Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 11

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This 11th volume brings together 13 new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including moral conscientiousness and moral wrongness; impartiality and the boundaries of morality; moral testimony; Kant’s categorical imperative; and ethical theories as methods of ethics.

Introduction

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in normative ethical theory. This 11th volume includes chapters on the following topics: the significance of appreciation; the objective/subjective debate over wrongness; requests as a kind of wrong; the puzzle of taking comfort in the travails of others; finding meaning in one’s life; the boundaries of morality in light of the legitimacy of non-moral partialist pursuits; the value of moral testimony to those who testify; the category of “ordinary” wrongs that are not blameworthy; the practical role of Kant’s Categorical Imperative; the possibility of non-moral blame; reasons to reject the category of subjective obligation; how to understand the point of ethical theory; and the justification of social moral rules....

Human Dignity and Tragic Choices

This essay comments on the aspirations and limits of normative ethical theory, some merits of a broadly Kantian version, the common complaint that Kantian ethics refuses to admit exceptions to familiar moral principles, objections to the idea of human dignity, examples of lies and torture, and the value of details and simplicity in ethics.

Ethical issues in physician aid-in-dying

According to international convention, physician aid-in-dying includes euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, both of which are voluntarily requested forms of medicalized killings. In the former, a physician injects the patient with lethal drugs, whereas in the latter, the patient self-administers such drugs. The two practices differ fundamentally from non-treatment decisions and from the last-resort treatment, palliative sedation, and details of the differences are outlined in the chapter. Physician aid-in-dying differs considerably in appearance, depending on which normative ethical theory is taken as the point of departure and how various theories can be used either to reject or to defend physician aid-in-dying. The chapter also discusses alternative ways for palliative care physicians to relate to physician aid-in-dying.

Life and Work

This chapter is an introduction to Kant’s life and his work. It situates Kant’s moral philosophy historically, explains his writing of The Doctrine of Virtue (DV) and its place in Kant’s overall moral philosophy. The chapter concludes with an overview of the book’s five parts. Part I is background comprising two chapters. Part II explains the material in Kant’s general introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, of which DV is a part. Part III covers the dedicated introduction to DV, while parts IV and V cover the doctrine of elements of ethics and the doctrine of method that comprise his normative ethical theory.

Introduction

The Introduction summarizes the basic tenets of Target Centred Virtue Ethics. It begins with an account of the fundamental concepts of virtue ethics in general and shows that virtue ethics is a family of normative ethical theory with several genera and species. The target-centred version of virtue ethics developed in the book is one species of virtue ethics opposed to the orthodox neo-Aristotelian version in many respects. Central to all forms of virtue ethics is ‘Thick Concept Centralism’, and the ‘Centrality of Virtuousness’, whether the notion of virtuousness is applied to character, actions, rules or motives. The Introduction outlines these theses, and the notion of the targets of virtues, before summarizing the contents of the book, including the metaphysics of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, the nature of Target Centred Virtue Ethics, and broad issues surrounding the application of Target Centred Virtue Ethics.

A Decision-making Framework for the Ethical Planning Practitioner

This article describes a three-part framework for making ethical decisions in planning practice. The framework includes both process and substantive components and is based on my own perspective of ethics as a practicing planner but also informed by descriptions of ethics from the planning and public administration literatures. The framework draws heavily on Howe (1994) and Bolan (1983). In terms of process, I describe five stages of a decision-making process and recommend it as a modest contribution to normative ethical theory. The framework also describes four sources of normative ethics; that part of the framework is descriptive, not normative. A third component of the framework identifies different values of the deontological and consequentialist approaches to ethics, neither of which can be considered complete or correct in its own right.

Introduction

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in the field of normative ethical theory. This tenth volume features chapters on the following topics: defending deontology, justice as a personal virtue, willful ignorance and moral responsibility, moral obligation and epistemic risk, the so-called numbers problem in ethics, rule consequentialism, moral worth, respect and rational agency, a Kantian solution to the trolley problem, virtue and character, and the limits of virtue ethics....

The Limits of Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is often understood as a rival to existing consequentialist, deontological, and contractualist views. But some have disputed the position that virtue ethics is a genuine normative ethical rival. This chapter aims to crystallize the nature of this dispute by providing criteria that determine the degree to which a normative ethical theory is complete, and then investigating virtue ethics through the lens of these criteria. In doing so, it’s argued that no existing account of virtue ethics is a complete normative ethical view that rivals existing consequentialist, deontological, and contractualist views. Moreover, it is argued that one of the most significant challenges facing virtue ethics consists in offering an account of the right-making features of actions, while remaining a distinctively virtue ethical view.