The Incomplete Legal Transplant – Good Faith and the Common Law

Author(s):  
Anthony Gray
1993 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Braham Dabscheck

In October 1992 the federal coalition released Jobsback, a statement of its industrial relations policies. The article situates Jobsback in the context of the evolution of the coalition's industrial relations policies since the Fraser years, outlines its major features, and provides a critique. Jobsback erects a new regulatory schema under a banner of deregulation. Three key elements are contained in Jobsback. They are tribunal avoidance and the use of the common law, legislatively imposed employment rules to ‘aid’ the transition from an award to a non-award system, and enterprise confinement. The article draws attention to the coalition's views concerning industrial conflict, constitutional issues, transitional problems associated with establishing legislatively imposed workplace rules, minima in workplace agreements, the Office of the Employee Advocate, equality before the law and good faith bargaining.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (19) ◽  
pp. 118-127
Author(s):  
Nurli Yaacob ◽  
Nasri Naiimi

Good faith has been defined as justice, fairness, reasonableness, decency, taking no chances, and so on. The concept of good faith has long been rooted in contract law under the jurisdiction of Civil law, although the definition of it is still debated until today. However, the view of the Common Law tradition does not recognize the concept of good faith as long as the contract is entered into with the freedom of contract and both parties abide by the terms of the contract. Given that a franchise contract involves a long-term contract and always been developed, it is impossible to define both rights and responsibilities base on express terms only. As such, the franchise contract gives the franchisor the right to exercise its discretion in executing the contract. It is in this context that the element of good faith is very important to ensure that the franchisor does not take advantage of the franchisee and that the business continues to prosper. Therefore, the objective of this article is to discuss the concept of good faith in a franchise contract. The findings show that the common law system that initially rejected the application of the concept of good faith also changed its approach and began to recognize the concept of good faith as it is very important for relational contracts such as franchise contracts.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-265
Author(s):  
Baris Soyer

Determining the scope of the fraudulent claims rule in insurance law has posed a significant challenge for the courts, particularly in the last two decades. In the shadow of the doctrine of utmost good faith, the law in this area has developed in an uncompromising fashion introducing draconian remedies against an assured who submits a fraudulent claim. The Supreme Court's most recent intervention has provided much needed guidance on the state of the law. This article, taking into account the fact that in other areas of law more proportionate remedies have gradually been introduced, discusses the boundaries of the fraudulent claims rule in insurance law as it applies in England and Wales and Scotland. Considering that the insurers might be tempted to introduce fraudulent claims clauses into their contracts to expand the common law definition of insurance fraud at the claims stage, this article also evaluates the wording of such clauses often used in practice and concludes that they lack the desired clarity.


• contrary to the requirement of ‘good faith’; • it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ right and obligations; • to the detriment of the consumer (reg 5(11)). The issues of ‘significant imbalance’ and consumer ‘detriment’ seem largely matters of fact to be decided ‘case by case’, although, significantly, they seem suggestive of substantive unfairness compared to the largely, procedural unfairness perspective of ‘good faith’ discussed below. ‘Consumer’ is defined (reg 3) so as to include only ‘natural’ persons, thereby immediately ruling out the possibility of an R & B Customs Brokers type argument. The burden of proof (that is, to establish that a term ‘challenged’ is fair) lies on the seller/supplier (reg 5(4)). Three issues in the regulations seem of particular interest and uncertainty: (i) Core terms Regulation 6(2) reconfirms that the Regulations will not ‘bite’ on any term which either: (a) defines the main subject matter of the contract; or (b) relates to the adequacy of the contract price, so long as the term in question is in ‘plain intelligible’ language. The meaning of (a) is far from clear, as it seems to link back to the ‘Coote’ perspective on exemption clauses dismissed earlier (see fn 10) and, unless interpreted carefully could lead to a re-emergence of the argument that liability is not being excluded – merely not accepted in the first place. Of course, there must be something at the ‘core’ of a contract which cannot be challenged as ‘unfair’ (assuming the consumer entered into the contract freely in the first place) – but this should, surely, be construed narrowly. (ii) Good faith The remarks of Bingham LJ in Interfoto v Stiletto convey lucidly the broad sense of ‘good faith’, a concept which seems of the essence of the idea of procedural fairness. In many ways, good faith in the codes of countries like Germany seems to play a similar role to that of equity in relation to the common law – giving a ‘gloss’ of flexibility, humanity and justice to an otherwise rather schematic and technical system. The wording of reg 5(1) suggests that, even if a term shows some evidence of imbalance and detriment, it may be acceptable if the consumer received full and clear information about the implications of the clause and went into it with his/her eyes open.

1995 ◽  
pp. 497-497

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Berger ◽  
Thomas Arntz
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-331
Author(s):  
Hector MacQueen ◽  
Shannon O'Byrne

In 2014 the Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v Hrynew formally but cautiously acknowledged good faith as a general organising principle of contractual performance at common law and that the principle largely manifests by way of implied terms and through the new duty of honesty. Rejecting English recalcitrance on the subject, the SCC concluded that recognising a good faith principle makes the common law less unsettled and piecemeal, more coherent and just. The article suggests that the limitations placed on the good faith principle by the SCC make its potential adoption in Scotland offer more opportunity than risk, especially in relation to the exercise of contractual discretions and contractual remedies.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon O'Byrne ◽  
Ronnie Cohen

This article explores the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2014 decision in Bhasin v. Hrynew. This includes an assessment of the new duty of honesty in contractual performance and the newly identified organizing principle of good faith. The authors also discuss contracting out of the duty of honesty — which Bhasin itself raises as a possibility — by assessing both Canadian and American law on point, including the Uniform Commercial Code. The article concludes that Bhasin’s largest and most lasting contribution is likely in how it expressly legitimates and defends the role of good faith in the common law of contract.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Dr. Brunela Kullolli

This article analysis relates to the creation of conditions for the conclusion of the contract.This is the moment when the negotiating parties determine whether there will be a contract or not. This is the stage that in the best case is finalized with the contract signing.Known as the pre-contractual stage, it is considered as the foundation of the contractual relationship.Conduct in good faith at the stage of entering into a contract would also avoid causing potential damages and liability".- The first part gives , of Completion of the contract in good faith, is a legal requirement under the Civil Laë tradition, but unlike the requirement for pre-contractual trust, finds place in the Common Law tradition.In this part of the study, the detailed treatment of the manner of performance of the contract will be set aside, focusing mainly on the obligations that dictate its fulfillment in good faith and the liability incurred in the event of its absence . The second part is concentrated, Contract Interpretation. The third part will be treated as a brief and comparative overview of the common law of Civil Law in the interpretation of the contract, taking into account the main interpretative criteria, to underline the main differences between them. Among all the criteria, the focus will be on trust, which is sanctioned as a special criterion of interpretation by the Civil Law countries. The fourth part analysis the validity of the contract.In this last part of the chapter, I will try to clarify the confusion created between the rules of contract validity and the rules of conduct, as well as the role and impact of the breach of the trust principle in the validity of the contract. Conclusions .Regarding the situations that arise for the damage that comes to the parties from non-fulfillment of obligations and breach of the principle of good faith during the contract's formation, it is necessary to clarify how the type of damage that came during the pre-contractual phase and which interest has failed to realize one of the parties. In fact, this is a genuine duty of the court which, as the case may be, must specify exactly: the responsibility of the parties, the interest that has been violated, the type of damage that has been caused.Keywords: contract law ,internal law ,contractual relation,internal contract interpretation, civil law


Author(s):  
Andre Louw

This piece, which is in three parts, will revisit the importation of fairness into the employment contract (outside and independent of the fairness-based provisions of our labour legislation) by a line of Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judgments during the 2000s. This process culminated in the recognition of an "implied duty of fair dealing" in the common-law employment contract. This piece will discuss such developments, will argue that such an implied duty still forms part of our law (despite the apparent consensus in the literature that the SCA turned its back on such earlier judgments), will critically examine some of the arguments for and against the recognition of such a duty, and will then consider the issue within the broader context of the role of good faith and fairness in our general law of contract.    


Author(s):  
Brittany Scott

Over the past number of years, the law surrounding the requirement to operate in good faith in conducting contractual obligations has been a developing principle in common law countries from Australia, to the United Kingdom to Canada. In Canada, this principle has developed separately within the civil and common law legal traditions respectively. While the Quebec Civil Code has historically provided for an expectation of parties to a contract to operate in good faith, the common law in Canada has not been as clear.  Prior to 2014, the Canadian common law duty to negotiate in good faith was an unsettled body of law, recognized in certain areas, but not across the discipline as a whole. It has only been since the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bhasin v. Hrynew that this duty to negotiate in good faith has been outlined as a coherent set of guiding principles. Parties to a contract are now both bound by a general organizing principle of good faith in contracts and are expected to act honestly in the performance of their contractual obligations. While new to the Canadian common law, numerous cases have been quick to test the court’s interpretation of this change in scope to the law of good faith. As Canadian common law jurisprudence moves forward, this principle will continue to expand and develop.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document