prus

Whereas Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) has long been envisioned as a structuralist, quantitative, and positivist sociologist, some materials that Durkheim produced in the later stages of his career—namely, Moral Education (1961 [1902-1903]), The Evolution of Educational Thought (1977 [1904-1905]), The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915 [1912]), and Pragmatism and Sociology (1983 [1913-1914]) attest to a very different conception of sociology—one with particular relevance to the study of human knowing, acting, and interchange. Although scarcely known in the social sciences, Emile Durkheim’s (1993 [1887]) “La Science Positive de la Morale en Allemagne” [“The Scientific Study of Morality in Germany”] is an exceptionally important statement for establishing the base of much of Durkheim’s subsequent social thought and for comprehending the field of sociology more generally. This includes the structuralist-pragmatist divide and the more distinctively humanist approach to the study of community life that Durkheim most visibly develops later (1961 [1902-1903]; 1977 [1904-1905]; 1915 [1912]; 1983 [1913-1914]) in his career.


2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 167-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol J. Greenhouse

This article takes up Marilyn Strathern’s formulation of a law/culture ‘duplex’ – her term for the complementarity of anthropology and law as means to each other’s ends. She draws attention to the limitations of the duplex, and urges us to consider ethnography as (in part) a project of unwinding its entwinement. As a step toward that end, the article returns to classic texts by Emile Durkheim and Bronislaw Malinowski – texts that were foundational to the emergence of anthropology, and to the establishment of law as an object of study for the social sciences. Re-read in light of Strathern’s insight, what has been widely taken as their relativism emerges instead as their defense of political community as a subject for ethnography, and (accordingly) the basis for a theoretical check on law conceived globally – within states or as colonial overrule. The article concludes with a discussion of the contemporary relevance of that position.


Author(s):  
Daniel Halliday ◽  
John Thrasher

This book acquaints the reader with arguments for the moral foundations of market society, as well as the applications of these arguments. Broadly, the book encourages a distinction between capitalism construed as an ideal rather than as a label for the economic status quo and its associated injustices. These foundational arguments are compared with arguments in favor of socialism. Special attention is paid to historically significant figures such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and F.A. Hayek. Later chapters deal with more specific and contemporary themes. These include problems not fully foreseen by historic proponents of market order, such as the challenges of climate change, competitive consumption, and the need for an institutionalized order for global trade. Other chapters focus on institutions familiar to most market societies, such as a welfare state, as well as alternatives, such as basic income. Overall, the book seeks to both revisit historically influential arguments for capitalism while also seeking to examine how these historical views stand up to contemporary challenges of economic justice. The book is written primarily for an audience of undergraduates (including majors in the humanities and the social sciences). But it would also be useful for anyone seeking a summary of major themes in political economy, particularly those with moral significance.


Author(s):  
Linda A. Dietch

This chapter briefly reviews the rise of social-scientific criticism—a subfield of biblical criticism that uses social-scientific theory to ascertain how social forces, institutions, and practices impacted the origin and development of biblical religions and texts and the peoples and communities behind both—and demonstrates the method’s usefulness through application to Judges 3:12–30. Since biblical narratives provide partial and fragmentary glimpses into ancient lives, this essay recommends the careful use of the social sciences to extrapolate encoded social values, systems, and relations. Émile Durkheim’s conceptions of sacred and profane and the function of religious ritual highlight the Ehud narrative’s cultic interests, which underscore the interdependence between deity and collective. Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptions of social field, habitus, and doxa permit one to hypothesize the effect of field and habitus on the text’s ancient producers and distinguish between their explicit views and doxic assumptions.


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