Consequentialist Perfectionism

Dialogue ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-116
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Perfectionism is an ambitious and thoroughly engaging work in which Thomas Hurka sets out to formulate and defend a normative ethical theory that “is of sufficient depth and generality to be … the basis of all moral claims” (p. 32). Beginning with an axiology, Hurka proposes that the development of the properties constitutive of human nature is intrinsically good, and his fundamental moral principle enjoins us to promote the greatest development of the nature of all humans at all times.

A Common Subject for Ethics

Mind ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
History Of ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Common ◽  
Moral Twin Earth ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize and explore what I shall call the Common Subject Problem for ethics. The problem is that there seems to be no good answer to what property everyone who makes moral claims could be talking and thinking about. The Common Subject Problem is not a new problem; on the contrary, I will argue that it is one of the central animating concerns in the history of both metaethics and normative theory. But despite its importance, the Common Subject Problem is essentially invisible on many contemporary ways of carving up the problems of metaethics and normative ethical theory. My aim, therefore, is to make progress – in part by naming the problem, but also by beginning to sketch out the contours of what gives the problem its force, by distinguishing between different paths of response to the problem and assessing some of their chief merits, and finally, by distinguishing the Common Subject Problem from another problem with which it has come to be conflated. This nearby problem is the Moral Twin Earth Problem. Whereas the Common Subject Problem is a problem about what property ‘wrong’ could refer to, the Moral Twin Earth Problem is a problem about how ‘wrong’ could refer to it. The upshot of the paper, therefore, is to rescue one of the historically significant problems in normative ethics and metaethics – a problem that is essentially about normative semantics – from the illusion that has persisted over the last twenty years that it is really, somehow, a problem about metasemantics. Once we have reclaimed this problem, we can see that it could still be a problem even if there are no distinctively metasemantic problems in metaethics at all, that it is a problem faced by a wider variety of views, and that the space of possible solutions is much wider and more interesting for normative theory, moral psychology, and moral epistemology.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Thick Concept ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

The Introduction summarizes the basic tenets of Target Centred Virtue Ethics. It begins with an account of the fundamental concepts of virtue ethics in general and shows that virtue ethics is a family of normative ethical theory with several genera and species. The target-centred version of virtue ethics developed in the book is one species of virtue ethics opposed to the orthodox neo-Aristotelian version in many respects. Central to all forms of virtue ethics is ‘Thick Concept Centralism’, and the ‘Centrality of Virtuousness’, whether the notion of virtuousness is applied to character, actions, rules or motives. The Introduction outlines these theses, and the notion of the targets of virtues, before summarizing the contents of the book, including the metaphysics of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, the nature of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, and broad issues surrounding the application of Target Centred Virtue Ethics.

Naturalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 169-179
Author(s):  
Jay L. Garfield
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Ethical Orientation ◽  
Buddhist Ethics

This chapter argues that naturalism is a virtue in an account of human experience, and thus desideratum in any ethical theory, and that Buddhist ethics is indeed naturalistic. In particular, its ethical orientation relies on no transcendent or transcendental concerns; its theory of the good is rooted in an account of human nature and the nature of the natural world, and its account of agency and responsibility is thoroughly causal. The chapter also discusses some of the aspects and implications of karma, including karmic fruition, the ways that our future lives are conditioned by our present ones, and the idea of collective karma.

Reconsidering Ontology’s Relevance

2021 ◽  
pp. 24-42
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
General Principle ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Self ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Kwame Nkrumah ◽  
Moral Claims

This chapter and the next are methodological, focused on how to justify a moral theory. Many African philosophers believe that ethical claims follow immediately from ‘external’, metaphysical ones about human nature that must be established first. For example, Kwame Nkrumah maintains that an egalitarian ethic follows directly from a prior physicalist ontology, and Kwame Gyekye contends that his ‘moderate communitarian’ morality is derived from a certain conception of the self. Chapter 2 shows how these and similar rationales fail to clear the ‘is/ought gap’, as it is known in Western meta-ethics, and also how strategies one might use to bridge the gap do not work. It concludes that a more suitable way to defend a moral theory is to argue ‘internally’ to morality by appealing to intuitions, i.e., by determining which comparatively more controversial general principle of right action easily entails and best explains less controversial particular moral claims.

Teleological ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Different Types

The Greek telos means final purpose; a teleological ethical theory explains and justifies ethical values by reference to some final purpose or good. Two different types of ethical theory have been called teleological, however. Ancient Greek theories are ‘teleological’ because they identify virtue with the perfection of human nature. Modern utilitarianism is ‘teleological’ because it defines right conduct as that which promotes the best consequences.

Alienation and Self-realization

Philosophy ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 48 (183) ◽  
pp. 21-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Human Growth ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Animal ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Self-realizationist theories are among the classical attempts to develop a comprehensive normative ethical theory. Plato and Aristotle, in giving classical statements of such theories, argue that a man's distinctive happiness, a man's distinctive flourishing, will only be realized when he realizes himself, i.e. when he achieves to the fullest possible degree his distinctive function. And to achieve one's function is to develop to the full those capacities which are distinctive of the human animal. In doing this we are being most truly ourselves and in doing this we are doing what it is our own nature to do. Men who cultivate to the fullest that which men and only men have will be the happiest men and in so acting they will realize themselves most fully; they will achieve their maximum potential or their fullest distinctively human growth. To so realize oneself is the final end of all moral activity. It defines what is to constitute ‘the good life’ and what is to count as ‘a good man’.

Needs and Rights

Dialogue ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Duane Willard
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Ideal ◽  
Strong Impulse

It is not difficult to sympathize with the strong impulse among philosophers to attempt to explain, justify, and even define moral concepts in factual terms. For without some kind of grounding in the facts of human nature, we may be quite perplexed concerning what relevance moral concepts have to our actual decisions, actions, and social relationships. Put another way, without grounding moral concepts in facts we may be quite puzzled as to the connections between principles and practice, between the ideal and the actual. The history of ethical theory contains several serious efforts by various philosophers to provide factual grounding for moral concepts, efforts which we cannot here take up.

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