A Common Subject for Ethics

Mind ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
History Of ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Common ◽  
Moral Twin Earth ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize and explore what I shall call the Common Subject Problem for ethics. The problem is that there seems to be no good answer to what property everyone who makes moral claims could be talking and thinking about. The Common Subject Problem is not a new problem; on the contrary, I will argue that it is one of the central animating concerns in the history of both metaethics and normative theory. But despite its importance, the Common Subject Problem is essentially invisible on many contemporary ways of carving up the problems of metaethics and normative ethical theory. My aim, therefore, is to make progress – in part by naming the problem, but also by beginning to sketch out the contours of what gives the problem its force, by distinguishing between different paths of response to the problem and assessing some of their chief merits, and finally, by distinguishing the Common Subject Problem from another problem with which it has come to be conflated. This nearby problem is the Moral Twin Earth Problem. Whereas the Common Subject Problem is a problem about what property ‘wrong’ could refer to, the Moral Twin Earth Problem is a problem about how ‘wrong’ could refer to it. The upshot of the paper, therefore, is to rescue one of the historically significant problems in normative ethics and metaethics – a problem that is essentially about normative semantics – from the illusion that has persisted over the last twenty years that it is really, somehow, a problem about metasemantics. Once we have reclaimed this problem, we can see that it could still be a problem even if there are no distinctively metasemantic problems in metaethics at all, that it is a problem faced by a wider variety of views, and that the space of possible solutions is much wider and more interesting for normative theory, moral psychology, and moral epistemology.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
New Work ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Choice Under Uncertainty ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics brings together new work on various dimensions of normative ethical theory. This seventh volume features thirteen chapters dealing with practical reasoning, Bernard Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ complaint about impartial ethical theories, the concept of moral right, the wrongness of lying, moral choice under uncertainty, the notion of subjective obligation, commendatory reasons, desire satisfaction and time, a challenge to contractualism, the nature of creditworthiness, partiality toward oneself, the relation between virtue and action, and monism versus pluralism about non-derivative value....

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
New Work ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Evaluative Beliefs ◽  
Moral Advice ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in the field of normative ethical theory. This eighth volume features chapters which collectively address the following topics: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults....

Metaethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Finlay
Keyword(s):  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Many ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

A tripartite distinction is often drawn in moral philosophy between (i) applied ethics, (ii) normative ethical theory, and (iii) metaethics. Applied ethics seeks answers to moral questions about specific practices like abortion, euthanasia and business, while normative ethics seeks abstract moral principles that apply generally. We can loosely define metaethics as seeking answers to questions about normative ethics. It does not, at least directly, seek answers to moral or normative questions about (e.g.) which acts are right, what things are good, or how we ought to live our lives; instead it asks a variety of nonmoral questions about morality. While it is sometimes claimed that metaethics is morally neutral in the sense that it leaves normative questions open, metaethical theories can have normative implications, and it is sometimes argued that they all do. Since there is in principle no limit to the kinds of nonmoral questions one might ask about morality, there is no limit to the possible kinds of metaethical questions other than their relation to the subject of morality. One central kind of question is semantic, concerning the meaning of moral language. For example, what do we mean by saying that something is ‘right’ or ‘good’? Another central kind of question is metaphysical. For example, what kind of property is moral goodness, and does such a thing exist? A third central kind of question is epistemological, concerning how we might come to know moral truths. Some of the many other kinds of metaethical questions are psychological (concerned with the mental attitudes we call ‘moral judgments’ and how they motivate us to action), logical (concerning the inferences we can legitimately draw between different moral claims), sociobiological (concerning how humans may have evolved as beings with a moral sense), and – although it may blur the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics – normative (concerning the rational justification for acting morally). The boundaries of metaethics are vague. For example, just as normative ethics on a broader conception concerns itself not merely with morality narrowly construed but with all practical or normative questions about how to act, choose and live, so too metaethics on a broader conception asks nonnormative questions about normativity more generally.

Consequentialist Perfectionism

Dialogue ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-116
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Perfectionism is an ambitious and thoroughly engaging work in which Thomas Hurka sets out to formulate and defend a normative ethical theory that “is of sufficient depth and generality to be … the basis of all moral claims” (p. 32). Beginning with an axiology, Hurka proposes that the development of the properties constitutive of human nature is intrinsically good, and his fundamental moral principle enjoins us to promote the greatest development of the nature of all humans at all times.

Freedom and Morality

2019 ◽  
pp. 97-139
Author(s):  
Sandra Shapshay
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Hard Determinism ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The World ◽  
The Will ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Most contemporary ethical theorists do not look to Schopenhauer as a resource for contemporary normative ethics. Chapters 1 and 2 dispel one of the main reasons for this—namely, that Schopenhauer’s pessimism leads only to the recommendation of resignation. But there is another reason why Schopenhauer has been neglected as an ethical theorist that this chapter addresses. It is widely held that Schopenhauer espouses hard determinism, the view that human beings (in addition to non-human animals) are determined to act as they do on the basis of physical and psychological laws. Yet, without the presumption of freedom it makes little sense to offer a normative ethical theory. Accordingly, before reconstructing Schopenhauer’s normative ethical theory, one needs to get clearer on his views on freedom. This chapter begins with Schopenhauer’s grappling with the problem of how freedom is possible in his dissertation (1813) and traces the development of his theory of freedom through The World as Will and Representation (1818) and his essay “On the Freedom of the Will” (1839). Next, it offers an interpretation of Schopenhauer’s mature compatibilist view that shows how it aims to depart from, but remains highly indebted to Kant’s theory of freedom. This under-acknowledged debt is the “ghost of Kantian freedom” in Schopenhauer’s thought. Ultimately, for Schopenhauer, though we are each born with an innate character and are shaped largely by our empirical circumstances, a rational being is nonetheless responsible for her character, which she can shape and even, albeit rarely, transform.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Annual Basis ◽  
Instrumental Reasoning ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Contemporary Work ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This seventh volume brings together thirteen new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: instrumental reasoning; lying as infidelity; moral uncertaintism; subjective obligation; commendatory reasons; contractualism; and the definition of virtue.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Annual Basis ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Contemporary Work ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

This series aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new chapters that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This ninth volume brings together thirteen new essays that collectively cover a range of fundamental topics in the field, including: discretionary moral duties, third‐party forgiveness, subjective permissibility, agent‐relative prerogatives, and teleosemantics

Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in Kant's Moral Philosophy

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
The Voice ◽  
Ethical Systems

AbstractWhat is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.

scholarly journals A Decision-making Framework for the Ethical Planning Practitioner

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. p32
Author(s):  
Jerry Weitz
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Planning Practice ◽  
Ethical Decisions ◽  
Modest Contribution ◽  
Decision Making Framework ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

This article describes a three-part framework for making ethical decisions in planning practice. The framework includes both process and substantive components and is based on my own perspective of ethics as a practicing planner but also informed by descriptions of ethics from the planning and public administration literatures. The framework draws heavily on Howe (1994) and Bolan (1983). In terms of process, I describe five stages of a decision-making process and recommend it as a modest contribution to normative ethical theory. The framework also describes four sources of normative ethics; that part of the framework is descriptive, not normative. A third component of the framework identifies different values of the deontological and consequentialist approaches to ethics, neither of which can be considered complete or correct in its own right. 

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
The Self ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
New Work ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in the field of normative ethical theory. The chapters in this ninth volume collectively address the following topics: the relation between duty and motive, the structure of requests, discretionary moral duties, third-party forgiveness, persons as things, fitting love, the doctrine of double endorsement, taking oneself lightly, duty and right reasons, deontological decision theory, suboptimal beneficence, the self and radical change, and teleosemantics and normative ethics....

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