scholarly journals Racial Discrimination in Employment under the Civil Rights Act of 1866

1969 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 615
1976 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-328
Author(s):  
S. G. F. Spackman

Charles Sumner's Supplementary Civil Rights Bill, which after a tortuous legislative history became law as the Civil Rights Act of 1875, was intended to spell out in specific terms the procedural guarantees of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and so to outlaw racial discrimination in public accommodation, entertainment and transport, in juries, churches and publicly supported schools and charities. The measure was not only the culmination of Sumner's life-long efforts on behalf of the Blacks, but also the only comprehensive attempt made by Congress during Reconstruction to secure racial equality. Yet the purpose of the Act was undermined even before its passage by die racial ambivalence and political calculations of its supporters, while the challenge it made to traditional concepts of American federalism was defeated in 1883 by the Supreme Court's decision that it was unconstitutional. The nature and extent of this challenge, however, becomes apparent only in the context of the pressures that shaped Republican legislation.


1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 573-586
Author(s):  
Paul S. Greenlaw ◽  
John P. Kohl

In civil rights actions, employee-plaintiffs alleging discrimination must attempt to prove a prima facie case;1 and if accomplished the employer-defendant must attempt to rebut such cases with some type of defense. These defenses may be very narrow and specific in scope such as the seniority or merit system defenses explicitly provided for under the 1963 Equal Pay Act (EPA). On the other hand, broader “business” and or “job” defenses (and the wording and meaning varies from situation to situation) have been both devised by the courts as standards of behavior for employers, and stipulated for employers by legislation. This article will analyze four important of these employer defenses: (1) the legitimate business reason and its antecedents in EPA litigation; (2) the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) “reasonably necessary” defense provided in both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; (3) the business necessity and job related standards promulgated in Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), as eventually codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991; and (4) the job relatedness/business necessity/reasonable accommodation defense of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). All of the above defenses pose current challenges to employers except probably the BFOQ, so that their examination should be of value to all those involved in employee relations law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 103-126
Author(s):  
Linda C. McClain

This chapter studies how arguments about bigotry, conscience, and legislating morality featured in legislative debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly the public accommodations provision (Title II). President Lyndon B. Johnson urged clergy to support the act and help the United States overcome bigotry. Religious leaders testified for and against the law. Lawmakers and witnesses supporting the law insisted that the nation’s conscience demanded that Congress pass a law to end bigotry and racial discrimination. Opponents referred to bigotry in multiple ways: they argued that segregation reflected natural difference and God’s plan, not bigotry; that people had a right to be bigoted; and that the act’s supporters were the real bigots. The chapter concludes with two Supreme Court cases upholding Title II relevant to later constitutional challenges to civil rights laws protecting LGBTQ persons: Heart of Atlanta v. United States and Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.


1981 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-636
Author(s):  
Mayer G. Freed ◽  
Daniel D. Polsby

The Supreme Court's decision inCity of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manharthas engendered a considerable debate, much of which has appeared in the pages of thisJournal. Defenders of theManhartdecision take its critics to task for failure to appreciate the place of that decision in the overall jurisprudence of employment discrimination. In this article, the authors challenge the underlying conception of the law of sex discrimination that is said to dictate the result inManhart. Far from erecting a per se rule against all sex classifications, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is shown to recognize both the relevance of prevalent social norms about sex differences and the legitimacy of certain interests of employers as limited justifications for the maintenance of sex-conscious lines in some circumstances, a recognition that contrasts sharply with the statute's categorical prohibition on racial classifications. It follows from this discussion thatManhart'soutcome was not ordained by the ethos of the laws against sex discrimination.


Author(s):  
Richard A. Rosen ◽  
Joseph Mosnier

This chapter describes the contributions of Julius Chambers and his partners, most particularly Robert Belton, to the LDF's national litigation campaign to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which new law outlawed racial discrimination in the workplace effective July 1965. In October 1965, Chambers filed the nation's first-ever Title VII suit, and soon after filed three additional cases which, when ultimately decided years later, substantially ended overt racial discrimination in American workplaces. These critical victories included Supreme Court triumphs in Griggs v. Duke Power (1971) and Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody (1975), and the Fourth Circuit's Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. (1971). Griggs, recognized as the era's landmark employment ruling, established the "disparate impact" standard for adjudicating employers' use of "intelligence" tests and other pre-employment screening mechanisms. Together, Griggs, Moody, and Robinson did much to define the federal courts' interpretations of Title VII in a fashion that both opened workplaces to black job seekers and offered some compensatory remedy to those who had suffered under racially discriminatory workplace schemes. By these efforts, Chambers, his partners, and the LDF would leave the American workplace forever changed.


1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 410-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Moreno

The 1930s and 1940s saw the beginning of a discussion of the problem of racial discrimination in employment. The Great Depression, the maturation of civil rights organizations, and the New Deal's change in American principles of property rights and-labor policy helped launch this discussion. Campaigns undertaken by black organizations and federal agencies began to grapple with the idea of race-based remedial strategies to combat discrimination in employment, and our modern concept of equal employment opportunity, which holds that an employer's workforce should contain approximately the same proportion of minorities as are present in the population, first received expression in this period.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zafar E. Nazarov ◽  
Sarah von Schrader

Purpose: We explore whether certain employer characteristics predict Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) charges and whether the same characteristics predict receipt of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act charges.Method: We estimate a set of multivariate regressions using the ordinary least squares method.Results: Most employer-level characteristics that predict the receipt of ADA charges also predict the receipt of other types of discrimination charges.Conclusions: Our findings suggest that educational outreach efforts aimed at reducing the level of perceived disability discrimination in the workplace can be more efficient by targeting employer groups who are likely to receive charges under not only the ADA but also other statutes as well.


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