International Law and Self-Determination in Namibia

1970 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-603 ◽  
Author(s):  
U. O. Umozurike

Namibia, formerly South-West Africa, continues from the point of view ofinternational law to represent the symbol of violated right. Even though the United Nations has been seized of the matter for many years and the International Court of Justice has been given the opportunity to adjudicate, the problem appears to be as intractable as ever. South Africa has established her administrative and military presence and means to defend what she considers to be her right with all the forces at her command. The country does not lack friends whose direct or indirect support it counts upon. Yet the fundamental issue remains: Are the people of Namibia entitled to self-determination and how may they exercise that right? It will be necessary to refer back to the history of Namibia from the time of the mandate.

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-468

Professor Yaël Ronen introduced the workshop as the fourth in a series of events on legal aspects of the Middle East conflict. The first two events concerned the Palestine Mandate of 1922. The third focused on the 1948 refugee issue. All these events have and are being held with the generous support of the Knapp Family Foundation and under the auspices of the International Law Forum of the Faculty of Law. Also, as part of the Shabtai Rosenne International Law Center Initiative, the first session was dedicated to the commemoration of the work of the late Shabtai Rosenne, whose scholarship spanned a host of international law issues but who is most renowned for his work on the International Court of Justice (ICJ).


Author(s):  
Ingo Venzke

This chapter investigates the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during the battle for international law circa the years of 1955–1975. It first draws attention to newly independent states that saw the Court in its role of reinforcing international law’s colonial imprints. The chapter then focuses on the Court’s captivating highpoint during the battle for international law: its 1962 and 1966 Judgments in South West Africa, and the jarring 1966 decision which, in the eyes of many states, presented the ICJ as a ‘white man’s court’ in a white man’s world. The chapter then shows the effects of the 1966 decision in judicial elections and the quest to change the composition of the bench. Finally, the chapter argues that the present inquiry serves as a vivid reminder that international law and its institutions are the product of a veritable struggle, then as now.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-407
Author(s):  
Udoka Ndidiamaka Owie

Abstract International law has a long history of dealing with racial discrimination, including its involvement in the perpetration of racial discrimination. However, in establishing a body of norms to tackle the problems of racial discrimination, several multilateral instruments have been adopted under the auspices of the United Nations addressing this malaise to various extents with the most extensive being the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) of 21 December 1965. While lauded for its singular and dedicated focus on racial discrimination, the Convention is challenged, at least interpretatively, as to the grounds for racial discrimination within its remit. Events occurring between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates on 5 June 2017 have afforded the International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, an opportunity—the third since the coming into effect of the Convention—to interpret this landmark treaty.


1966 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-380
Author(s):  
Sol Picciotto

The judgment of the International Court of Justice of 18 July 1966 in the South-West Africa case throws revealing light on the role of that Court in the international community. A proper analysis of this case may also help to dispel some of the mystification about international law and the attitude of the new nations to it.


Author(s):  
Nico Schrijver

This chapter focuses on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations. After discussing pre-Charter attempts to restrict states’ freedom to resort to warfare, it examines the emergence of a normative doctrine on a bellum justum. It considers the history of Article 2(4) and the other articles of the Charter that touch on the use of force and outlines exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, including the so-called Uniting for Peace procedure. It examines the interpretation of Article 2(4) in the practice of the General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice), together with its inclusion in a number of multilateral treaties. Finally, it assesses the question whether the use of force after 1945 conforms to the object and purpose of Article 2(4), as well as the legal status of the prohibition to use force in contemporary international law.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-180
Author(s):  
Timo Koivurova

AbstractThe article examines how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has dealt with the concept of peoples and peoples' rights in its jurisprudence. Most prominent has been the Court's role with respect to the right of self-determination and it is this issue that forms the core of the article. A second important question dealt with is the role of indigenous peoples in ICJ case practice, as the struggle by those peoples to gain collective rights is a recent development in international law. Drawing on this analysis, the discussion proceeds to consider the role that the ICJ has played in the development of the rights of peoples in general and what its future role might be in this sphere of international law. The article also examines the way in which the Court has allowed peoples to participate in its proceedings and whether and how its treatment of peoples' rights has strengthened the general foundations of international law.


1996 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain G.M. Scobbie ◽  
Catriona J. Drew

On 22 February 1991, Portugal filed a case against Australia in the Registry of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) instituting proceedings in a dispute concerning “certain activities of Australia with regard to East Timor”. The impetus behind the case was the conclusion of the Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia in December 1989. The application alleged that Australia's conduct had caused “particularly serious legal and moral damage to the people of East Timor and to Portugal, which will become material damage also if the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources begins.” Jurisdiction was founded on the parties' declarations under Article 36(2) of the Statute.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 719-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
SERGEY PUNZHIN ◽  
NATHALIE WILES

There are three topics within the body of Vereshchetin's academic work which deserve special attention: the law of the sea, space law, and the theory of international law. Vereshchetin's contribution as a judge to the practice and theory of international law can be appreciated through his individual opinions and declarations, in which he dealt with various issues of international law and the international judicial process: self-determination, countermeasures, diplomatic protection, and questions which concern the functioning of the Court (the role and powers of the ICJ, non liquet, bases for the revision of decisions, declarations accepting the Court's jurisdiction and reservations to them, and so on).


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 586-592
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne

In 1987 I drew attention to a report published in 1986 by a member of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) of the United Nations, recommending a number of changes, some of them fundamental, in the presentation by the International Court of Justice of its judgments and advisory opinions. I indicated the principal objections that the Court had expressed on those recommendations, and pointed out that the implementation of some of them could constitute violations of the Charter, of which the Statute of the Court is an integral part. The matter was also the subject of a resolution adopted on April 9, 1987, by the American Society of International Law, reproduced in part in note 30 on page 695 of my Note. It is now possible to bring the story up-to-date and close an unfortunate chapter in the history of the Joint Inspection Unit.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Howse ◽  
Ruti Teitel

Abstract One of the most complex and uncertain areas of international legal doctrine concerns how to deal with the aspiration of a people to achieve self-determination through the establishment of a new state and the related claim to a specific territory over which statehood is to be exercised. Recently, when the General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the International Court of Justice the question of the legality of the declaration of independence by Kosovar Albanians, the Court was given an opportunity to clarify and develop the law on external self-determination. Instead, the Court answered extremely narrowly, confining its analysis to the legality of the act of declaration without determining any consideration of international legal norms applicable to the act of secession that was being proposed. This article intends to fill the gap left by the ICJ’s decision: first by critiquing the inadequacy and tensions visible in the existing doctrine and second by examining how recent developments in international law may allow for a more normatively coherent approach to the problem.


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