Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se from the distribution of key government pay-offs, such as cabinet portfolios, between members of the resulting government. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, taking into account knowledge of the identity of some government ‘formateur’ or even of the composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations – Gamson’s Law. This article resolves this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution that, for example, predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post. It concludes that canonical models of legislative bargaining do increase the ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.

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Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055407070517 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 101 (4) ◽

pp. 847-850 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

MARIA MONTERO ◽

JUAN J. VIDAL-PUGA

Keyword(s):

Bargaining Power ◽

Government Formation ◽

Legislative Bargaining ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante

Morelli (1999) provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. We provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff; furthermore, there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves.

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The Case for the Stateless Society: Law

Acta Economica Et Turistica ◽

10.1515/aet-2017-0012 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 3 (2) ◽

pp. 103-118

Author(s):

Antón Chamberlin ◽

Walter E. Block

Keyword(s):

Sharp Contrast ◽

Mutual Gain ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante ◽

Stateless Society ◽

The Government

AbstractWhat is the argument against government? There are several. For one thing, there is automatic exit for failure: businesses that do not earn a profit go bankrupt, and their resources tend to migrate to other, more effective, managers. For another, entrepreneurs operate with their own funds, or those voluntarily entrusted to them. This does not apply to bureaucrats and politicians, in sharp contrast. Perhaps most important, in the case of each and every commercial interaction in the market, buying, selling, renting, lending, borrowing, there is mutual gain at least in the ex ante sense of anticipations, and usually ex post, after the trade, as well. This rarely occurs under statism, at least not with regard to its source of funds, taxation, since it is not voluntary. An exception would be the relatively unimportant cases in which a consumer purchases something from the government, such as a ticket to cross a bridge, or a producer sells something to this organization, such as an airplane. The present paper is an attempt to elaborate upon this considerations.

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The Cost of Local Government Structural Reorganisation in Great Britain during the 1990s

Environment and Planning C Government and Policy ◽

10.1068/c0063 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 20 (2) ◽

pp. 251-262 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Michael Chisholm

Keyword(s):

Structural Change ◽

Great Britain ◽

Local Government ◽

Costs And Benefits ◽

Transition Costs ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante ◽

The Government ◽

The Cost ◽

Official Data

When the structure of local government in Great Britain was reorganised during the 1990s, considerable emphasis was placed by the government on the financial savings which would accrue to offset the costs incurred in making the changes. Previous work examined these expectations and found clear evidence that the ex ante estimates of transition costs given to the Westminster parliament were serious underestimates, and that the expected savings had not, at that time, materialised. This work was done at a time when it was known that some of the official data on transition costs would not be complete until after the close of the 2000/01 financial year. The author's primary purpose is to place on record what may be regarded as the final estimates of the transition costs in England, Scotland, and Wales. In addition, comparisons between the ex ante estimates of the costs of structural change and the ex post evidence concerning actual costs are updated. The discrepancy between these is such as to confirm the need for some form of independent scrutiny of new legislation at the time when it is being considered in parliament, to ensure that decisions are taken in the light of realistic assessments of the costs and benefits of proposed enactments.

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Iniciativa legislativa del gobierno y técnica normativa en las nuevas leyes administrativas (leyes 39 y 40/2015)

Teoría y Realidad Constitucional ◽

10.5944/trc.38.2016.18612 ◽

2016 ◽

pp. 433

Author(s):

Piedad García-Escudero Márquez

Keyword(s):

Impact Assessment ◽

Citizen Participation ◽

Public Consultation ◽

Ex Post ◽

Better Regulation ◽

Legislative Agenda ◽

Ex Ante ◽

Regulatory Impact ◽

The Government

El artículo examina las novedades que las nuevas grandes leyes administrativas de procedimiento y régimen jurídico (Leyes 39 y 40/2015) introducen en la regulación de la iniciativa legislativa por el Gobierno, en concreto en la elaboración de los proyectos de ley, que incluye un trámite de consulta pública y participación ciudadana. Se analizan asimismo las nuevas medidas en favor de la calidad de las leyes y la coherencia del ordenamiento, como la planificación normativa, la aplicación de los principios de buena regulación y la evaluación ex ante y ex post que afectará no sólo a los reglamentos, sino también a los anteproyectos de ley.This essay analyses the new rules introduced by the recent Spanish administrative laws of procedure and organization (39 and 40/2015) in the proposal of bills by the Government, in particular in the elaboration of draft legislation, which includes a process of public consultation and citizen participation. Are also examined the new measures tending to improve the quality of laws, such as legislative agenda, application of the principles of Better Regulation and ex ante and ex post regulatory impact assessment.

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To the theory of collective actions. Part 3. Conditions for achieving an optimum

Теоретическая и прикладная экономика ◽

10.25136/2409-8647.2020.2.29856 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 75-85

Author(s):

Vladimir Ivanovich Tsurikov ◽

Elena Matveevna Skarzhinskaya

Keyword(s):

Mathematical Model ◽

Human Capital ◽

Self Organization ◽

Incentive System ◽

Collective Actions ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante ◽

The Subject ◽

Gross Income ◽

Effective Use

The subject of this research is opportunities for effective use of human capital members of the collective in the conditions of self-governance and self-organization resources. It is assumed that members of the collective are capable to jointly create an additional cost by making individual efforts. Value of the expected gross income increases with the efforts put by each agent, and subordinated to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each member of the collective consists in maximization of the own individual profit. Overcoming ineffective equilibrium faced by the collective as a result of independent choice of amount of effort applied by the members, and achievement of Pareto-preferred outcome requires corresponding coordination of collective actions. The key goal of coordination consists in overcoming opportunistic behaviors in form of shirking and such setting of incentive system that would results in application of optimal efforts by all members of the collective. Within the framework of mathematical model structured on the general principles, the author determines the essential conditions for achieving this goal. One of them dictates a corresponding strategy, another one – formulates the ex post rule of distribution of value of the expected gross income, perceived by all members of the collective as ex ante. According to this rule, the portion of each member of the collective in gross income must be equal his portion of efforts. Acceptance of this rule allows implementing a strategy, which motivates each member of the collective to apply efforts that would meet the maximal combined profit.

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The Political Executive

The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198823834.013.21 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 348-365

Author(s):

Shane Martin

Keyword(s):

Political System ◽

Selection Process ◽

The Political ◽

Relative Power ◽

Central Theme ◽

Ex Post ◽

System P ◽

Ex Ante ◽

The Government ◽

Core Features

There can be little doubt that the cabinet is at the apex of political power in Ireland. Yet the central theme of this chapter is a challenge to the conventional wisdom of undue executive dominance. This is often thought of as an imbalance in the relative power of the executive and legislature, where the imbalance favours the executive. This chapter cautions that the degree to which the party or parties comprising the executive must remain responsive to the preferences of the bodies they serve—parliament, but ultimately the electorate—may be underestimated. Specifically, we suggest that the level of ex ante control (through the government selection process) and ex post control (through various oversight mechanisms) make the Irish cabinet particularly responsive to the interests and preferences of parliamentarians and voters. Even though the government may appear to dominate the legislature, responsiveness and accountability are core features of the political system.

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