Nielsen, Ethics and God

1978 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Osmond G. Ramberan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Moral Insight ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Will

One of the central claims of most religious people (especially those in the Judeo-Christian tradition) is that morality is based upon religion or, more specifically, on a belief in God. A morality which is not God-centred not only cannot provide a genuine basis for moral beliefs but is really and truly groundless. For without a belief in the sovereignty of God, there can be no genuine adequate foundation for moral beliefs. In his recent book, Ethics Without God, Kai Nielsen claims that this view is grossly mistaken. According to Nielsen, morality cannot be based on religion because moral claims cannot be derived from religious (non-moral) cosmological claims such as ‘God is Creator’, or ‘God exists’. ‘God wills X’, ‘God commands X’, do not entail ‘X ought to be done’, or ‘I ought to do X’. It is perfectly in order for someone to say that God wills (commands) X, but is X good? It is also perfectly in order for someone to say that God commands me to do X, but why should I obey God? Surely it cannot be because God is powerful and, if I do not obey his commands, he will punish me. It may be prudent and expedient to obey God because I am afraid of punishment, but this is surely not a morally good reason for obeying him. Moral obligations follow God's commands only if it is assumed that God is morally perfect or that he is good or that his commands are right (p. 5). But I cannot know that God is good without an understanding of what it is for something to be good. To be sure, ‘God is good’, is a truth of language, but in order to understand it we must have a prior understanding of goodness- an understanding which is ‘logically prior to, and independent of, any understanding or acknowledgement of God’ (p. 11). Moreover, Nielsen argues, the religious quest is a quest to find a being that is ‘worthy of worship’, but it is by our own moral insight that we decide that any being, any Z, is ‘worthy of worship’. The decision that there is a Z such that Z is worthy of worship is a moral judgment which is in no way dependent upon the will of God. But more than this, ‘God’, in ‘God is worthy of worship’, is, in most cases, used analytically so that anyone who is brought to say ‘My God’, or ‘My Lord and my God’, is using ‘God’ evaluatively and by implication making a moral judgment - a moral judgment which is logically prior to the will or command of God. This leads Nielsen to conclude:

scholarly journals CONCILIATIONISM AND MORAL SPINELESSNESS

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Fritz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Independent Reason ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Epistemic Role

ABSTRACTThis paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliationists cannot satisfactorily explain why we need not revise our beliefs in response to certain moral disagreements. Conciliationists can attempt to meet this challenge in one of two ways. First, they can individuate disputes narrowly. This allows them to argue that we have dispute-independent reason to distrust our opponents’ moral judgment. This approach threatens to license objectionable dogmatism. It also inappropriately gives deep epistemic significance to superficial questions about how to think about the subject matter of a dispute. Second, conciliationists can individuate disputes widely. This allows them to argue that we lack dispute-independent reason to trust our opponents’ moral judgment. But such arguments fail; our background of generally shared moral beliefs gives us good reason to trust the moral judgment of our opponents, even after we set quite a bit of our reasoning aside. On either approach, then, conciliationists should acknowledge that we have dispute-independent reason to trust the judgment of those who reject our moral beliefs. Given a conciliationist view of disagreement's epistemic role, this has the unattractive result that we are epistemically required to revise some of our most intuitively secure moral beliefs.

scholarly journals MORAL AND RELIGIOUS MOTIVES IN THE WORKS OF J.R.R. TOLKIEN: CULTURAL CONTEXT

2017 ◽  
pp. 60-65
Author(s):  
A. Y. Morozov
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Context ◽  
Fairy Tale ◽  
Coincidence Point ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Will To Power ◽  
The Will ◽  
Virtuous Life

The main moral and religious themes of J. Tolkien`s novels “The Lord of rings” and “The Silmarillion” are observed in the article. It is analyzed that Tolkien followed Christian tradition, sharing st. Augustine`s conception of evil as the absence of good. It is clarified Tolkien`s anti-Nietzschean position where evil is equal to the will to power, while the good is associated with humility and serving. It is shown an author`s interpretation of Socratic classic inquiry: would people live virtuous life if they achieve omnipotence and why moral life is preferable than immoral one. According to Tolkien, human moral obligations are closely connected with the awareness of freedom and mortality which are regarded as a giftto a man, enabling to escape from senseless “badinfinity” (Hegel) of material determinant existence. In its turn, a notion of “gift” refersto metaphysical model of world that assumes divine being and his providential intervention in the course of earthly history. One of this divine providence`s manifestation is so called “eucatastrophe”, unexpected salvation from tragedy, therapeutic consolation that returns to a man the feeling of meaningfulness and joy of being. It is suggested thatsalvation can be interpreted in romantic way as coincidence point of trajectories of art and nature, where fairy tale embodies in life, and life starts to be built according to the laws of fairy tale.

Beliefs, Desires and Moral Realism

Philosophy ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Goldstick
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Actual Fact ◽  
Moral Claims

An argument against the claim that moral realism cannot be sustained because moral beliefs, being affective-conative states, cannot themselves be true or false. In fact moral claims can fail both in terms of a failure of the standard it expresses to be realised by a given agent and also in terms of whatever it commends to be good or bad, right or wrong, in actual fact.

HUMAN AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS IN THE THOUGHT OF ORIGEN OF ALEXANDRIA

2016 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 673-690
Author(s):  
Kathleen Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Third Century ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Third ◽  
Human Choice ◽  
Origen Of Alexandria ◽  
Human Autonomy ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Church

As the church historian Henri Crouzel observed, questions about the nature of human autonomy were central to the thought of the third-century theologian Origen of Alexandria. On this question, his influence on later generations, though complicated, would be difficult to overstate. Yet, what exactly Origen thought autonomy required has been a subject of debate. On one widespread reading, he has been taken to argue that autonomy requires that human beings have the capacity to act otherwise than they do in fact act; that is, that alternative possibilities of action are causally available to them. As Susanne Bobzien has argued, however, there is good reason to think that the view that such alternative possibilities are required for the ascription of autonomy did not explicitly emerge until Alexander of Aphrodisias, a rough contemporary of Origen's of whose thought he was likely unaware. In revisiting Origen on the notion of ‘free will’, Michael Frede, against the ‘alternative possibilities’ reading, argued that his theory of the will was largely attributable to Stoicism, and in particular to Epictetus’ theory of will as προαίρεσις. George Boys-Stones, for his part, has claimed that, while Origen's theory of the descent of the pre-existent minds is aimed at providing an account of how human beings are entirely responsible for their characters, in the embodied state we find no evidence that he understood human choice subsequent to the fall to depend upon the existence of alternative possibilities in order to be autonomous.

Some Remarks about the Embodiment of God

1981 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
W.Murray Hunt
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
Widespread Belief

In two recent articles Grace M. (Dyck) Jantzen has argued that an embodied God could be both a being worthy of worship (in the Judaeo-Christian tradition) and omnipresent. In arguing for neither of these claims has she attempted to prove that God (if he exists) is embodied, or even that God (if he exists) must be embodied. Rather, she has urged acceptance of the more modest claim there is no good reason for denying the possible embodiment of God (if he exists) on grounds either connected with his being a worthy object of worship or in terms of a supposed entailment of incorporeality on God's omnipresence. Yet contemporary thinkers with as radically divergent views about God as Kai Nielsen and Father Copleston forward ‘the argument that an embodied God is inadequate for sophisticated theism’; and, Jantzen avers, there is a ‘widespread belief that if God is indeed omnipresent, as we are clearly taught in Scripture, then that doctrine of omnipresence entails immediately that God must be incorporeal’. The purpose of my remarks in this note is not to dispute Jantzen's conclusions, but to question the strength and/or satisfactoriness of some of her arguments for those conclusions. Perhaps the most pervading misgiving arises over her unquestioned equating of ‘embodiment’ with ‘having a body’. Surely at first blush such synonymy appears both obvious and innocuous. But where the notion of embodiment itself is the crux of the issue, careful reflection needs to be given to just what the notion involves. Yet she simply accepts the synonymy ‘without any further ado, as though it were just obviously true’, just as she accuses Findlay of doing regarding ‘the claim that only a being who exists necessarily would be worthy of our worship’.

The Rational Imperative to Believe

1993 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
The Will ◽  
Philosophical Task

‘The Will to Believe.’ The mere mention of this title cannot fail to elicit a reaction from philosophers. Written almost 100 years ago, it continues to intrigue, inspire, perplex and repel, often all in the selfsame reader. Few who make acquaintance with this robust and insightful lecture can remain neutral toward it. In 100 years there has been continuous debate about both the content of the argument and its merits. I will confess to being among those intrigued and inspired by this lecture of James's – and, until recently, also much perplexed by it. The sources of my intrigue have been its guiding insights: that living is choosing in the midst of uncertainty; that in pressing cases, waiting for evidence is no escape from risk; and that believing can create certain truths. The sources of my inspiration have been its vibrant presence and its gallant call to courage. But the main source of my perplexity was the shape of the argument itself: Just what was James's case here? What was the conclusion? What were the premises? Off and on, I pondered the matter for years without resolution, and it was only after I abandoned the very frame of the question that I found a way out of my puzzlement. What I have come to see is that James is not pressing toward one key conclusion in ‘The Will to Believe’. There are two, the second far bolder, far more sweeping than the first. What makes this especially difficult to see is that James himself nowhere acknowledges it. Indeed, he expressly disavows the second conclusion, and this for good reason: The two conclusions are incompatible. In what follows, I want first to take you to the source of my problem in understanding James's classic lecture, then to explain to you why my two-argument theory seems its unavoidable if inelegant resolution. Finally, I want to turn to the properly philosophical task. I want to inquire into the truth of his more sweeping (albeit disavowed) claim.

God, Other Minds, and the Inference to the Best Explanation

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip A. Ostien
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Teleological Argument ◽  
Analogical Argument

Professor Plantinga's “scandalous” conclusion thatIf my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latterrests in part on the twin claims that the best reason we have for belief in other minds is the analogical argument, and the best reason we have for belief in God is the teleological argument. The conclusion also rests on Plantinga's analyses of these two arguments, which show that both fail for very similar reasons. Thus the beliefs based on these arguments are “in the same epistemological boat,“ and Plantinga draws his conclusion. This is, as James Tomberlin says, “an ingenious argument for the conclusion that belief in God is justified in the absence of any good reason whatever.“In this paper I wish to consider the two claims mentioned above, that the best reasons we have for belief in other minds and belief in God are the analogical and teleological arguments, respectively.

scholarly journals Moral Diversity and Efficient Breach

2019 ◽  
pp. 885
Author(s):  
Matthew Seligman
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Housing Crisis ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Moral Diversity ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Regulatory Interventions ◽  
Wealth Inequalities

Most people think it is morally wrong to breach a contract. But sophisticated commercial parties, like large corporations, have no objection to breaching contracts and paying the price in damages when doing so is in their self-interest. The literature has ignored the profound legal, economic, and normative implications of that asymmetry between individuals’ and firms’ approaches to breach. To individuals, a contract is a promise that cannot be broken regardless of the financial stakes. For example, millions of homeowners refused to breach their mortgage contracts in the aftermath of the housing crisis even though doing so could have saved them tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. Their moral beliefs led homeowners to forgo opportunities for efficient breach that firms would have seized, thus exacerbating al-ready swelling wealth inequalities. This Article explains this phenomenon, identifies its consequences and examines strategies to address it. Neither ex post judicial interventions (such as adjusting the remedies for breach) nor traditional ex ante regulatory interventions (such as disclosure requirements) will effectively address the problem. Instead, the most promising approach is a novel solution based on the framework of choice architecture: requiring contracts to include an express term creating an option to exit the contract and pay a fee equivalent to expectation damages. An express exit term elevates an implicit legal option into an explicit contractual option, reframing the moral choice so individuals would perceive exiting the contract as a morally permissible performance of their promise rather than a morally forbidden breaking of it. The presence of that exit term thereby aligns individuals’ perceptions of their moral obligations under the contract with sophisticated firms’ approaches to breach. The Article concludes with new empirical evidence that demonstrates the practical impact of an exit clause. It presents the results of two experimental studies I performed that demonstrate the effectiveness of a mandatory exit clause in reducing the effects of the asymmetry between individuals and firms. Those results show that exit clauses could have substantial practical implications for the regulation of contracts in contexts like consumer and mortgage contracts.

Defending Moral Judgment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Belief ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Substantial Influence ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Main Basis

Wide-ranging debunking arguments aim to support moral skepticism based on empirical evidence (particularly of evolutionary pressures, framing effects, automatic emotional heuristics, and incidental emotions). But such arguments are subject to a debunker’s dilemma: they can identify an influence on moral belief that is either substantial or defective, but not both. When one identifies a genuinely defective influence on a large class of moral beliefs (e.g. framing effects), this influence is insubstantial, failing to render the beliefs unjustified. When one identifies a main basis for belief (e.g. automatic heuristics), the influence is not roundly defective. There is ultimately a trade-off for sweeping debunking arguments in ethics: identifying a substantial influence on moral belief implicates a process that is not genuinely defective. We thus lack empirical reason to believe that moral judgment is fundamentally flawed. Our dual process minds can yield justified moral beliefs despite automatically valuing more than an action’s consequences.

Emotion in Imaginative Resistance

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dylan Campbell ◽  
William Kidder ◽  
Jason D'Cruz ◽  
Brendan Gaesser
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Negative Affect ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Trait Anxiety ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
High Severity ◽  
Imaginative Resistance ◽  
Emotional Harm

Imaginative resistance refers to cases in which one’s otherwise flexible imaginative capacity is constrained by an unwillingness or inability to imaginatively engage with a given claim. In three studies, we explored which imaginative demands engender resistance when imagining morally deviant worlds and whether individual differences in emotion predict the degree of this resistance. Participants read narratives containing either no harmful actions, harmful actions, or harmful actions with evaluative statements that the harms were morally justified, after which measures of moral judgment and imaginative resistance were assessed. In Study 1 (N = 176), participants resisted the notion that harmful actions could be morally acceptable regardless of the author’s claims about these actions but did not resist imagining that a perpetrator of harm could believe their actions to be morally acceptable. In Study 2 (N = 167) we replicated the findings of Study 1 and showed that imaginative resistance is greatest among participants who experience more negative affect in response to imagining harm and are lower in either trait anxiety or trait psychopathy. In Study 3 (N = 210) we show that this is the case even when the harms assessed include both low-severity (i.e., emotional harm) and high-severity (i.e., killing) cases. These findings suggest that people’s moral beliefs constrain their ability to imagine hypothetical moral alternatives, although this ability systematically varies on the basis of stable individual differences in emotion.

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