The Legal Aspect of Money. Fourth edition. By F. A. Mann, C.B.E., F.B.A., LL.D. (London), DR. JUR. (Berlin), HON. DR. JUR. (Kiel), Member of the Institut de Droit International, Honorary Member of the American Society of International Law, Honorary Professor of Law in the University of Bonn, Solicitor of the Supreme Court, London. [Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1982. lvi, 580 and (Index) 22 pp. Hardback £35·00 net.]

It is a happy conjunction that makes it possible for this Journal to celebrate in successive numbers the eightieth birthdays of Harry Hollond and Arnold McNair.Arnold Duncan McNair, c.b.e., q.c., f.b.a., ll.d., first Baron McNair of Gleniffer, was born on March 4, 1885. It is given to very few to attain to such high distinction in so many different spheres. As an academic, a jurist de grande classe, the author of many works in the first rank of legal literature, the occupant at one time of the Whewell chair in international law and later of the chair of comparative law, an honorary doctor of seven universities, an honorary member of the Institut de Droit International, his special place amongst international lawyers was marked in 1959 when he was presented with the Manley Hudson Gold Medal by the American Society of International Law; as an administrator, he was, during the difficult period of the war and its aftermath, the Vice-Chancellor of one of the great civic universities; as a member of the legal profession, he is a former Judge and President of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, President of the European Court of Human Rights, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and a Bencher of his Inn and sometime its Treasurer; as a man of affairs, he has served on numerous government inquiries and commissions, and is now regularly employing in the House of Lords those talents as a speaker that were already in evidence when he became President of the Cambridge Union in 1909.

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Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appointments to the Supreme Court. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. ix, 310 - Philippa Strum, The Supreme Court and “Political Questions”: A Study in Judicial Evasion. University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1974, pp. 188

Canadian Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0008423900046400 ◽

1975 ◽

Vol 8 (4) ◽

pp. 572-573

Author(s):

Carl Baar

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Political History ◽

University Of Alabama ◽

Oxford University ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

History Of ◽

The University ◽

Oxford University Press

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The Legal Aspect of Money. By F. A. Mann, ll.d. (Lond.), DR.Jur. (Berlin), Honorary Professor of Law in the University of Bonn, Solicitor of the Supreme Court. [Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1971. i, 605 and (Index) 9 pp. £9”00 net.]

The Cambridge Law Journal ◽

10.1017/s0008197300090401 ◽

1973 ◽

Vol 32 (1) ◽

pp. 165-166

Author(s):

J. G. Collier

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Legal Aspect ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

The University

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ASSUMING REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR TRANSNATIONAL TORTS: AN INTERSTATE AFFAIR? A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CANADIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW TORT RULES

Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice ◽

10.22329/wyaj.v31i1.4321 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 31 (1) ◽

pp. 197

Author(s):

Roxana Banu

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

International Law ◽

Multinational Corporations ◽

Legal Aspects ◽

Striking Similarity ◽

Private International Law ◽

Public International Law ◽

Legislative Authority ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Droit International

In Tolofson v. Jensen, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that in most cases the law of the place where the tort occurred has exclusive authority to regulate all legal aspects related to it. In developing this choice of law rule, the Supreme Court relied on an analogy between Private International Law and Public International law. This allows Private International Law to claim a structural, neutral function in the distribution of legislative authority in the international realm and to ignore both private law and public law considerations. To best reveal the way in which the Supreme Court injected these limitations into Private International Law by reference to Public International Law, I show the striking similarity between the Supreme Court’s reasoning and several Private International Law writings at the end of the 19th century in Continental Europe. In the context of the extraterritorial tortious activity of multinational corporations, these limitations make Private International Law oblivious to arguments of Corporate Social Responsibility scholars showing that a multinational corporation may legitimately be regulated by the state of its headquarters, even for extraterritorial conduct. Overall, I argue that an overemphasis on legislative authority as a symbol of state sovereignty transforms Private International Law matters generally, and transnational torts in particular, in inter-state affairs, removed from the interests and pleas of the individuals and communities affected by them. Dans l’arrêt Tolofson c. Jensen, la Cour suprême du Canada a décidé que, dans la plupart des cas, la loi du lieu où le délit a été commis régit exclusivement tous les aspects juridiques qui s’y rapportent. Pour établir cette règle du choix de la loi applicable, la Cour suprême s’est fondée sur une analogie entre le droit international privé et le droit international public. Cela permet au droit international privé de réclamer une fonction structurelle et neutre au niveau de la distribution du pouvoir législatif dans le domaine international et d’ignorer tant les considérations de droit privé que les considérations de droit public. Pour mieux illustrer la façon dont la Cour suprême a inséré de telles restrictions dans le droit international privé par renvoi au droit international public, je démontre la similitude frappante entre le raisonnement de la Cour suprême et de nombreux écrits en droit international privé à la fin du 19e siècle en Europe continentale. Dans le contexte des activités délictueuses extraterritoriales des sociétés multinationales, de telles restrictions rendent le droit international privé insensible aux arguments des universitaires prônant la responsabilité sociale des entreprises selon lesquels une société multinationale peut légitimement être régie par l’État où est situé son siège social, même pour sa conduite extraterritoriale. Dans l’ensemble, je fais valoir qu’une trop grande importance accordée au pouvoir législatif comme symbole de la souveraineté étatique transforme les affaires relevant du droit international privé en général et les délits transnationaux en particulier en affaires interétatiques qui ne tiennent pas compte des intérêts et demandes des particuliers et collectivités qu’elles touchent.

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