THE BINDING FORCE OF AGREEMENTS TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH

2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 598-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leon E. Trakman ◽  
Kunal Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
The Common ◽  
Commercial Value ◽  
Law Courts

AbstractThis article evaluates the established judicial proposition that an agreement to negotiate in good faith is antithetical to the principles of the common law. English courts are reluctant to enforce such agreements on the ground that they constitute unenforceable “agreements to agree”. Recently, courts have started to recognise an exception in cases where parties agree to negotiate over a term mandated by an existing agreement, such as to review a price clause or resolve a dispute by undertaking negotiations in good faith. The primary arguments against enforcing an independent agreement to negotiate in good faith are threefold. First, parties engaged in good faith negotiations are assumed to lack a serious legal intention to contract. Second, such an agreement is substantively uncertain in nature and does not promise to produce a contract. Third, the failure of parties to conclude their negotiations does not lead to an easily identifiable loss. In light of these considerations, this article considers the viability of enforcing an agreement to negotiate in good faith in the absence of a pre-existing contract. It argues that the legal obstacles to recognising agreements to negotiate have been overstated. Given the commercial value of enforcing such agreements, it proposes that agreements to negotiate in good faith should be recognised and given legal content by common law courts.

The New Private Law and Intellectual Property

2020 ◽  
pp. 408-426
Author(s):  
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Concepts And Categories ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Legal Concepts

This chapter studies intellectual property (IP). A hallmark of the New Private Law (NPL) is attentiveness to and appreciation of legal concepts and categories, including the traditional categories of the common law. These categories can sometimes usefully be deployed outside of the traditional common law, to characterize, conceptualize, and critique other bodies of law. For scholars interested in IP, for example, common law categories can be used to describe patent, copyright, trademark, and other fields of IP as more or less “property-like” or “tort-like.” Thischapter investigates both the property- and tort-like features of IP to understand the circumstances under which one set of features tends to dominate and why. It surveys several doctrines within the law of copyright that demonstrate how courts move along the property/tort continuum depending on the nature of the copyrighted work at issue—including, in particular, how well the work’s protected contours are defined. This conceptual navigation is familiar, echoing how common law courts have moved along the property/tort continuum to address disputes over distinctive types of tangible resources.

The Coalition's Plan to Regulate Industrial Relations

1993 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Braham Dabscheck
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
The Common ◽  
Industrial Conflict ◽  
The Law

In October 1992 the federal coalition released Jobsback, a statement of its industrial relations policies. The article situates Jobsback in the context of the evolution of the coalition's industrial relations policies since the Fraser years, outlines its major features, and provides a critique. Jobsback erects a new regulatory schema under a banner of deregulation. Three key elements are contained in Jobsback. They are tribunal avoidance and the use of the common law, legislatively imposed employment rules to ‘aid’ the transition from an award to a non-award system, and enterprise confinement. The article draws attention to the coalition's views concerning industrial conflict, constitutional issues, transitional problems associated with establishing legislatively imposed workplace rules, minima in workplace agreements, the Office of the Employee Advocate, equality before the law and good faith bargaining.

scholarly journals GOOD FAITH IN FRANCHISE CONTRACT

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (19) ◽  
pp. 118-127
Author(s):  
Nurli Yaacob ◽  
Nasri Naiimi
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Law System ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
Term Contract ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Good faith has been defined as justice, fairness, reasonableness, decency, taking no chances, and so on. The concept of good faith has long been rooted in contract law under the jurisdiction of Civil law, although the definition of it is still debated until today. However, the view of the Common Law tradition does not recognize the concept of good faith as long as the contract is entered into with the freedom of contract and both parties abide by the terms of the contract. Given that a franchise contract involves a long-term contract and always been developed, it is impossible to define both rights and responsibilities base on express terms only. As such, the franchise contract gives the franchisor the right to exercise its discretion in executing the contract. It is in this context that the element of good faith is very important to ensure that the franchisor does not take advantage of the franchisee and that the business continues to prosper. Therefore, the objective of this article is to discuss the concept of good faith in a franchise contract. The findings show that the common law system that initially rejected the application of the concept of good faith also changed its approach and began to recognize the concept of good faith as it is very important for relational contracts such as franchise contracts.

Remedies for equitable wrongs

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Burrows
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Substantive Law ◽  
Court Of Chancery

Torts and breach of contract are termed common law wrongs because they were historically developed in the common law courts. Equitable wrongs are civil wrongs that historically were developed in the Court of Chancery. Despite the fusion of the common law courts and the Court of Chancery by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873–1875, much of the substantive law has not been fused. One example is the continued distinction between common law and equitable wrongs. In a rational fused system, nothing should turn on whether a civil wrong is common law or equitable. But that is not the present law.

Dispute Resolution in the Islamic Finance Industry

2020 ◽  
pp. 804-833
Author(s):  
Camille Paldi
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Islamic Finance ◽  
Finance Industry ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Courts

A unique and independent legal framework is important to effectively adjudicate Islamic finance disputes, Sukuk bankruptcies, and Takaful disputes. Currently, these disputes are being adjudicated in common law courts or ineffective arbitration centres where often the Islamic finance transaction is inadvertently converted into a conventional transaction due to the common law nature of the dispute adjudication. In this chapter, a framework is proposed for Islamic finance dispute resolution in the form of the Dubai World Islamic Finance Arbitration Centre (DWIFAC), DWIFAC Jurisprudence Office, the Sukuk Bankruptcy Tribunal (SBT) and the Takaful Tribunal (TT).

The Law of Negligence as Reported in The Times, 1785–1820

2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 383-419
Author(s):  
James Oldham
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Jury Trials ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
The Times ◽  
Post Trial ◽  
Century Development

Historically, the clear recognition by the courts that all adults in public intercourse owe a duty of reasonable care to avoid injuring others has been seen as an early nineteenth century development. Occasionally it is recognized that what is known about the emergence of the tort of negligence in English law comes almost entirely from the printed reports of civil (plea side) cases tried in the three common law courts (King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer). It was not until the 1790s that regular printed reports of jury trials (or nisi prius cases, as they were called) began, and even then, enlightenment from the nisi prius reports was limited. Most of those reports were sketchy, and very few included instructions given to the jury by the trial judge. More importantly, the reports covered only a small fraction of the jury trials that were conducted by the common law courts. The overwhelming majority of civil jury trials ended with the jury verdict (or an occasional nonsuit), with no post-trial proceedings, and what happened in many thousands of these plea-side jury trials in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has been something of a black hole in the historical record.

GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE IN CANADIAN CONTRACT LAW

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris D.L. Hunt
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Hospital Services ◽  
Similar Statement ◽  
General Duty ◽  
Binding Force

IN Mellish v Motteux (1792) 170 E.R. 113, 157, Lord Kenyon observed that “in contracts of all kinds, it is of the highest importance that courts of law should compel the observance of honesty and good faith”. This passage echoes a similar statement by Lord Mansfield 25 years earlier in Carter v Boehm (1766) 97 E.R. 1162, 1910. Despite these early statements of principle, the modern common law has been notoriously hostile to the notion that contracting parties are under a general duty of good faith in the performance of their obligations (see W.P. Yee, “Protecting Parties' Reasonable Expectations: A General Principle of Good Faith” (2001) 1 Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J. 195), and there is certainly “no firm line of modern cases to support such an obligation” in English law (see L.E. Trakman and K. Sharma, “The Binding Force of Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith” [2014] C.L.J. 598). Nevertheless, some recent decisions in Australia, Canada, and England have begun to imply obligations to perform certain types of promises, in certain classes of contracts, in an honest manner, crafting, in the words of Lord Bingham, “piecemeal solutions in response to piecemeal problems” (Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989] 1 QB 433, 439 (CA)). A recent English example is Yam Seng Pte Ltd. v International Trade Corporation Ltd. [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) in which Leggatt J. found there to be an implied duty of “honesty” and “fidelity to the bargain” in the context of a long-term distribution contract. Importantly, His Lordship emphasised that whether such obligations can be implied is a matter of construction, which involves ascertaining the parties' objective intentions through conventional techniques such as the principle of business efficacy. As implying such obligations depends entirely on the context of each contract (at paras [137]–[143]) there is, at present, no general principle of good faith performance in English contract law, despite some case-by-case recognition (see Mid-Essex Hospital Services N.H.S. Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd. [2013] EWCA Civ 200, at [105], [150]).

scholarly journals Lies, Collateral Lies and Insurance Claims: The Changing Landscape in Insurance Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-265
Author(s):  
Baris Soyer
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Insurance Fraud ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Insurance Law ◽  
Significant Challenge ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utmost Good Faith ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of

Determining the scope of the fraudulent claims rule in insurance law has posed a significant challenge for the courts, particularly in the last two decades. In the shadow of the doctrine of utmost good faith, the law in this area has developed in an uncompromising fashion introducing draconian remedies against an assured who submits a fraudulent claim. The Supreme Court's most recent intervention has provided much needed guidance on the state of the law. This article, taking into account the fact that in other areas of law more proportionate remedies have gradually been introduced, discusses the boundaries of the fraudulent claims rule in insurance law as it applies in England and Wales and Scotland. Considering that the insurers might be tempted to introduce fraudulent claims clauses into their contracts to expand the common law definition of insurance fraud at the claims stage, this article also evaluates the wording of such clauses often used in practice and concludes that they lack the desired clarity.

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