scholarly journals RETURN TO SENDER: LET THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE JUSTIFY OR QUALIFY INTERNATIONAL-CRIMINAL-COURT EXCEPTIONALISM REGARDING PERSONAL IMMUNITIES

2019 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 596-611
Author(s):  
Sarah M.H. Nouwen

AbstractThis article argues that it is important for the International Court of Justice to be given an opportunity, for instance through a request for an Advisory Opinion, to explain what exactly it meant when it suggested that the ordinarily applicable international law on immunities need not be an obstacle “before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction”. Two international criminal courts have built a structure of case law on this one obiter comment, which it seems unable to support.

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 616-693
Author(s):  
Alessandra Spadaro

For the first time, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are dealing concurrently with the same set of events, which concern the violence to which those in the group that self-identifies as the Rohingya have been subjected in Myanmar, and that has prompted their mass exodus to Bangladesh. Before both courts, proceedings are at a preliminary stage.


2003 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALAIN WINANTS

The 1993/1999 Belgian Law on Universal Jurisdiction allows for prosecution before Belgian domestic courts regardless of the nationality of perpetrators or victims, the place where the breaches were committed, or the presence on Belgian territory of the alleged perpetrators. Is universal jurisdiction contrary to international law? Is universal jurisdiction in absentia permitted under Belgian law and under international law? What is the relationship between universal jurisdiction, as exercised by a national court, and the Statute of the International Criminal Court? This article provides an overview of the Belgian legislation and its future with regard to international law and the Statute of the International Criminal Court.


Author(s):  
Theodor Meron

This chapter discusses the revival of customary humanitarian law. It begins by considering the origins of the revival, followed by discussions of the application of customary international law by non-criminal international bodies, such as the International Court of Justice; the customary law jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and the customary law jurisprudence of the other international criminal courts.


2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger S. Clark

The crime of aggression will be included within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court once agreement is reached on its definition and the conditions for exercising jurisdiction. The author discusses the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of the now concluded Preparatory Commission for the Court to complete the drafting. He suggests how the mental and material elements of the offense might be structured consistently with other offenses in the Statute of the Court. Probably the biggest intellectual hurdle is that of “conditions.” A number of states, notably the Permanent Members of the Security Council, insist that there must be a predetermination of an act of aggression by a state made by the Security Council. Others believe that the predetermination can be made by the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice. Yet others claim that all decisions must be made by the International Criminal Court. The political choice between these positions has still to be made.


1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariano J. Aznar-Gomez

Following extensive debate by the great theoreticians of public international law earlier in this century,1 it might seem that the completeness of the international legal order is now a banal issue, which should be remembered only as an academic dispute.2It might have been so had the International Court of Justice not intervened, perhaps unintentionally, in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons3 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Rosalyn Higgins argues that “the Court effectively pronounces a non liquet on the key issue on the grounds of uncertainty in the present state of law, and of facts”.4 In her view, the Court thus interrupted a line of case law which, in theory, had endorsed the idea of the completeness of international law and which, in practice, made it unthinkable that an international judge or arbitrator should actually pronounce a non liquet.5


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