The Rational Imperative to Believe

1993 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
The Will ◽  
Philosophical Task

‘The Will to Believe.’ The mere mention of this title cannot fail to elicit a reaction from philosophers. Written almost 100 years ago, it continues to intrigue, inspire, perplex and repel, often all in the selfsame reader. Few who make acquaintance with this robust and insightful lecture can remain neutral toward it. In 100 years there has been continuous debate about both the content of the argument and its merits. I will confess to being among those intrigued and inspired by this lecture of James's – and, until recently, also much perplexed by it. The sources of my intrigue have been its guiding insights: that living is choosing in the midst of uncertainty; that in pressing cases, waiting for evidence is no escape from risk; and that believing can create certain truths. The sources of my inspiration have been its vibrant presence and its gallant call to courage. But the main source of my perplexity was the shape of the argument itself: Just what was James's case here? What was the conclusion? What were the premises? Off and on, I pondered the matter for years without resolution, and it was only after I abandoned the very frame of the question that I found a way out of my puzzlement. What I have come to see is that James is not pressing toward one key conclusion in ‘The Will to Believe’. There are two, the second far bolder, far more sweeping than the first. What makes this especially difficult to see is that James himself nowhere acknowledges it. Indeed, he expressly disavows the second conclusion, and this for good reason: The two conclusions are incompatible. In what follows, I want first to take you to the source of my problem in understanding James's classic lecture, then to explain to you why my two-argument theory seems its unavoidable if inelegant resolution. Finally, I want to turn to the properly philosophical task. I want to inquire into the truth of his more sweeping (albeit disavowed) claim.

HUMAN AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS IN THE THOUGHT OF ORIGEN OF ALEXANDRIA

2016 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 673-690
Author(s):  
Kathleen Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Third Century ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Third ◽  
Human Choice ◽  
Origen Of Alexandria ◽  
Human Autonomy ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Church

As the church historian Henri Crouzel observed, questions about the nature of human autonomy were central to the thought of the third-century theologian Origen of Alexandria. On this question, his influence on later generations, though complicated, would be difficult to overstate. Yet, what exactly Origen thought autonomy required has been a subject of debate. On one widespread reading, he has been taken to argue that autonomy requires that human beings have the capacity to act otherwise than they do in fact act; that is, that alternative possibilities of action are causally available to them. As Susanne Bobzien has argued, however, there is good reason to think that the view that such alternative possibilities are required for the ascription of autonomy did not explicitly emerge until Alexander of Aphrodisias, a rough contemporary of Origen's of whose thought he was likely unaware. In revisiting Origen on the notion of ‘free will’, Michael Frede, against the ‘alternative possibilities’ reading, argued that his theory of the will was largely attributable to Stoicism, and in particular to Epictetus’ theory of will as προαίρεσις. George Boys-Stones, for his part, has claimed that, while Origen's theory of the descent of the pre-existent minds is aimed at providing an account of how human beings are entirely responsible for their characters, in the embodied state we find no evidence that he understood human choice subsequent to the fall to depend upon the existence of alternative possibilities in order to be autonomous.

Nielsen, Ethics and God

1978 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Osmond G. Ramberan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Moral Insight ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Will

One of the central claims of most religious people (especially those in the Judeo-Christian tradition) is that morality is based upon religion or, more specifically, on a belief in God. A morality which is not God-centred not only cannot provide a genuine basis for moral beliefs but is really and truly groundless. For without a belief in the sovereignty of God, there can be no genuine adequate foundation for moral beliefs. In his recent book, Ethics Without God, Kai Nielsen claims that this view is grossly mistaken. According to Nielsen, morality cannot be based on religion because moral claims cannot be derived from religious (non-moral) cosmological claims such as ‘God is Creator’, or ‘God exists’. ‘God wills X’, ‘God commands X’, do not entail ‘X ought to be done’, or ‘I ought to do X’. It is perfectly in order for someone to say that God wills (commands) X, but is X good? It is also perfectly in order for someone to say that God commands me to do X, but why should I obey God? Surely it cannot be because God is powerful and, if I do not obey his commands, he will punish me. It may be prudent and expedient to obey God because I am afraid of punishment, but this is surely not a morally good reason for obeying him. Moral obligations follow God's commands only if it is assumed that God is morally perfect or that he is good or that his commands are right (p. 5). But I cannot know that God is good without an understanding of what it is for something to be good. To be sure, ‘God is good’, is a truth of language, but in order to understand it we must have a prior understanding of goodness- an understanding which is ‘logically prior to, and independent of, any understanding or acknowledgement of God’ (p. 11). Moreover, Nielsen argues, the religious quest is a quest to find a being that is ‘worthy of worship’, but it is by our own moral insight that we decide that any being, any Z, is ‘worthy of worship’. The decision that there is a Z such that Z is worthy of worship is a moral judgment which is in no way dependent upon the will of God. But more than this, ‘God’, in ‘God is worthy of worship’, is, in most cases, used analytically so that anyone who is brought to say ‘My God’, or ‘My Lord and my God’, is using ‘God’ evaluatively and by implication making a moral judgment - a moral judgment which is logically prior to the will or command of God. This leads Nielsen to conclude:

scholarly journals Σοπενχάουερ περί Θανάτου και Αυτοκτονίας

Bioethica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Lina Papadaki (Λίνα Παπαδάκη)
Keyword(s):  
Old Age ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Fear Of Death ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The World ◽  
Pain And Suffering ◽  
The Will ◽  
Genuine Solution

Schopenhauer is portrayed as the philosopher of pessimism, and for good reason. For him, life is suffering where ‘ultimately death must triumph’ (The World as Will and Representation vol. I, 311). However, his pessimism fades away when he contemplates death. He argues enthusiastically that, far from being an evil, death is in fact a friend we should welcome. Moreover, he believes it is possible for human beings to use their knowledge to fight the fear of death. Interestingly, however, at the point where the reader expects a philosophical defense of suicide, Schopenhauer vehemently argues against it. Suicide to avoid pain and suffering, according to him, is a mistake, a futile, foolish and egoistic act. Not only does suicide not offer a genuine solution to suffering, but also it hinders true salvation, the denial of the will.In this paper, I argue that Schopenhauer’s condemnation of suicide is in fact at odds with his views on death and can weaken his argumentation about why we must not fear death. It is my belief that Schopenhauer’s views on suicide stem - quite ironically - from his being, at times, overly optimistic about the possibility of genuine salvation. When it comes to freeing ourselves from the will, however, we are better off pessimists. This, I explain, will allow us to at least keep our optimism regarding death and find solace in the knowledge that - be it by old age, illness, accident, suicide or any other cause - death is not to be feared.

Freedom and the determination of the will

2019 ◽  
pp. 171-205
Author(s):  
Georges Dicker
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Human Motivation ◽  
The Will ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter analyzes Locke’s complex account of human motivation, volition, and freedom. It explains Locke’s Hobbesian definition of freedom as the ability to do or to refrain from doing as one wills, and his arguments for holding that the will itself cannot sensibly be called “free.” It argues that although Locke’s refusal to call the will free and his talk of “determining the will” have led readers to see him as a “soft determinist,” he should not be seen as a determinist (whether “hard” or “soft”) because there is no good reason to think he holds volitions to be causally necessitated. It discusses his view that our volitions and the actions they produce stem from our desire for happiness, the obstacle to which is any “uneasiness,” which intelligent beings, provided they temporarily suspend their wills, can see may need to be endured now in order to avoid worse uneasiness later. It argues that although Locke does not directly address the problem of freedom and determinism in its contemporary form, he is best interpreted as a libertarian.

Doctrine of the will.

1846 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asa Mahan
Keyword(s):  
The Will

The return of the will

1973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Assagioli
Keyword(s):  
The Will
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