THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE TO THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

2010 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koen Lenaerts

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to provide an overview of the European Court of Justice's (‘ECJ’) past and present contribution— both procedurally and substantively—to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. While it is too early to speculate what the ECJ's contribution to this area will be under the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, the latter's modifications to the ECJ's jurisdiction merit close attention. After describing how the procedural limitations that were imposed on the ECJ's jurisdiction by ex Title IV of Part Three of the EC Treaty and by ex Title VI of the old EU Treaty have been almost entirely eliminated by the Treaty of Lisbon, this article posits that not only does the latter Treaty improve significantly the judicial protection of private individuals, but it also facilitates the dialogue between the Union and the national judiciaries in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Next, the article briefly explores the special ECJ procedures which may be followed in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in cases where time is of the essence. There, it is argued that, when having recourse to these procedures, the ECJ strives to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, swift judging and, on the other hand, the preservation of a qualitative and fair judicial procedure. As to substantive issues, drawing on examples from the fields of judicial cooperation in civil matters, asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, it is argued that the ECJ's contribution to this area is largely grounded in the protection of fundamental rights. Finally, a brief conclusion supports the contention that the ECJ's contribution to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has favoured a ‘mutual borrowing’ of concepts and principles as between this area and other fields in relation to which the EU has competences, such as the internal market and competition. The Treaty of Lisbon having entered into force, an unprecedented level of coordination between different areas of EU law on both the procedural and substantive levels is to take place. Respect for fundamental rights will definitely be a unifying factor binding them all together.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuliya Samovich

The manual is devoted to making individual complaints to the European Court of human rights: peculiarities of realization of the right to appeal, conditions of admissibility and the judicial procedure of the European Court of Human Rights. The author analyses some “autonomous concepts” used in the court's case law and touches upon the possibility of limiting the right to judicial protection. The article deals with the formation and development of the individual's rights to international judicial protection, as well as the protection of human rights in universal quasi-judicial international bodies and regional judicial institutions of the European Union and the Organization of American States. This publication includes a material containing an analysis of recent changes in the legal regulation of the Institute of individual complaints. The manual is recommended for students of educational organizations of higher education, studying in the areas of bachelor's and master's degree “Jurisprudence”.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-102
Author(s):  
Maria Belén Sánchez Domingo

The new European framework for the protection of personal data on freedom, security and justice is embodied, among other instruments, in EU Directive 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regards to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for criminal law purposes. This Directive protects fundamental rights, such as the right to the protection of personal data, as well as ensuring a high level of public security by facilitating the exchange of personal data between competent authorities within the Union, with the establishment of a legal system on the transfer of personal data.


Author(s):  
Anastazja Gajda

The aim of the study is to present the proposals of legal regulations presented by the European Commission in one of the fields of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (JHA), i.e. within the framework of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The European Commission’s proposals aim at strengthening of the rights of suspects/defendants in criminal proceedings in the EU. They consist of the right to a fair trial and include: strengthening of the presumption of innocence principle and the right to be present at the trial, special safeguards for children suspected or accused of a crime and the right to provisional legal aid for citizens suspected or accused of a crime. In the paper I analysed the most important provisions of the projects and showed that these proposals are intended to ensure the protection of fundamental rights within the JHA.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 718-732
Author(s):  
Leandro Mancano

This paper argues that the application of mutual recognition to judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the European Union (EU) imposes a redefinition of the right to liberty to adjust the latter to the peculiarities of the Union legal order. The article emphasizes the important role that the principle of proportionality in EU law can have for improving the protection of the right to liberty. The two main scenarios of this research are analysed against the different understandings of proportionality: on the one hand, the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision and the interpretation of the EU Court of Justice; on the other, the three Framework Decisions on transfer of prisoners, probation measures and pre trial measures alternative to detention. The conclusions reveal that, despite the increasing attention paid to proportionality in relation to the right to liberty in mutual recognition, the potential offered by EU law to better protect the right to liberty is still underexploited.


Medicne pravo ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 80-85
Author(s):  
K. Y. Tereshko

The concept of defamation and the composition of defamation tort are analyzed. Foreign experience and judicial practice of defamation application are given. The need to uphold the principle of ensuring a balance between the constitutional right to freedom of thought and speech, the right to free expression of one’s views and beliefs, on the one hand, and the right to respect for human dignity, constitutional guarantees of non-interference in private and family life, judicial protection of the right to rebuttal inaccurate personal information, on the other. The defamation balance between medical collegiality and critical assessment of doctors' activity is formulated. A «defamatory balance» has been formed between the collegiality of doctors and the critical evaluation of doctors' activities, which will be achieved by the preemptive right to freedom of expression to protect the lives and health of patients, actions in the public interest in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.


Author(s):  
Evelien Brouwer

‘EU legality’ in EU migration and asylum laws can be considered as a double-edged sword. This chapter describes how, on the one hand, the CJEU, by the mere application of general principles of EU law, offered in its case-law important criteria strengthening the rights and legal protection of third-country nationals while, on the other hand, more recent developments show that the EU legislator, but also the CJEU, almost artificially excludes migration laws or decisions from the legal framework of the EU. It will be argued that developments of ‘re-nationalization’, the application of mutual trust, and the externalization of EU asylum and migration policies, challenge the applicability of general principles of EU legality, including the protection of fundamental rights and the right to effective judicial protection.


Author(s):  
Enrique Guillen López

En este trabajo se aborda la ejecución de las sentencias del TEDH desde la perspectiva del Derecho constitucional, más concretamente del Derecho constitucional europeo. Se comienza así señalando la cualidad sustancialmente constitucional que han adquirido el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos y el Tribunal de Estrasburgo en un marco ordinamental caracterizado por la subsisidiariedad como instrumento óptimo para la garantía tanto del texto normativo como de las sentencias de su guardián. De aquí se deduce un tratamiento de estas últimas que pone el énfasis en la obligatoriedad de su cumplimiento. Éste es el sentido de la jurisprudencia del TEDH de modo que se ha podido hablar de la distorsión del carácter declarativo de sus resoluciones. Considerando el carácter constitucional del CEDH y del TEDH, y dada la necesidad de asegurar la eficacia de su doctrina para garantizar los derechos, se repara en el ordenamiento constitucional interno español entendiendo que es el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva (ex art. 24) como derecho a la ejecución de lo juzgado el que hace necesario un procedimiento específico como el que se establece finalmente en la LO 7/2015.This paper studies the execution in Spain of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights from the perspective of Constitutional Law, more specifically from the perspective of the European Constitutional Law. This begins by pointing out the substantially constitutional quality that both the Convention and the Court have acquired in an ordinamental framework characterized by the principle of subsidiarity as the optimal instrument for guaranteeing both the normative text and the judgments. From this we can deduce a treatment of the latter that puts the emphasis on the obligatory nature of its fulfillment. This is the meaning of the ECtHR jurisprudence so that it has been possible to speak of the distortion of the declaratory nature of its resolutions. Considering the constitutional nature of the ECHR and the ECtHR, and given the need to ensure the effectiveness of its doctrine to guarantee rights, it is focused on the Spanish internal constitutional order, understanding that it is the right to effective judicial protection (ex Article 24) as the right of having judgments executed that makes necessary a specific procedure like the one finally established in the LO 7/2015.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


2021 ◽  
pp. 203228442199593
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Schomburg ◽  
Anna Oehmichen ◽  
Katrin Kayß

As human rights have increasingly gained importance at the European Union level, this article examines the remaining scope of human rights protection under the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. While some international human rights instruments remain applicable, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union did not become part of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The consequences, especially the inapplicability of the internationalised ne bis in idem principle, are analysed. Furthermore, the conditionality of the TCA in general as well as the specific conditionality for judicial cooperation in criminal matters are discussed. In this context, the risk that cooperation may cease at any moment if any Member State or the UK leave the European Convention of Human Rights is highlighted. Lastly, the authors raise the problem of the lack of judicial review, as the Court of Justice of the European Union is no longer competent.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Bárd ◽  
Wouter van Ballegooij

This article discusses the relationship between judicial independence and intra-European Union (EU) cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition. It focuses on the recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM. In our view, a lack of judicial independence needs to be addressed primarily as a rule of law problem. This implies that executing judicial authorities should freeze judicial cooperation in the event should doubts arise as to respect for the rule of law in the issuing Member State. Such a measure should stay in place until the matter is resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU or a permanent mechanism for monitoring and addressing Member State compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Court, however, constructed the case as a possible violation of the right to a fair trial, the essence of which includes the requirement that tribunals are independent and impartial. This latter aspect could be seen as a positive step forward in the sense that the judicial test developed in the Aranyosi case now includes rule of law considerations with regard to judicial independence. However, the practical hurdles imposed by the Court on the defence in terms of proving such violations and on judicial authorities to accept them in individual cases might amount to two steps back in upholding the rule of law within the EU.


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