International Court of Justice

1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 184-187 ◽  

South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. Union of South Africa and Liberia v. Union of South Africa): On November 4, 1960, applications were filed in the Registry of the Court by Ethiopia and Liberia, instituting separate proceedings against the Union of South Africa. Both applications concerned the mandate for South West Africa and the duties and performance of the Union, as mandatory, thereunder. The applicants alleged that the Union, acting through official bodies created by it to administer the territory, had violated, and was continuing to violate, Article 2 of the mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations by: 1) arbitrary and unreasonable legislation; 2) the suppression of rights and liberties essential to the orderly evolution of the inhabitants toward self-government; 3) the failure to render annual reports concerning the territory to the General Assembly of the UN; and 4) the exercise of administrative and legislative powers inconsistent with the international status of the territory. The applications contended that the Union of South Africa had thereby modified substantially the terms of the mandate without the consent of the UN, and sought declarations by the Court in accordance with their allegations.

1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-603

South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa): By an order of February 5, 1963, the President of the International Court of Justice fixed September 30, 1963, as the time limit for the filing of the South African countermemorial in the South West Africa cases. At the request of the government of South Africa, the Court in its order of September 18, 1963, extended this time limit to January 10, 1964. By its order of January 20, 1964, the International Court noted that the South African countermemorial had been filed, and it fixed as time limits June 20, 1964, for the filing of the replies of Ethiopia and Liberia; and November 20, 1964, for the filing of the rejoinder by South Africa


Author(s):  
Brian Flemming

A first reading of the majority opinion in the South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, may leave the Common Law reader with the feeling of having waded through the marshes of a pre-Judicature Act search for a form of action in which to frame this case; the plaintiff having failed to find the proper writ, the defendant's demurrer is thereby upheld. The extremely technical, indeed artificial, nature of the International Court of Justice's judgment of 1966 has already stirred controversy, but one suspects that the heat of debate will cool rapidly out of sheer frustration with this judgment. Many writers will assume the attitude of Judge Wellington Koo who said in his dissenting opinion that “There is a Chinese proverb put in the form of a question: Why write a long and big essay on such a small subject?” In labouring to bring forth its largest judgment yet (500 pages), the International Court of Justice has engaged in what Judge Jessup, in his excellent dissenting opinion, called a “procedure of utter futility.”


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 68-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingo Venzke

In the present essay I compare the 2016 judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nuclear Arms Race (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom) with the Court's 1966 judgment in South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa). A series of similarities between the two judgments are obvious: They are two of the three cases in the history of the Court in which the judges were equally split and the President had to cast his tie-breaking vote. The critique of the judgments has been exceptionally strong, in 2016 as in 1966. The core of the critique, then as now, has practically been the same—the Court retreats into an excessive formalism that protects great powers.


1966 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-380
Author(s):  
Sol Picciotto

The judgment of the International Court of Justice of 18 July 1966 in the South-West Africa case throws revealing light on the role of that Court in the international community. A proper analysis of this case may also help to dispel some of the mystification about international law and the attitude of the new nations to it.


Author(s):  
Livia Meret

In 1971 The International Court of Justice in an Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia concluded that the mandate for South-West Africa had been validly terminated by the General Assembly in Resolution 2145 (XXI) of October 27, 1966, and that “the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under an obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory.” Further, the Court said that:States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and, in particular, any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration.


1967 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Falk

Ethiopia and Liberia instituted litigation in 1960 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to test the legality of South Africa's administration of the mandated territory of South West Africa. The ICJ received, thereby, an opportunity to deal with a major question of international concern. Hopes were raised that the role of international adjudication would be enhanced by the results of this litigation. The case was also expected to demonstrate to the new states that the procedures and institutions of traditional international law could be used to promote, as well as to retard, their distinctive goals in international life.


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