American Federalism and the Civil Rights Act of 1875

1976 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-328
Author(s):  
S. G. F. Spackman

Charles Sumner's Supplementary Civil Rights Bill, which after a tortuous legislative history became law as the Civil Rights Act of 1875, was intended to spell out in specific terms the procedural guarantees of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and so to outlaw racial discrimination in public accommodation, entertainment and transport, in juries, churches and publicly supported schools and charities. The measure was not only the culmination of Sumner's life-long efforts on behalf of the Blacks, but also the only comprehensive attempt made by Congress during Reconstruction to secure racial equality. Yet the purpose of the Act was undermined even before its passage by die racial ambivalence and political calculations of its supporters, while the challenge it made to traditional concepts of American federalism was defeated in 1883 by the Supreme Court's decision that it was unconstitutional. The nature and extent of this challenge, however, becomes apparent only in the context of the pressures that shaped Republican legislation.

Author(s):  
Desmond S. King ◽  
Rogers M. Smith

This chapter illustrates the conflicting approaches advanced by today's racial alliances on issues of race equality in the workplace, as on so many other topics—conflicts that include disagreements not only over formal affirmative action programs but also over the legitimacy of race-conscious policymaking of any sort. It is no accident when these issues emerge with particular intensity in employment policy. No area of American life is more central to the quest to eradicate unjust material racial inequalities. This is why, as the chapter shows, previous struggles on racial equality focused so strongly on equality in the workplace. While such actions were hailed by many veterans of the civil rights movement as necessary, color-blind proponents came to assail these as new forms of unjust racial discrimination. Contestation over these policies became the central “battleground” around which modern racial policy coalitions formed.


2020 ◽  
pp. 103-126
Author(s):  
Linda C. McClain

This chapter studies how arguments about bigotry, conscience, and legislating morality featured in legislative debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly the public accommodations provision (Title II). President Lyndon B. Johnson urged clergy to support the act and help the United States overcome bigotry. Religious leaders testified for and against the law. Lawmakers and witnesses supporting the law insisted that the nation’s conscience demanded that Congress pass a law to end bigotry and racial discrimination. Opponents referred to bigotry in multiple ways: they argued that segregation reflected natural difference and God’s plan, not bigotry; that people had a right to be bigoted; and that the act’s supporters were the real bigots. The chapter concludes with two Supreme Court cases upholding Title II relevant to later constitutional challenges to civil rights laws protecting LGBTQ persons: Heart of Atlanta v. United States and Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 354-364
Author(s):  
Tanya Katerí Hernández

A growing number of commentators view discrimination against multiracial (racially-mixed) people as a distinctive challenge to racial equality. This perspective is based on the belief that multiracial-identified persons experience racial discrimination in a manner that makes it necessary to reconsider civil rights law. This article disputes that premise and deconstructs its Personal Identity Equality approach to anti-discrimination law and demonstrates its ill effects reflected in Supreme Court affirmative action litigation.


Author(s):  
Richard A. Rosen ◽  
Joseph Mosnier

This chapter describes the contributions of Julius Chambers and his partners, most particularly Robert Belton, to the LDF's national litigation campaign to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which new law outlawed racial discrimination in the workplace effective July 1965. In October 1965, Chambers filed the nation's first-ever Title VII suit, and soon after filed three additional cases which, when ultimately decided years later, substantially ended overt racial discrimination in American workplaces. These critical victories included Supreme Court triumphs in Griggs v. Duke Power (1971) and Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody (1975), and the Fourth Circuit's Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. (1971). Griggs, recognized as the era's landmark employment ruling, established the "disparate impact" standard for adjudicating employers' use of "intelligence" tests and other pre-employment screening mechanisms. Together, Griggs, Moody, and Robinson did much to define the federal courts' interpretations of Title VII in a fashion that both opened workplaces to black job seekers and offered some compensatory remedy to those who had suffered under racially discriminatory workplace schemes. By these efforts, Chambers, his partners, and the LDF would leave the American workplace forever changed.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-380
Author(s):  
Marialuisa S. Gallozzi

Plaintiff, a United States citizen employed in Saudi Arabia, brought an employment discrimination suit against defendant, a U.S. corporation, alleging violations of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §2000e (1982)). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed (per Davis, J.) the district court’s dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held (two to one): (1) that neither the language nor the legislative history of title VII evinces a clearly expressed congressional intent to apply title VII outside U.S. borders; (2) that in the absence of clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, the presumption against extraterritoriality controls; and (3) that no “negative inference” extending the reach of title VII should be drawn from its “alien exemption” provision. Judge King’s dissent discussed international law principles not addressed by the majority. The Fifth Circuit subsequently granted on December 23, 1988, the petition for rehearing en banc submitted by plaintiff and various amici, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).


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