Shakespeare’s Staged Trials

The trials in Shakespeare’s plays are strange. There are no lawyers or professional judges, there may be no witnesses, and the adjudicator often imposes unusual sanctions such as banishment. Most strikingly, almost all the trials are fakes, manipulated by a character toward a predestined result. Two obvious explanations—that trials in Shakespeare’s day were like that, and that trials in the contemporary drama were like that—turn out to be largely incorrect. It is more persuasive to trace the strange features of Shakespeare’s trials to the various dramatic functions they fulfill, yet even this approach does not explain everything.

The Fairness Argument Against Catholic Integralism

Political philosophers are overwhelmingly liberal: freedom and equality are the fundamental political values. Yet, in much of the world, people adopt religious anti-liberalisms. States must bring people into harmony with the cosmic moral order, not protect their autonomy. In this essay, I argue against Catholic integralism, the most intellectually sophisticated and long-standing Christian anti-liberalism. Most people believe that we should treat peoples of all race, nationalities, and creeds as equals. But Catholic integralism treats people unequally according to their creed because it coercively privileges one creed above all others—its own. So integralism treats its citizens unfairly.

Legitimacy, Signature and Sovereignty in Derrida

Legitimacy is a concept that has been largely forgotten by the deconstructive discourse on law and politics. This article seeks, on the one hand, to reassess the role of legitimacy in deconstruction and, on the other hand, to bring deconstructive thinking to bear on the concept of legitimacy. By re-reading Derrida’s “Declarations of Independence” through the lenses of his later texts on sovereignty and (counter)signature, it is argued that, rather than being deconstructible, legitimacy is deconstructing any self-founding of law and power. As such, legitimacy functions not as an evaluative concept of law and order but as a constantly insisting demand that facilitates the principles of responsibility and responsiveness.

Last Words of the Condemned: Christian-Humanist Rhetoric in the American Abolition Debate

Through the interrogation of recent analyses of the last words of people executed in the USA, this article critiques the popular abolitionist rhetoric that interprets last words in terms of evidence of sin and redemption. In reading the execution event in this way, the article suggests, these texts inadvertently celebrate and affirm the act of execution. Drawing on Gil Anidjar’s Blood (2014), the article suggests that this duality is in consonance with the history of modern Christianity as epitomised in the bonding of two events: the Eucharist and the Inquisition.

The Death of the Data Subject

This paper situates the data privacy debate in the context of what I call the death of the data subject. My central claim is that concept of a rights-bearing data subject is being pulled in two contradictory directions at once, and that simultaneous attention to these is necessary to understand and resist the extractive practices of the data industry. Specifically, it is necessary to treat the problems facing the data subject structurally, rather than by narrowly attempting to vindicate its rights. On the one hand, the data industry argues that subjects of biometric identification lack legal standing to pursue claims in court, and Facebook recently denied that that its facial recognition software recognizes faces. On the other hand, industry takes consent to terms of service and arbitration clauses to create enforceable legal subject positions, while using promises of personalization to create a phenomenological subject that is unaware of the extent to which it is being manipulated. Data subjects thus have no legal existence when it is a matter of corporate liability, but legal accountability when it is a matter of their own liability. Successful reform should address the power asymmetries between individuals and data companies that enable this structural disempowerment.

Mature Enough to Disobey Jurors, Women, and Radical Enfranchisement in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America

While many have pointed to Tocqueville’s admiration of the jury system as a schoolhouse for civic participation, I argue that Tocqueville sets up, but forgoes, the opportunity to make jurors empowered enough to counter the ills of democracy that he enumerates, specifically the tyranny of the majority and soft despotism. The education of American women, Tocqueville remarks, prepares them to be independent, confident and astute observers of social conditions, but these characteristics are eclipsed by their domestic responsibilities as wives and mothers. Juxtaposing two sections of Democracy in America that are normally thought of separately (juries and women), I show that Tocqueville falters in his perception of the radical enfranchisement of jurors and women because of his fears about the instability of democracy (with its delusions of equality) just as he provides some of the best arguments for the importance of their political interventions.