American Trade Policy and Conflict of Interests - Howard S. Piquet: The Trade Agreements Act and the National Interest. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1958. Pp. vi-61. $1.25.)

1959 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-732
Author(s):  
Q. L. Quade
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
National Interest ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Brookings Institution ◽  
Conflict Of Interests ◽  
American Trade

The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade

1997 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Bailey ◽  
Judith Goldstein ◽  
Barry R. Weingast
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Institutional Innovation ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Dramatic Reduction ◽  
American Trade

The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) changed the structure of the making of U.S. trade policy and made possible a dramatic reduction in tariffs. The authors demonstrate that the key institutional innovation in the RTAA was its mandate to lower tariffs through reciprocal agreements with foreign nations. The expansion of exports under the RTAA enhanced political support for increasingly lower U.S. tariffs. Evidence that export interests were positively associated with congressional votes for free trade supports this view.

Subsidies Regulation Beyond the WTO

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo Borlini
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Bilateral Agreements ◽  
Negative Function ◽  
Public Aid ◽  
The Eu

An increasingly important aspect of EU trade policy since the lifting of its self-imposed moratorium on preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has been the inclusion of WTO+ provisions on subsidies in bilateral agreements negotiated with a number of third countries. This article covers the main bilateral PTAs negotiated after the publication of the Commission’s Communication on ‘Global Europe’ in order to explore the implications of the different subsidy disciplines they set out. It also discusses the questions that arise when examining the legal discipline of public aid provided by such agreements, regarding not only the substantive appropriateness of standards and rules on compatibility, but also the procedural mechanisms designed to guarantee the implementation and the enforcement of such rules. It concludes that the most advanced among the EU PTAs are shaped as competition regulation and go beyond a mere negative function, ensuring that subsidies can contribute to fundamental public goals.

scholarly journals EU Trade Agreements and Non-Trade Policy Objectives

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Ferrari ◽  
Matteo Fiorini ◽  
Joseph Francois ◽  
Bernard Hoekman ◽  
Lisa Maria Lechner ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Policy Objectives

Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL J. HISCOX
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Political Conflict ◽  
Factor Mobility ◽  
Congressional Voting ◽  
The Past ◽  
Trade Politics ◽  
Over Time ◽  
American Trade ◽  
Trade Legislation

The extent to which political conflict over U.S. trade policy has led to clashes between broad-based class coalitions has varied significantly over time during the past two centuries. I argue that much of this variation can be explained by changes in economywide levels of interindustry factor mobility. Class distinctions between voters are more economically and politically salient when interindustry mobility is high; when mobility is low, industry distinctions become more critical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions. I report evidence indicating large changes in levels of labor and capital mobility over the last two centuries. These changes coincide with significant shifts in the character of American trade politics. Analysis of congressional voting on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 provides evidence of large swings in coalition patterns.

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