Foundations of Political Analysis: An Introduction to the Theory of Collective ChoiceRobert Abrams New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. xii, 357 - Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice TheoryClifford S. Russell, ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979, pp. xvi, 296

1981 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-442
Author(s):  
Mark Sproule-Jones
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.


Author(s):  
Randall G. Holcombe

Austrian economics is a school of thought, while public choice is an area of inquiry, so one way to analyze the two together is to look at how the Austrian school approaches the subject matter of public choice. There are substantial and long-standing areas of commonality between Austrian ideas and the literature in public choice, but most Austrian school contributions to public choice are in the form of critiques of the ideas of public-choice theories rather than the development of an independent Austrian public-choice theory. Public choice analyzes collective decision-making processes, but Austrian economists often assume away collective decision-making issues to focus on knowledge problems that hinder government allocation of resources. For this and other reasons, an Austrian school analysis of collective decision-making processes remains underdeveloped. Austrian economics offers many insights that could be used to develop a more Austrian public-choice theory.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pickering

"Instead of considering »being with« in terms of non-problematic, machine-like places, where reliable entities assemble in stable relationships, STS conjures up a world where the achievement of chancy stabilisations and synchronisations is local.We have to analyse how and where a certain regularity and predictability in the intersection of scientists and their instruments, say, or of human individuals and groups, is produced.The paper reviews models of emergence drawn from the history of cybernetics—the canonical »black box,« homeostats, and cellular automata—to enrich our imagination of the stabilisation process, and discusses the concept of »variety« as a way of clarifying its difficulty, with the antiuniversities of the 1960s and the Occupy movement as examples. Failures of »being with« are expectable. In conclusion, the paper reviews approaches to collective decision-making that reduce variety without imposing a neoliberal hierarchy. "


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